

Published: Feb 24, 2026 7:00 PM
Updated: Feb 25, 2026 12:04 AM
COMMENT | Six years ago today, the first non-Umno government collapsed after Bersatu pulled out from Pakatan Harapan and 11 PKR MPs quit PKR. Dr Mahathir Mohamad tactically resigned but failed to come back to power again.
Exactly three years and three months ago, Anwar Ibrahim started his premiership and has surpassed his three immediate predecessors, Ismail Sabri Yaakob, Muhyiddin and Mahathir in duration.
Given the prime minister's 10-year tenure limit that he is introducing and expected to be passed, Anwar would not last longer than 10 years (interregnum excluded). This would practically block the return of Najib Abdul Razak, who had served nine years and one month.
Holding a parliamentary super-majority of 153 seats (69 percent), Anwar can serve until the end of the 15th Parliament, Dec 18, 2027, if he does not seek early dissolution. There is no imminent risk of midterm collapse for Anwar, as Mahathir inflicted on himself.
To surpass Abdul Razak Hussein, Hussein Onn, and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi in duration, he would have to win the GE16. Harapan must win a clear plurality over other blocs, not just for the whole of Malaysia, but in Peninsular Malaysia too, where it won 75 seats in 2022.

To be safe, Harapan needs to win over 70 peninsula seats. Can Anwar do it? This column examines several factors.
Opposition disarray
On the surface, some would say it is a no-brainer. Under the Madani government, Malaysia is now enjoying both economic growth and political stability. In contrast, Bersatu is split, with now 11 out of its 31 MPs ousted from the party, and Perikatan Nasional is in decline and might be operationally reduced to PAS.
PN is the fifth opposition coalition that sank into decline or demise after losing one or two general elections.
The list started with Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah’s two-in-one bloc, Gagasan Rakyat-Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah, which folded up in 1995 and 1996, Anwar’s first vehicle Barisan Alternatif, which was effectively dormant by 2004, Anwar’s second vehicle Pakatan Rakyat, which officially ended in 2015, and BN, which was practically reduced to peninsula Umno after 2018.
Beyond the personality factor, opposition coalitions disintegrated or declined because once the prospect of winning or returning to power is lost, the incentives for component parties to stick together gradually disappear.
The diminishing electoral prospect can even be personal when opposition lawmakers are denied constituency allocation to help needy constituents.
Built over six decades by Umno, Malaysia’s winner-takes-all and patronage-heavy political structure systematically depletes the losers to ensure a dominant party.
Ethnic tensions
However, dominance does not ensure stability. What do you do if you are an opposition party with no chance to win power? You focus on winning seats by electrifying your communal/regional vote bank, who are more responsive to identity issues than policy matters.
In its heydays, BN - Umno and its non-Malay allies - were simultaneously accused of selling out the Malay-Muslims (by PAS) and marginalising the minorities (by DAP).
In the 22 months after GE14, Umno and PAS formed Muafakat Nasional and attacked Harapan on ethnicity, religion and language, riding the anti-Icerd wave and later benefitting from Harapan’s mismanagement of the Jawi issue, which alienated both the Malays and non-Malays.

Hence, it would be naïve to think the GE16 would be a walk in the park for Harapan and its allies. If the opposition is convinced that they have no chance to win votes and seats beyond their hardcore supporters, then the most rational strategy is to make GE16 a negative competition with smears and hatred, making it hard for a centrist government to play its balancing act.
The goals are simple: (a) getting the non-Malays and liberals to think they are being taken for granted by Anwar (so that they might abstain), (b) getting more Malays to feel threatened or just irritated by DAP or non-Malays (so that they might vote PN or abstain), and (c) getting middle ground voters to get frustrated or disillusioned (so that they too might abstain).
And what better issues than Hindu temples and pig farms? Expect these two to continue hogging news headlines, unless Anwar seriously finds solutions to “de-weaponise” them.
Corruption and reform
For voters who see beyond or are less affected by ethno-religious tension, the trust deficit is now centred on MACC chief commissioner Azam Baki and the separation of the attorney-general and public prosecutor.
The cabinet’s decision to form a committee headed by Attorney-General Dusuki Mokhtar, who was personally involved in the withdrawal of charges against Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, to investigate only Azam’s shareholding in public listed companies but not allegations of MACC’s collusion in economic extortion, suggests extremely poor political judgment or worse, extreme political arrogance.

