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Thank goodness for that otherwise we’d never have been able to guess!!
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Wednesday, August 12, 2026
Trump Adds to Long History of US Abuse of Cuba
Consortium News
Volume 31, Number 216— Monday, August 10, 2026
Trump Adds to Long History of US Abuse of Cuba
For over a century, U.S. officials have regarded Cuba as a plantation to exploit, rival to defeat, or dissenting voice to silence, never shedding their colonial outlook, writes Jonathan Ng
U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth aboard a ship on Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 2025. (U.S. Secretary of Defense/Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain)
By Jonathan Ng
Truthout
In recent months, President Donald Trump’s blockade against Cuba has generated blackouts and hunger, stretching society to its breaking point.
Exploiting the crisis, Cuban American reactionaries across Florida are pressing for regime change.
Decked in MAGA swag, they frequently gather along the palm tree-lined streets of Miami to excoriate socialism, promote escalation, and sport signs declaring “Make Cuba Great Again.”
Since the war against Iran began, their demand has been simple: “Cuba next.”
While lobbying for intervention, community leaders have drafted detailed agreements for dividing the political spoils and implanting unfettered capitalism on the island. From GuantΓ‘namo Bay, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently primed activists’ expectations by declaring that Trump is “taking back our hemisphere,” insinuating the imminent use of force.
Cuban-American conservatives and U.S. officials claim to champion Cuban democracy. Yet the intensified sanctions and pro-war demonstrations lay bare the violence of U.S. policy, while revealing a horrific tolerance for human suffering.
Far from defending Cuban sovereignty, Washington and its reactionary allies have long attempted to thwart the island’s aspirations for self-determination.
For over a century, U.S. officials have regarded Cuba as a plantation to exploit, rival to defeat, or a dissenting voice to silence, never shedding their colonial outlook. The current crisis mirrors this troubled history, as policymakers and right-wing extremists revive siege warfare in the Caribbean.
The Blood-Stained Facade
Exploiting the crisis, Cuban American reactionaries across Florida are pressing for regime change.
Decked in MAGA swag, they frequently gather along the palm tree-lined streets of Miami to excoriate socialism, promote escalation, and sport signs declaring “Make Cuba Great Again.”
Since the war against Iran began, their demand has been simple: “Cuba next.”
While lobbying for intervention, community leaders have drafted detailed agreements for dividing the political spoils and implanting unfettered capitalism on the island. From GuantΓ‘namo Bay, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently primed activists’ expectations by declaring that Trump is “taking back our hemisphere,” insinuating the imminent use of force.
Cuban-American conservatives and U.S. officials claim to champion Cuban democracy. Yet the intensified sanctions and pro-war demonstrations lay bare the violence of U.S. policy, while revealing a horrific tolerance for human suffering.
Far from defending Cuban sovereignty, Washington and its reactionary allies have long attempted to thwart the island’s aspirations for self-determination.
For over a century, U.S. officials have regarded Cuba as a plantation to exploit, rival to defeat, or a dissenting voice to silence, never shedding their colonial outlook. The current crisis mirrors this troubled history, as policymakers and right-wing extremists revive siege warfare in the Caribbean.
The Blood-Stained Facade
1898 political cartoon: “Ten thousand miles from tip to tip.” referring to the expansion of American domination, symbolized by a bald eagle, from Puerto Rico to the Philippines following the Spanish–American War; the cartoon contrasts this with a map showing the significantly smaller size of the United States in 1798, exactly 100 years earlier. (Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain)
The latest string of U.S. sanctions and promises to liberate the island resound with bitter irony. In 1898, Washington justified intervening in Cuba’s war for independence against Spain by citing mass starvation among civilians. Leading the charge, Sen. George Hoar declared that Madrid “deliberately [plotted] to starve them to death.”
After invading, President William McKinley proclaimed Cuba’s liberation, yet refused to cede power to local revolutionaries, excluding them from negotiations with Spain.
Instead, his administration turned the island into a U.S. protectorate, while claiming that its large population of color made self-rule dangerous. Echoing this sentiment, The New York Times warned against “an irresponsible government of half-breeds,” and The San Antonio Express argued that foreign control was necessary to “save the Cubans from themselves.”
For four years, U.S. military authorities attempted to disenfranchise Black citizens, established the Rural Guard to squash dissent, and oversaw a land grab by foreign businessmen, who displaced thousands of farmers.
In 1901, Washington linked independence to acceptance of the Platt Amendment, which granted the United States “the right to intervene” to protect strategic interests.
Sen. Orville Platt argued that it was essential for stability, since local politicians were as “irresponsible as children.” The statute allowed U.S. officials to establish a naval base in GuantΓ‘namo Bay, before again invading the island in 1906, 1912 and 1917.
Platt in 1902. (George Prince /Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain)
U.S. leaders mocked Cuba’s sovereignty. Deploying U.S. soldiers in 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt derided “that infernal little Cuban Republic,” claiming that he wanted to “wipe its people off the face of the earth.”
