The Shock and Awe of Operation Epic Fury

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Betty Teh


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The Shock and Awe of Operation Epic Fury

By Betty Teh

The US led Operation Epic Fury, launched on February 28, 2026, alongside Israel's Operation Roaring Lion, has delivered a devastating blow to Iran's military and leadership infrastructure. In the initial 48 hours, over 2,000 targets were hit across 24 provinces, including nuclear sites, missile facilities, IRGC command centers, and naval assets, with nine Iranian ships sunk in the Gulf of Oman. The campaign, described by Pentagon officials as a "shock and awe" redux, employed B-2 bombers, Tomahawk missiles, and drones to decapitate the regime, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and key figures like Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh.

Casualties mount: Iran's Red Crescent reports 555 deaths, including 150 civilians from a school strike, while three U.S. service members have died in retaliatory attacks.

President Trump frames this as a righteous push to neutralize nuclear threats and liberate Iranians, urging them to seize power.

The message from Washington and Jerusalem was unmistakable: deterrence restored, threats degraded, escalation dominance achieved. But shock and awe campaigns are not only about destroying targets. They are about political outcomes.

And the central question now is not how many facilities were hit it is what kind of Iran emerges from the smoke.

Many Iranians long for change but fear war. Desire for change is not the same as endorsement of foreign military intervention.

History in the region has shown what externally driven regime collapse can look like: prolonged instability, factional struggle, and years of insecurity. For citizens who already live under surveillance and economic strain, war does not automatically translate into liberation. It can just as easily produce a harder security state under the justification of national emergency.

This is the paradox: internal pressure for reform is high, but foreign attack risks consolidating hardliners rather than dismantling them.

Any conversation about regime change inevitably circles back to the monarchy and to Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late Shah.

To some in the diaspora, the Shah’s era represents stability, secular governance, modernization, and close alignment with the West. Tehran in the 1970s was rapidly industrializing. Oil revenues were transforming infrastructure. Iran was positioning itself as a regional power.

But there was another side.

The turning point came in the 1970s when rapid modernization collided with political repression. The Shah centralized power, weakened political parties, and relied heavily on the SAVAK security apparatus to silence dissent. Economic growth was uneven, wealth concentration sharpened inequality, and cultural Westernization alienated religious and traditional sectors of society. What began as reform from above hardened into autocracy. By 1979, resentment coalesced across ideological lines: Islamists, leftists, nationalists producing a revolution that swept the monarchy away.

That historical memory has not disappeared. For many Iranians inside the country, the idea of returning to monarchical leadership especially one perceived as externally backed evokes caution. Some fear replacing clerical authoritarianism with a different form of centralized rule. Others question whether a figure who has spent decades abroad can authentically channel domestic aspirations.

Is Reza Pahlavi Waiting in the Wings?

Geopolitically, exile leadership models are not new. External powers sometimes position a recognizable opposition figure as a transitional face in the event of regime fracture. The question is whether such a figure has internal legitimacy.

Reza Pahlavi presents himself not as a king in waiting but as a facilitator of a democratic referendum. That framing is strategic. It distances him from automatic restoration and aligns him with self determination rhetoric.

But legitimacy cannot be air dropped to be honest.

Inside Iran, opposition movements are fragmented: students, labor activists, women’s rights groups, reformists, secular nationalists. There is no single unified command structure. If the Islamic Republic weakens significantly, the struggle may not be monarchy versus clerics. It could become a multi directional contest among security elites, reform factions, technocrats, and grassroots activists.

Boots on the Ground?

Regime change through bombardment alone is historically rare. Sustained transformation often requires either internal elite fracture or external stabilization forces. But boots on the ground in Iran would be an entirely different scale of conflict militarily, politically, and regionally.

Iran is not a small state; it has a large population, complex terrain, and entrenched institutions.
A foreign occupation scenario would likely trigger nationalist resistance across ideological divides. Even opponents of the regime might resist external control. That reality makes large scale intervention extraordinarily risky.

If there are no boots on the ground, then regime change depends primarily on internal collapse elite defections, military fragmentation, economic implosion, or mass uprising. And in that environment, outcomes become unpredictable.

Would Iran Be “Better” Under Reza?

That depends on three factors:

1. Legitimacy inside Iran: Does he command organic support beyond diaspora circles?

2. Institutional transition: Is there a roadmap for constitutional reform, or simply a power vacuum?

3. Perception of foreign sponsorship: If he is viewed as imposed by external powers, nationalist backlash could undermine him before reforms begin.

Iran’s future will not be decided solely by external strikes. It will be shaped by internal political culture, historical memory, and whether any new leadership can avoid repeating the Shah’s fatal mistake: modernization without pluralism, strength without participation.

The turning point now may not be military at all. It may be whether Iranians themselves define the next chapter or whether it is defined for them.

Shock and awe can destroy infrastructure in hours.
Political legitimacy takes generations to build.