
Murray Hunter
Who is Really Behind the Indonesian Fires?
Oct 30, 2026

Picture: Down To Earth
The seasonal haze that once again blanketed much of Southeast Asia in 2026 has produced the familiar cycle of satellite hotspot maps, school closures, respiratory wards filling up, and official statements carefully calibrated to minimise domestic political damage.
This time, however, an Indonesian environmental group has refused to let the story settle into the usual fog of mutual recrimination. Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Walhi) has published its actor-mapping analysis, “Who Are Behind the Fires?”, identifying 21 companies linked to Malaysian business groups whose concessions showed active hotspots or fire incidents between January and September 2026. The findings directly contradict the Malaysian government’s earlier insistence that no Malaysian plantation companies were involved.
Walhi’s data is stark. Satellite monitoring recorded at least 30,927 hotspots across Indonesia in the first nine months of the year. Nearly half fell inside oil-palm and forestry concession boundaries. West Kalimantan alone accounted for 9,529 hotspots; Central Kalimantan another 7,141. Air quality in affected areas repeatedly hit unhealthy to hazardous levels.

The NGO’s analysis does not stop at the Indonesian subsidiaries. It traces ownership and affiliation upward, revealing parent companies and principal shareholders based primarily in Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, with further financial links extending into the British Virgin Islands, Samoa and other low-transparency jurisdictions.

Haze in Singapore: Bloomberg
A complementary analysis published by Windonesia (drawing on Tenggara Strategics and carried by The Jakarta Post) sharpens the picture. It singles out nine corporations tightly linked to major fire hotspots—PT Kayung Agro Lestari, PT Panca Surya Agrindo, PT Arjuna Utama Sawit, PT Sumber Mardhika Graha, PT Finnantara Intiga, PT Hutan Ketapang Industri, PT Mayawana Persada, PT Hermes Sugar Indonesia and PT Globalindo Alam Perkasa, whose ultimate ownership structures point overwhelmingly to Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong, plus the usual offshore vehicles.
Beyond these nine, an estimated 93 companies affiliated with Malaysian and Singaporean palm-oil conglomerates appear in the broader fire data. Of these, roughly 66 connect to Singapore-headquartered groups (Sinar Mas and Wilmar dominating), while 27 trace back to Malaysian conglomerates, notably Sime Darby and Genting. The opacity is deliberate and structural: beneficial ownership frequently terminates in jurisdictions that shield the real decision-makers.
This is not a new pattern. Greenpeace Indonesia and Pantau Gambut had already flagged Malaysian and Singaporean entities among the top 20 linked to haze sources in the August–early October window, naming Kuala Lumpur Kepong (via PT Menteng Jaya Sawit Perdana) among others. Some of the same Indonesian entities had appeared in 2019 fire analyses.
Recurrence is the point. The same corporate groups keep reappearing because the underlying land-use model—large-scale peat drainage and conversion enabled by state-issued concessions—has never been fundamentally altered.
Malaysian officialdom has responded with practised denial. On 16 October, government spokesman Fahmi Fadzil stated that checks by the Plantation and Commodities Ministry found no Malaysian plantation companies involved, where most observed fires lay outside their concessions.
Plantation and Commodities Minister Noraini Ahmad later reiterated that Malaysian Palm Oil Board monitoring showed fires starting outside Malaysian-owned estates and spreading inward because of extreme heat and prolonged dry conditions.
Individual companies have issued similar statements. SD Guthrie insisted there is no credible evidence its subsidiaries caused fires, noted that many named entities are not under its ownership or control, and highlighted its own firefighting expenditure. Genting Plantations and KLK both maintained that fires entered their concessions from outside and were extinguished.
Walhi’s counter is simple and grounded in Indonesian law. Concession holders remain responsible for preventing and controlling fires inside their areas regardless of where the ignition occurred. Negligence in maintaining firebreaks, water tables on peat, or rapid response teams is itself a breach. The legal distinction between “we didn’t start it” and “we failed to stop it on our land” is precisely where accountability usually evaporates.
The deeper problem is structural. Decades of peatland drainage and forest conversion—facilitated by successive Indonesian administrations—have created a landscape primed for fire.
Foreign capital, particularly from Malaysia and Singapore, has been central to the expansion. Complex cross-border ownership, layered through Hong Kong holding companies and classic tax-haven vehicles, makes it extraordinarily difficult to pierce the corporate veil. When fires occur, responsibility fragments across borders, regulators retreat behind jurisdictional arguments, and the public in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia continues to breathe the consequences.
Indonesian authorities have begun to act. The Forestry Ministry has imposed administrative sanctions on 32 companies (names still largely undisclosed). Police are investigating 97 corporations and have named 20 as suspects, including four foreign-invested entities from Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea. Singapore has issued preventive measures notices to several Indonesian-operating firms under its Transboundary Haze Pollution Act. Walhi itself is preparing citizen lawsuits in Indonesia and exploring action against parent entities in Singapore, where the legal pathway is clearer than in Malaysia, which still lacks equivalent legislation.
Yet these steps remain reactive. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution has never possessed meaningful enforcement teeth. Malaysian officials continue to speak of “no conclusive evidence” while preferring desk-based cross-checks with company self-reporting over independent, on-the-ground verification of the kind Walhi demands. The result is a recurring regional public-health and environmental emergency in which the economic beneficiaries of the concession system, whether headquartered in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore or Hong Kong operate at a comfortable distance from the smoke.
The 2026 season has once again demonstrated that satellite data and ownership mapping can identify patterns that official statements prefer to obscure. Until parent companies, beneficial owners and the governments that host them are held to the same standard of responsibility as the local concession holders, the haze will return with the dry season.
The question is no longer whether Malaysian-linked capital is present in the fire landscape. The evidence shows it is. The question is whether the political will exists, in Putrajaya as much as in Jakarta, to treat that presence as a matter of accountability rather than an inconvenience to be denied.