In large part, tensions remained high because of economic exploitation. Following the War of 1898, U.S. businessmen manipulated the widespread destruction of legal records to seize Cuban land.
Between 1905 and 1911, the number of farms in GuantΓ‘namo alone fell from 1,154 to 419, as foreign investors consolidated massive sugar plantations.
The sociologist Lowry Nelson observed that property disputes were “one-sided affairs,” since U.S. corporations employed high-powered lawyers and “corrupt[ed] the officials … with bribes.” Poverty spread across the island, and male unemployment rates surpassed 20 percent by 1907.
Popular outrage finally exploded in 1912, when the Independent Party of Color organized mass protests against racial and economic exclusion. In response, Secretary of State Philander Knox pressured Cuban officials to stifle the uprising by threatening another invasion.
Leaders of the Partido Independiente de Color or Independent Party of Color, undated. (Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain)
Historian Louis PΓ©rez, Jr. emphasizes that U.S. Marines blitzed from the local naval base to protect U.S. property, freeing Cuban soldiers to undertake a cruel campaign of repression. “They have lopped off the heads of probably some six thousand negroes in this province,” a U.S. citizen in GuantΓ‘namo claimed. One Afro-Cuban resident recalled that soldiers “killed everything that was Black” and set fire to piles of bodies.
The massacre of 1912 not only showcased the racist fury of Cuba’s ruling class. It also revealed the persistence of colonial control, as the threat of further U.S. intervention supercharged the violence.
For decades, Washington portrayed such policies as a form of benign paternalism that guaranteed Cuba’s sovereignty.
Yet the Platt Amendment’s shadow encouraged Cuban leaders to prioritize the rights of foreign investors over demands for social justice, prompting former U.S. Ambassador Sumner Welles to conclude in 1934 that Cuba’s government was “merely a facade” for “American interests.”
Unwanted Guests
Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista with U.S. Army Chief of Staff Malin Craig in Washington, D.C., on Armistice Day 1938. (Harris & Ewing via Library of Congress/Wikimedia Commons/ Public Domain)
Before the Cuban Revolution, U.S. businessmen oversaw the island’s economy, while backing President Fulgencio Batista, who tortured dissidents and received suitcases of bribes each week.
Historian Van Gosse explains that Batista cemented Havana’s status as a hotbed of vice and colonial desire, where tourists like future President John F. Kennedy drank, gambled and pursued women in segregated luxury. Overseeing a tropical tax haven, Cuban authorities allowed U.S. investors to remit profits, while controlling entire industrial sectors and 40 percent of sugar fields.
In 1956, Fidel Castro returned from exile to lead a popular uprising that aimed to dismantle the semi-colonial order.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower mobilized to help Batista quell the insurrection. A C.I.A. officer recalled that agents “penetrated all institutions” of Cuban life, and U.S. diplomats pursued “all means short of outright intervention” to block Castro from power.
While providing military aid, the Pentagon also allowed Batista to launch air strikes from its GuantΓ‘namo naval base, razing hamlets with B-26 bombers. In a theatrical twist, rebels then seized U.S. Marines as hostages, forcing Eisenhower to downgrade cooperation.
After their victory in 1959, revolutionaries strove to overcome the legacy of colonialism, successfully eliminating malnutrition and racial segregation. Rebel leader RaΓΊl Castro announced that Cubans had finally “finish[ed] the War of Independence.”
April 1959: Special Agent Leo Crampsey of Office of Security, on left, escorts Cuba’s new premier, Fidel Castro, center, during a visit to Washington, D.C., shortly after the January revolution in Cuba. (U.S. Department of State)
Yet again, Washington conspired to stifle the revolution, fearing that it would undercut U.S. imperial authority and inspire leftists worldwide.
In 1960, the State Department contemplated “every possible means” to “weaken the economic life of Cuba,” paving the way for a decades-long blockade. U.S. authorities even impounded Fidel Castro’s airplane, when he visited the United Nations that year.
While tensions grew, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles lamented the Kennedy administration’s “lack of moral integrity,” as officials sponsored assassination plots and terrorist attacks against Cuba. Asked about invasion plans, presidential advisor Adolf Berle exclaimed, “Let ’er rip.”
After the U.S.-backed incursion failed, Castro stationed Soviet missiles on the island in self-defense. Furious, Kennedy risked nuclear war to remove them. Revealingly, he worried that the missiles made Cubans “look like they’re coequal with us.”
More than anything, the U.S. government’s refusal to leave GuantΓ‘namo illustrated its colonial mindset. For decades, policymakers exploited the enclave to promote subversion.
Island scholars claim that the base became “an important footbridge” for counterrevolutionaries.
One Cuban-American operative recalled that he simply “jumped the fence,” after the Bay of Pigs invasion failed. Repeatedly, U.S. soldiers shot Cuba’s sentries, killed local civilians, and hurled stones and insults. In 1964 alone, the revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara reported 1,323 provocations at the border, including “acts of sexual exhibitionism.”