With Azam linked to Anwar’s former aide and widely perceived money man Farhash Wafa Salvador Rizal Mubarak, and to the GRS Sabah state government, a for-show-only investigation is pushing reform-minded voters and decent businesspeople to the corner.
Voting for Anwar in GE16 would be incredibly difficult for them because “the evil” would not be visibly “lesser”.
Azam’s scandal is structural, not personal. He is a powerful unelected officer appointed by and answerable only to the prime minister. As long as he is a “court favourite”, he can act with little restraint. And as long as he does the prime minister’s bidding, he can stay powerful.
This incentivises a structurally symbiotic relationship between the prime minister and the MACC chief commissioner and the resulting institutional decadence.
Another powerful yet unaccountable high office is the attorney-general, whose power is constitutionally enshrined under Article 145. This is why Malaysians demand the separation of AG and PP, and this is why the Constitutional Amendment Bill on Article 145 horrifies reform advocates and experts.
The AG-PP separation, if passed in the current format, would not create an independent and Parliament-accountable office of public prosecutor. It would only create a new unelected office whose officer bearer has the potential to be another monster who preys on citizens and businesses, hounds the enemies of his/her political master, or both.

Instead of an appointment with parliamentary input and exclusion of executive influence, the public prosecutor would be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the recommendation of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (JLSC) and after consultation with the Conference of Rulers.
The chronic problem with the attorney-general is not resolved but repackaged with even more complications.
First, the new composition of JLSC includes the attorney-general (as long as s/he is not an MP), who represents the executive interest in the appointment of the public prosecutor, who, in turn, gets to influence the appointment of lower court judges and high court registrars.
Second, the appointment by the king might be construed as discretionary, which then risks exposing the institution of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to suspicion, distrust, and attacks that any prime minister faces for holding the power to effectively appoint the attorney-general.
This is politicising and undermining the constitutional monarchy as a key pillar of Malaysia’s parliamentary democracy.
A simpler and better option would be splitting the JLSC into two separate commissions for the judicial and prosecutorial services and granting Parliament a filtering role in the PP nomination and an ongoing scrutinising role in prosecutorial conduct, as civil society groups and experts suggest.
Ditch Umno’s majoritarian playbook
Notwithstanding significant reform initiatives, including the prime minister's 10-year tenure and the AG-PP separation, Anwar appears to have been employing much of the old playbook in Umno’s statecraft, from discriminating against opposition parliamentarians to covertly maintaining executive control even in the separated office of the public prosecutor.

Umno’s old playbook embodies majoritarianism and power concentration, which have both led to corruption and Umno’s ouster on one hand, and fuelled Malays’ communal anxiety on the other hand.
If Anwar wants to win his second term, he must ditch the old playbook and deliver true reforms that can better stabilise Malaysia’s politics. If that playbook had worked for Mahathir for the first time for 22 years, it did not last him beyond 22 months for the second time. Malaysia has moved on.
Anwar has been bold enough to introduce the 10-year tenure limit, something which Mahathir would never do; he must now move further from Mahathir’s shadow.
He shoul immediately put Azam on leave, appoint Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat to lead a truly independent panel to investigate all allegations against Azam and refer the constitutional bill on AG-PP separation to a Parliamentary Select Committee for refinements.
That’s how he may reclaim the reformasi brand and not let it become Rafizi Ramli’s.
WONG CHIN HUAT is a political scientist at Sunway University and a member of Project Stability and Accountability for Malaysia (Projek Sama).





















