Bridget Welsh
Published: Feb 15, 2026 2:07 PM
Updated: 5:12 PM
COMMENT | Last Sunday, 53 million Thais had the opportunity to vote, with 65 percent doing so. The results have been characterised as a “surprise” victory for the conservative Bhumjaithai party led by incumbent prime minister Anutin Charnvirakul.
The progressive party People’s Party (renamed from Move Forward and Future Forward) and the battered Pheu Thai, controlled by former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, lost significant electoral ground.
Bhumjaithai’s victory showcases a decisive conservative electoral victory in terms of seat share, the first of its kind in this century for Thailand.
Lacking an outright majority, Anutin will still need to form a coalition government and is expected to do so by April. He has already announced that he will form a coalition with Pheu Thai.
Bhumjaithai’s electoral gains echo a parallel win by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party in Japan led by PM Sanae Takaichi on polls held the same day – raising the spectre of growing electoral power of the right after conservative winners in Singapore last year, Indonesia in 2024 and in terms of the most electoral gains by PAS-Perikatan Nasional in Malaysia in 2023 and 2022.
Published: Feb 15, 2026 2:07 PM
Updated: 5:12 PM
COMMENT | Last Sunday, 53 million Thais had the opportunity to vote, with 65 percent doing so. The results have been characterised as a “surprise” victory for the conservative Bhumjaithai party led by incumbent prime minister Anutin Charnvirakul.
The progressive party People’s Party (renamed from Move Forward and Future Forward) and the battered Pheu Thai, controlled by former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, lost significant electoral ground.
Bhumjaithai’s victory showcases a decisive conservative electoral victory in terms of seat share, the first of its kind in this century for Thailand.
Lacking an outright majority, Anutin will still need to form a coalition government and is expected to do so by April. He has already announced that he will form a coalition with Pheu Thai.
Bhumjaithai’s electoral gains echo a parallel win by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party in Japan led by PM Sanae Takaichi on polls held the same day – raising the spectre of growing electoral power of the right after conservative winners in Singapore last year, Indonesia in 2024 and in terms of the most electoral gains by PAS-Perikatan Nasional in Malaysia in 2023 and 2022.
Incumbent Thai PM Anutin Charnvirakul
While Thailand has its unique political conditions, there are lessons that this election offers for Malaysia. Similar conditions of entrenched political polarisation and expedient elite political coalitions bringing together former political opponents have evolved into the emergence of new political configurations.
It is useful to look closely at relevant factors shaping the outcome. Here are four:
Primacy of the local/candidate
Political scientist and US speaker of the House Tip O'Neill famously said, “all politics is local” – an axiom that was true in the Thai polls.
Of the 500 seats up for grabs in Thailand’s election, 400 of these were constituency races. It is also where Bhumjaithai placed its efforts, building a base from the local government election in February 2025, when it won leadership in 14 provinces.
This year, it secured 174 of its 193 seats from local candidates in constituency contests. The systematic focus on building party machinery, allying with local “big houses or Baan Yai networks” (locally prominent families or dynasties) and relying on patronage and heavy spending had an impact; to become a national powerhouse, the strategy was local.
A key feature was the defection of Baan Yai candidates to Bhumjaithai, primarily from the Democrat and Pheu Thai parties, giving Anutin a significant boost in constituency seats.
While Thailand has its unique political conditions, there are lessons that this election offers for Malaysia. Similar conditions of entrenched political polarisation and expedient elite political coalitions bringing together former political opponents have evolved into the emergence of new political configurations.
It is useful to look closely at relevant factors shaping the outcome. Here are four:
Primacy of the local/candidate
Political scientist and US speaker of the House Tip O'Neill famously said, “all politics is local” – an axiom that was true in the Thai polls.
Of the 500 seats up for grabs in Thailand’s election, 400 of these were constituency races. It is also where Bhumjaithai placed its efforts, building a base from the local government election in February 2025, when it won leadership in 14 provinces.