Before the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, U.S. officials portrayed Cuba as an unrestrained aggressor. But the truth was the reverse: U.S. policymakers opposed the revolution because it targeted the legacy of the Platt Amendment and crushing exploitation.
Colonizing the Opposition
Ladies in White demonstration in Havana, April 2012. (Hvd69 / Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 3.0)
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the State Department revamped the blockade and stimulated Cuban dissent, hoping to erase what remained of global socialism. Between 1996 and 2011, authorities allocated $205 million for regime change on the island.
In particular, Washington financed media outlets to stir discontent and orient government critics. The National Endowment for Democracy, USAID, and other institutions funded dissident newspapers such as CubaNet, ADN Cuba, El Estornudo, El Toque and Diario de Cuba.
In 2010, policymakers also debuted the social media platform, ZunZuneo, to organize “smart mobs,” and later, spread anti-government hashtags in a failed “Bay of Tweets” in 2021.
A former senior U.S. intelligence analyst, Fulton Armstrong, stressed that the policy put Cuba in an impossible bind: “We win if the opposition media gain a foothold, and we win if they provoke government repression,” which would further legitimize U.S.-backed dissent.
This cynical logic equally applied to support for human rights activists. Most notably, Washington helped turn the Ladies in White into international icons of resistance. Cuban women established the group in 2003 after authorities imprisoned their relatives, who allegedly received U.S. financing for political subversion. Ironically, the Ladies then used foreign funds to promote the release of “political prisoners” and intensifying economic sanctions.
Leaked cables reveal that U.S. diplomats often collaborated with the group, while requesting covert financial aid from Washington. Chief of Mission Michael Parmly reported that he met with “[l]eading members” to coordinate tactics. At one session, co-founder Berta Soler lamented the challenge of smuggling money “from a private organization in the United States.”
U.S. officials also cultivated charismatic opposition leaders such as Oswaldo PayΓ‘, who became the leading anti-government critic in Cuba. In 2012, PayΓ‘ died in a car accident. The driver, Γngel Carromero, was a far-right activist from Spain illegally funneling cash to him.
Notorious for speeding, Charmer had received 42 traffic tickets from the Spanish government. Nonetheless, Washington and the PayΓ‘ family claimed that Cuban authorities assassinated Oswaldo by forcing his car off the road.
Relying on Carromero’s testimony, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights blamed Cuba for the crash in 2023, while U.S. leaders venerated the deceased activist as a martyr. Afterward, the Trump administration strong-armed members of the Organization of American States into placing Oswaldo’s daughter, Rosa MarΓa PayΓ‘, onto the commission.
Human rights experts feared “conflicts of interest,” since her anti-government activism would tarnish the body’s “appearance of independence.” In response, the State Department secured her nomination by threatening aid cuts to states that opposed it.
PayΓ‘ now exploits the position and her U.S.-sponsored nonprofit organization to promote regime change against progressive governments across the hemisphere, citing the violent 2019 coup in Bolivia as a model.
In short, U.S. officials have fostered political division in Cuba for decades. Rather than strengthen democracy, they chose to colonize the opposition.
In turn, prominent government critics pursued counter-revolution over reform, as they competed for foreign support. Projecting an imperial forcefield, U.S. power remained discreet yet suffocating. Policymakers were too weak to uproot socialism, but strong enough to keep Cuba frozen in an unending Cold War.
The Politics of Hunger
President Donald Trump signing an order to reimpose some sanctions on Cuba, June 16, 2017.(White House, Shealah Craighead)
Since 2017, the United States has drastically tightened the blockade against Cuba, asserting extraterritorial sovereignty over the island. Both Republicans and Democrats backed sanctions to court the votes of Cuban Americans in Florida, as many drifted into the MAGA camp. Celebrating this shift, the Ladies in White dubbed Trump the “Achilles heel” of socialism.
A high-tech form of siege warfare, the blockade prevents Cuba from accessing financial markets, oil, agricultural supplies and more. During the Covid-19 pandemic, U.S. officials literally tried to asphyxiate the island, blocking the export of oxygen and ventilators.
Since 1992, the United Nations General Assembly has passed 33 resolutions denouncing the blockade, which it says inflicts incalculable losses running into the trillions of dollars.
This year, Trump justified escalating sanctions by citing the Monroe Doctrine, which U.S. leaders invoked to invade Cuba in 1898. Ironically, he portrayed Cuban socialism as undemocratic, while interfering in elections in Argentina, Honduras and Colombia to advance the far-right realignment of the region.
He also pardoned the former Honduran president, Juan Orlando HernΓ‘ndez, for cocaine trafficking, so he could help isolate Cuba and other leftist governments. In leaked audio files, HernΓ‘ndez and his colleagues boast about plans to “eradicate the cancer of the left,” as well as a “new North American base” in Honduras “for conflicts… [with] Cuba.”
More than anyone, Cuban-American extremists propel the latest wave of aggression. Despite espousing democracy, their leaders exemplify the strident conservatism and vulgar corruption of the Batista dictatorship, while pushing Cuba toward humanitarian collapse.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s main political backers, the Fanjul brothers, run a sugar plantation that employs forced labor in the Dominican Republic. Likewise, Trump’s principal adviser on Cuba, Mauricio Claver-Carone, is notorious for sexual and financial misconduct.
More broadly, the Cuban American National Foundation, Cuban Democratic Directorate, and other pillars of the Cuban American lobby have misused federal funds, violently assaulted critics, or organized terrorist attacks against the island.
Leveraging her human rights credentials, PayΓ‘ now leads Pasos de Cambio, a coalition of counter-revolutionary groups, and has signed a “Liberation Agreement” advocating regime change.
Island residents call the blockade “genocide,” reporting skyrocketing infant mortality rates and starvation.
By contrast, PayΓ‘’s colleague Orlando GutiΓ©rrez-Boronat of the Assembly of the Cuban Resistance dubs it “a great achievement by Cuban exiles,” claiming that it grants them the legitimacy to govern Cuba.
Pandering to supporters, Trump recently celebrated the 1898 invasion, before implying that a new era of colonialism has begun: “Cuba … is coming our way.” Afterward, PayΓ‘ praised the president, recognizing “the historical parallels” and insisting his government is “the best ally of the Cuban people.”
As war drums sound, Rubio demands that U.N. members “refrain from delivering any remarks” critical of U.S. policy or face retaliation.
The Pentagon is considering plans for an aerial invasion of Cuba. And U.S. legislators who visited the island this July warn that sanctions are turning it into a “silent Gaza,” systematically strangling Cuban society.
Ultimately, Cuba’s humanitarian crisis is the latest episode in a 128-year struggle for control over the island. The Platt Amendment and Monroe Doctrine have morphed into the “Donroe Doctrine,” making unprovoked aggression a strategic principle.
Legally speaking, the blockade is colonialism in all but name: an extraterritorial assertion of sovereignty that aims to starve Cubans, capsize their economy and bring them to their knees while Cuba continues its resistance.
Jonathan Ng is a postdoctoral fellow at the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College.
This article is from Truthout.
This article is from Truthout.
OPINION | The Daughter Is Leaving But Who Is Really Abandoning PKR?
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OPINION | The Daughter Is Leaving But Who Is Really Abandoning PKR?
12 Aug 2026 • 4:00 PM MYT
Nurul Izzah Anwar, Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad symbolically walking away from PKR, reflecting questions over the party’s internal direction and future. Image generated with Google Gemini AI for illustrative purposes as a visual reference for this article, based on a prompt by Annan Vaithegi.
There is something far more revealing about the Nurul Izzah Anwar resignation episode than the immediate debate over whether she is stepping down, taking leave, pursuing further studies, or simply stepping away temporarily from the political frontline. The real issue is not merely why the daughter of Prime Minister and PKR president Anwar Ibrahim is leaving the party’s second-highest position; it is why so many Malaysians have instinctively refused to accept the official explanation as the full story. That reaction should concern PKR far more than the resignation itself, because it exposes a credibility gap that no press statement, political reassurance, or carefully worded clarification can easily close.
Amirudin Shari may dismiss the speculation surrounding Nurul Izzah’s decision, and Anwar may insist that she has “strong reasons” for taking leave, while Nurul herself has reiterated her intention to step down. All of that may be entirely legitimate. Nurul has every right to make personal decisions about her political future without having every private motive dissected in public. Yet politicians cannot expect Malaysians to stop asking questions simply because an official explanation has been issued. The public has heard too many explanations from too many political parties over the decades, and what matters now is not whether one particular theory circulating on social media is true, but why public confidence has fallen to the point where almost every explanation is immediately met with suspicion.
That is the deeper crisis facing PKR.
The comments surrounding Nurul Izzah’s departure are certainly emotional, and some are unnecessarily personal, harsh, or speculative, and should not be treated as fact. But beneath the noise is a consistent question that PKR cannot simply dismiss: if Nurul Izzah genuinely intended to pursue other commitments or further studies, why did she contest the deputy presidency against Rafizi Ramli in the first place?
That question persists because it goes directly to the political credibility of the entire episode. Nurul did not accidentally find herself in the position. She contested the second-highest post in PKR, defeated Rafizi, and became one of the central figures in the party’s leadership structure. Now, not long after, she is stepping away from that same position. Naturally, members and voters are asking what changed, whether the original decision was fully hers, and whether the party fully understood the implications of placing her at the centre of an already sensitive internal contest.
Public commentary repeatedly returns to this contradiction. Some argue she should not have challenged Rafizi if she was not prepared for the responsibilities of the role. Others suggest she was caught between internal power dynamics involving Anwar and Rafizi. Still others defend her right to make personal decisions without political interrogation. The disagreement itself is telling, because it shows Malaysians are not united in condemning Nurul Izzah; rather, they are increasingly united in questioning PKR’s internal direction.
And that brings us back to Reformasi.
PKR was built on the promise that Malaysian politics could be reformed: that institutions could be strengthened, corruption confronted, and political parties made more democratic and accountable. For many Malaysians, Anwar’s long political struggle was never just about one man reaching the premiership; it represented a broader hope that Malaysia could move beyond patronage, personality-driven politics, and entrenched political entitlement.
But after more than two decades, the question facing PKR is simple and uncomfortable: what happens when a movement that once challenged power becomes part of the establishment?
PKR is no longer an opposition party. Anwar is prime minister, PKR holds key positions in government, and the party now has direct access to executive power. The expectations of voters have changed accordingly. When PKR was in opposition, it could promise reform. Now it must demonstrate results.
This is why repeated references to “struggle” increasingly sound disconnected from public sentiment. When PKR secretary-general Fuziah Salleh reflected on the party’s 23-year journey and said the quest for a better Malaysia remains unfinished, many responded with a simple question: unfinished in what way?
This is not necessarily a rejection of Reformasi history. Many within PKR genuinely sacrificed under difficult conditions, and that history should not be dismissed. But history cannot substitute for performance, and nostalgia cannot function as a permanent political strategy.
Malaysians now want clarity on outcomes. They want stronger institutions, consistent anti-corruption enforcement, credible governance, economic opportunity, and political accountability. They want to know whether the principles PKR once demanded from others are now being applied by PKR itself. They want to know whether internal dissent is tolerated, whether competence outweighs loyalty, and whether the party is genuinely developing new leadership or simply preserving existing power structures.
Many of the public comments reflect this frustration, arguing that Pakatan Harapan’s decline in support is not simply due to misunderstanding, but due to perceived broken promises, inconsistent delivery, and the weakening of strong internal voices such as Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi.
This is where Rafizi’s absence becomes politically significant.
Whether one agrees with Rafizi or not is secondary. A healthy political party requires internal competition, policy debate, and leaders who can challenge authority without being treated as adversaries. Rafizi represented one of PKR’s strongest internal counterweights, and his departure has left a vacuum that has not been convincingly filled.
When strong figures leave a party, the danger is not just the loss of individuals. The deeper risk is the erosion of internal balance. Without competing voices, leadership becomes more insulated, debate weakens, and loyalty can begin to outweigh competence. This is how political parties gradually begin to resemble the establishments they once opposed.
This is also why Nurul Izzah’s situation has become larger than Nurul herself.
She is Anwar’s daughter, and that fact does not automatically disqualify her or invalidate her political role. But politics does not operate in a vacuum. When the daughter of a party president contests the deputy presidency against a major internal rival, and that rival subsequently leaves the party, public questions about influence and succession are inevitable. This does not prove wrongdoing, but it explains why perception has become unavoidable.
The situation becomes more complicated when leadership transitions are followed by further questions about appointments and internal consolidation. Some view Saifuddin Nasution’s elevation as strengthening party stability, while others see it as reinforcing centralised control. Again, perception is not proof, but perception is politically powerful.
A party that defines itself as a reform movement must be especially sensitive to how its internal decisions appear externally. If voters begin to believe that internal competition is being replaced by loyalty, PKR risks a credibility problem that extends far beyond any single resignation.
Rodziah Ismail’s reminder that the deputy presidency is “no child’s play” underscores this seriousness. A party that demands public trust in its reform agenda must also demonstrate seriousness in its internal democracy.
The electoral record adds further pressure. Public commentary frequently references setbacks in Sabah, Johor, and Negeri Sembilan, with voters questioning whether the party is learning from these results or rationalising them away. Elections are the clearest feedback mechanism in a democracy. A party can dismiss criticism, but it cannot dismiss electoral outcomes indefinitely.
Losing elections does not mean a party is finished. But failing to understand why it is losing is far more dangerous.
This is why the Nurul Izzah episode should be seen as a warning rather than just another internal dispute. PKR may survive her resignation and may even recover politically. But it cannot sustain itself if it continues to rely on historical narrative while neglecting present-day trust.
The most difficult question is not about Nurul Izzah’s personal decision. It is whether PKR has become too dependent on Anwar Ibrahim to imagine a future beyond him.
That is a succession problem no press conference can resolve.
Anwar’s rise from opposition leader to prime minister is historic, but his personal journey cannot remain the entire identity of PKR. Reformasi was meant to be larger than one individual. If the party has not built a credible leadership pipeline after decades of struggle, then the contradiction is unavoidable.
Nurul Izzah’s resignation therefore matters less as a personal story and more as a reflection of PKR’s internal condition.
It reveals a party struggling to reconcile its past with its present, its reformist ideals with the realities of governance, and its promise of internal democracy with the growing centrality of its leadership structure. It reveals a party that still speaks of struggle while voters increasingly demand delivery, and it explains why public reactions are so sharp whenever internal crises emerge.
PKR is not collapsing, despite the most extreme criticisms. It remains a major political force with national reach, experienced leaders, and a long political legacy. But it is clearly facing a credibility reckoning, and ignoring that reality would be its greatest mistake.
The rakyat are no longer asking Anwar to recount his struggle.
They are asking what he intends to leave behind.
They are no longer asking PKR to remind them of its past sacrifices.
They are asking what it has achieved in power.
And they are no longer willing to accept that every internal crisis is simply a misunderstanding.
Because when a party loses Rafizi, sees strong voices depart, faces electoral setbacks, encounters succession questions, and watches its deputy president step away, the issue is no longer one individual.
The issue is reflection.
For more than two decades, PKR asked Malaysians to scrutinise those in power.
Now, the mirror has turned.
And PKR must finally look at itself.
“Reform is not what we once demanded of others, but what we must now demand of ourselves.” - Annan Vaithegi
Amirudin Shari may dismiss the speculation surrounding Nurul Izzah’s decision, and Anwar may insist that she has “strong reasons” for taking leave, while Nurul herself has reiterated her intention to step down. All of that may be entirely legitimate. Nurul has every right to make personal decisions about her political future without having every private motive dissected in public. Yet politicians cannot expect Malaysians to stop asking questions simply because an official explanation has been issued. The public has heard too many explanations from too many political parties over the decades, and what matters now is not whether one particular theory circulating on social media is true, but why public confidence has fallen to the point where almost every explanation is immediately met with suspicion.
That is the deeper crisis facing PKR.
The comments surrounding Nurul Izzah’s departure are certainly emotional, and some are unnecessarily personal, harsh, or speculative, and should not be treated as fact. But beneath the noise is a consistent question that PKR cannot simply dismiss: if Nurul Izzah genuinely intended to pursue other commitments or further studies, why did she contest the deputy presidency against Rafizi Ramli in the first place?
That question persists because it goes directly to the political credibility of the entire episode. Nurul did not accidentally find herself in the position. She contested the second-highest post in PKR, defeated Rafizi, and became one of the central figures in the party’s leadership structure. Now, not long after, she is stepping away from that same position. Naturally, members and voters are asking what changed, whether the original decision was fully hers, and whether the party fully understood the implications of placing her at the centre of an already sensitive internal contest.
Public commentary repeatedly returns to this contradiction. Some argue she should not have challenged Rafizi if she was not prepared for the responsibilities of the role. Others suggest she was caught between internal power dynamics involving Anwar and Rafizi. Still others defend her right to make personal decisions without political interrogation. The disagreement itself is telling, because it shows Malaysians are not united in condemning Nurul Izzah; rather, they are increasingly united in questioning PKR’s internal direction.
And that brings us back to Reformasi.
PKR was built on the promise that Malaysian politics could be reformed: that institutions could be strengthened, corruption confronted, and political parties made more democratic and accountable. For many Malaysians, Anwar’s long political struggle was never just about one man reaching the premiership; it represented a broader hope that Malaysia could move beyond patronage, personality-driven politics, and entrenched political entitlement.
But after more than two decades, the question facing PKR is simple and uncomfortable: what happens when a movement that once challenged power becomes part of the establishment?
PKR is no longer an opposition party. Anwar is prime minister, PKR holds key positions in government, and the party now has direct access to executive power. The expectations of voters have changed accordingly. When PKR was in opposition, it could promise reform. Now it must demonstrate results.
This is why repeated references to “struggle” increasingly sound disconnected from public sentiment. When PKR secretary-general Fuziah Salleh reflected on the party’s 23-year journey and said the quest for a better Malaysia remains unfinished, many responded with a simple question: unfinished in what way?
This is not necessarily a rejection of Reformasi history. Many within PKR genuinely sacrificed under difficult conditions, and that history should not be dismissed. But history cannot substitute for performance, and nostalgia cannot function as a permanent political strategy.
Malaysians now want clarity on outcomes. They want stronger institutions, consistent anti-corruption enforcement, credible governance, economic opportunity, and political accountability. They want to know whether the principles PKR once demanded from others are now being applied by PKR itself. They want to know whether internal dissent is tolerated, whether competence outweighs loyalty, and whether the party is genuinely developing new leadership or simply preserving existing power structures.
Many of the public comments reflect this frustration, arguing that Pakatan Harapan’s decline in support is not simply due to misunderstanding, but due to perceived broken promises, inconsistent delivery, and the weakening of strong internal voices such as Rafizi Ramli and Nik Nazmi.
This is where Rafizi’s absence becomes politically significant.
Whether one agrees with Rafizi or not is secondary. A healthy political party requires internal competition, policy debate, and leaders who can challenge authority without being treated as adversaries. Rafizi represented one of PKR’s strongest internal counterweights, and his departure has left a vacuum that has not been convincingly filled.
When strong figures leave a party, the danger is not just the loss of individuals. The deeper risk is the erosion of internal balance. Without competing voices, leadership becomes more insulated, debate weakens, and loyalty can begin to outweigh competence. This is how political parties gradually begin to resemble the establishments they once opposed.
This is also why Nurul Izzah’s situation has become larger than Nurul herself.
She is Anwar’s daughter, and that fact does not automatically disqualify her or invalidate her political role. But politics does not operate in a vacuum. When the daughter of a party president contests the deputy presidency against a major internal rival, and that rival subsequently leaves the party, public questions about influence and succession are inevitable. This does not prove wrongdoing, but it explains why perception has become unavoidable.
The situation becomes more complicated when leadership transitions are followed by further questions about appointments and internal consolidation. Some view Saifuddin Nasution’s elevation as strengthening party stability, while others see it as reinforcing centralised control. Again, perception is not proof, but perception is politically powerful.
A party that defines itself as a reform movement must be especially sensitive to how its internal decisions appear externally. If voters begin to believe that internal competition is being replaced by loyalty, PKR risks a credibility problem that extends far beyond any single resignation.
Rodziah Ismail’s reminder that the deputy presidency is “no child’s play” underscores this seriousness. A party that demands public trust in its reform agenda must also demonstrate seriousness in its internal democracy.
The electoral record adds further pressure. Public commentary frequently references setbacks in Sabah, Johor, and Negeri Sembilan, with voters questioning whether the party is learning from these results or rationalising them away. Elections are the clearest feedback mechanism in a democracy. A party can dismiss criticism, but it cannot dismiss electoral outcomes indefinitely.
Losing elections does not mean a party is finished. But failing to understand why it is losing is far more dangerous.
This is why the Nurul Izzah episode should be seen as a warning rather than just another internal dispute. PKR may survive her resignation and may even recover politically. But it cannot sustain itself if it continues to rely on historical narrative while neglecting present-day trust.
The most difficult question is not about Nurul Izzah’s personal decision. It is whether PKR has become too dependent on Anwar Ibrahim to imagine a future beyond him.
That is a succession problem no press conference can resolve.
Anwar’s rise from opposition leader to prime minister is historic, but his personal journey cannot remain the entire identity of PKR. Reformasi was meant to be larger than one individual. If the party has not built a credible leadership pipeline after decades of struggle, then the contradiction is unavoidable.
Nurul Izzah’s resignation therefore matters less as a personal story and more as a reflection of PKR’s internal condition.
It reveals a party struggling to reconcile its past with its present, its reformist ideals with the realities of governance, and its promise of internal democracy with the growing centrality of its leadership structure. It reveals a party that still speaks of struggle while voters increasingly demand delivery, and it explains why public reactions are so sharp whenever internal crises emerge.
PKR is not collapsing, despite the most extreme criticisms. It remains a major political force with national reach, experienced leaders, and a long political legacy. But it is clearly facing a credibility reckoning, and ignoring that reality would be its greatest mistake.
The rakyat are no longer asking Anwar to recount his struggle.
They are asking what he intends to leave behind.
They are no longer asking PKR to remind them of its past sacrifices.
They are asking what it has achieved in power.
And they are no longer willing to accept that every internal crisis is simply a misunderstanding.
Because when a party loses Rafizi, sees strong voices depart, faces electoral setbacks, encounters succession questions, and watches its deputy president step away, the issue is no longer one individual.
The issue is reflection.
For more than two decades, PKR asked Malaysians to scrutinise those in power.
Now, the mirror has turned.
And PKR must finally look at itself.
“Reform is not what we once demanded of others, but what we must now demand of ourselves.” - Annan Vaithegi
LHDN’s uneven hand: Tough on MSMEs, soft on the shadows
Murray Hunter
LHDN’s uneven hand: Tough on MSMEs, soft on the shadows
Under the Insolvency Act 1967, individual bankruptcies reached 6,776 new cases in 2025, up from 5,977 the previous year, bringing the cumulative total close to 100,000.
Murray Hunter
Aug 12, 2026
MALAYSIA’S Inland Revenue Board (LHDN) has earned a reputation for rigorous enforcement against micro, small and medium enterprises.
When MSMEs fall behind on tax liabilities, even sums under RM500,000, the department often pursues them to the fullest extent of the law, culminating in prosecutions that can trigger personal bankruptcy for owners or winding-up for companies.
This approach extracts revenue from the visible, relatively compliant segment of the economy while larger and more opaque players appear to operate with greater latitude.
Bankruptcy and insolvency data illustrate the human and economic cost.
Under the Insolvency Act 1967, individual bankruptcies reached 6,776 new cases in 2025, up from 5,977 the previous year, bringing the cumulative total close to 100,000.
Business-related causes form a meaningful share.
Roughly 1,121 cases linked to business loans and more than 1,300 involving entrepreneurs or merchants.
Company liquidations provide a closer proxy for formal SMEs.
Forced winding-ups registered about 1,739 cases in 2025, with voluntary proceedings adding another 781.
Since 2018, the combined figure has exceeded 20,000. The Companies Commission of Malaysia recorded 3,277 companies with winding-up status in 2024.
Department of Statistics Malaysia figures show 28,924 enterprise deaths in 2024 alone.
Given that MSMEs constitute approximately 96 per cent of all Malaysian businesses, the overwhelming majority of these closures involve smaller operators.
These outcomes remove entrepreneurs from the productive economy at a time when Malaysia needs innovation and risk-taking.
Bankruptcy carries a lasting stigma that restricts access to credit, contracts and fresh starts.
History shows that second chances can yield extraordinary results: Walt Disney’s first studio collapsed into bankruptcy before he built a global entertainment empire; Henry Ford’s early automobile venture failed before the assembly-line revolution; Milton Hershey and H.J. Heinz both recovered from early business failures to create enduring consumer brands.
Even modern figures such as William C. Durant, a key architect of General Motors, experienced personal bankruptcy yet left a lasting industrial legacy.
Malaysian tax enforcement rarely affords comparable room for recovery.
Meanwhile, activities that generate substantial untaxed income face far less consistent pressure.
Loan-shark operations frequently remain outside the formal tax net, sometimes using subsidiary businesses that facilitate money laundering.
A certain international group structure local subsidiaries as cost centres, while shifting revenue offshore at the point of sale.
Large domestic corporations, advised by sophisticated legal teams, deploy complex arrangements that minimise taxable income.
The result is a system that appears equitable on paper yet uneven in practice: the easily identifiable MSME is pursued, while more elusive or better-resourced actors exploit gaps.
This imbalance carries macroeconomic consequences.
When promising small businesses are driven into insolvency, capital, skills and entrepreneurial energy exit the formal economy.
The tax base itself is narrowed as potential future contributors are sidelined.
True equity would require consistent enforcement across the spectrum with proportionate treatment of MSMEs alongside determined action against illicit and highly engineered avoidance. Until then, the perception that LHDN takes the path of least resistance risks discouraging the very innovators Malaysia needs most. – August 12, 2026
Germans and Ukrainians Call for Russian Genocide While Trump Signals Putin Partnership
Germans and Ukrainians Call for Russian Genocide While Trump Signals Putin Partnership
At a joint press conference in Belgrade, a German journalist asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky what Europeans could concretely do to help him kill more Russians, clarifying later that he meant Russian soldiers.
Zelensky responded by calling for additional money, weapons, and tougher sanctions on Moscow. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, who appeared taken aback, said the two leaders had not discussed military cooperation and expressed hope that all killing would end.
Separately, President Trump announced that former U.S. Marine Robert Gilman is being released from Russian imprisonment after being detained since 2022.
The release is occurring on humanitarian grounds following Trump’s discussions with Russian President Vladimir Putin; Russia requested nothing in return and no prisoner exchange took place.
Burning Bright: Okay, so there's a few things to run down, here.
First off, the original inspiration for the take came from a recent press conference in Belgrade, Serbia on August 8, wherein a German reporter directly asked Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and I quote:
"What can we [Europeans] concretely do to help you kill more Russians."
Don't believe me?
Aleksandar VuΔiΔ, President of Serbia didn't either.
To his further credit, VuΔiΔ said the following in response to the ghastly question:
“We did not discuss military cooperation today. What happens when the war ends is another matter. And speaking about killing, I hope all killing will end."
Now, obviously this is not just escalatory rhetoric, the sort that's been raging for four years, ever since Russia launched its Special Military Operation into Ukraine (ie: the Russian part of Ukraine, which includes the entire part they 'invaded,') and certainly, as I've been reporting the entire time, the NATO bloc and the European Collectorate have painted themselves in stark opposition to Russia and therefore the Sovereign Alliance ... but this now-viral moment out of the German press has opened up the can of worms I began prying in 2022, when I claimed that this 'Special Military Operation' was about something other than national territory, but was rather the continuation or restart of a war that's been waged for a century and counting, and against an enemy we've been told we defeated, but who actually never lost, and certainly never left.
I am talking, of course about the Nazis, and the fact that taking Vladimir Putin at face value has never been a bad bet when it comes to navigating the winding ways of the Info War.
After all, the Russian leader did tell you he was 'DeNazifying' Ukraine, did he not?
So, how is this relevant to the above clip, besides the fact that it was a German reporter who asked the Ukrainian Proxy Prince how to kill more Russians?
Well, it's relevant because that wasn't just any German reporter.
That was Michael Martens ... and Michael Martens' grandfather was himself a high-ranking Wehrmacht Command Officer.
That's right ... Hans-Hermann Martens held senior positions in the Nazi regime and Wehrmacht high command.
What's that about apples and trees?
All of which is to say, the Ukrainian Nazis have been saying the quiet part out loud for four years ... but now even the German Nazis are saying it.
Which begs the question ... why now?
Why are they feeling pressured to escalate against Russia now?
And why, at the same time is Trump signaling that his relationship with Vladimir Putin has never been better?
Could it be that both are waging a war against the Invisible Enemy?
And could it be that the true nature of that Invisible Enemy is being revealed, and which already was, for those with the eyes to see and the ears to hear?
You will know them by their fruit, yes ... but their words aren't too far away, now.
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