This year, it secured 174 of its 193 seats from local candidates in constituency contests. The systematic focus on building party machinery, allying with local “big houses or Baan Yai networks” (locally prominent families or dynasties) and relying on patronage and heavy spending had an impact; to become a national powerhouse, the strategy was local.
A key feature was the defection of Baan Yai candidates to Bhumjaithai, primarily from the Democrat and Pheu Thai parties, giving Anutin a significant boost in constituency seats.
Malaysian political parties are less locally grounded than in the past as grassroots ties have weakened, with perhaps PAS as the exception in its core states.
Yet ties to local communities matter more than ever, as this was the advantage that Gabungan Rakyat Sabah had in Sabah in securing the most seats in state polls last November.
Walk the talk/deliverables
In Thailand, Anutin centred his campaign around deliverables. He brought in high-profile technocrats to improve policy delivery, especially on the economy – and he allowed them, the team, to have prominence in doing their jobs.
He campaigned on subsidies, low-interest loans, and cash handouts, aiming to reduce household debt.
While Thailand’s economy remains among the region’s poorest performers, the effect of Anutin’s leadership was to turn around perceptions as he advocated for a pro-business, stable, and fiscally reserved economy while simultaneously recognising the challenges faced by ordinary citizens.
Ordinary Thais are hurting economically, as in Malaysia.
This worked – in part due to the fact that he had only a short tenure, calling for an election less than 100 days in office – a pattern that Takaichi also did to secure her stronger mandate.
Anwar Ibrahim’s governance echoes many of the same features of Anutin, the mix of pro-business, stability and populist measures, yet he has a longer tenure that will be judged and, unlike Anutin, came to power promising political reforms, which remain outstanding.
Anwar Ibrahim
Nevertheless, the need to deliver – performance legitimacy – is critical and to be able to showcase this meaningfully in everyday lives in an era where affordability and household debt are serious challenges.
A key obstacle for the Madani government remains effective political communication, which Anutin and Takaichi mastered – at least for the recent elections. Critical will be perceptions of ordinary citizens that their future shows promise.
Unifying identity politics
Much of the attention of analysts has focused on Anutin’s use of Thai nationalism in its conflict with Cambodia. No question, the role that nationalism played impacted the outcome, as the positive results for his party from outside of Bangkok clearly show, including along the border areas.
Yet, what is not fully appreciated is the ability of Anutin to connect the conflict with the everyday lives of Thais, especially the negative impact of scams on ordinary Thais and the economy as a whole, notably on tourism.
With almost everyone knowing a victim of scams, the threat was personal, and he promised to address it. At the same time, Anutin forged a broader unifying “Thai” identity, one that worked to his favour electorally as he was able to tap into emotions of aspiration and bring groups together.
Perhaps where Malaysia most differs from Thailand is how identity politics are configured. While Thailand’s political polarisation has been ideological, with some overtones of regional identity, in Malaysia, political polarisation has been closely tied to ethnic voting along racial or religious lines, with ideology secondary.
Nevertheless, the need to deliver – performance legitimacy – is critical and to be able to showcase this meaningfully in everyday lives in an era where affordability and household debt are serious challenges.
A key obstacle for the Madani government remains effective political communication, which Anutin and Takaichi mastered – at least for the recent elections. Critical will be perceptions of ordinary citizens that their future shows promise.
Unifying identity politics
Much of the attention of analysts has focused on Anutin’s use of Thai nationalism in its conflict with Cambodia. No question, the role that nationalism played impacted the outcome, as the positive results for his party from outside of Bangkok clearly show, including along the border areas.
Yet, what is not fully appreciated is the ability of Anutin to connect the conflict with the everyday lives of Thais, especially the negative impact of scams on ordinary Thais and the economy as a whole, notably on tourism.
With almost everyone knowing a victim of scams, the threat was personal, and he promised to address it. At the same time, Anutin forged a broader unifying “Thai” identity, one that worked to his favour electorally as he was able to tap into emotions of aspiration and bring groups together.
Perhaps where Malaysia most differs from Thailand is how identity politics are configured. While Thailand’s political polarisation has been ideological, with some overtones of regional identity, in Malaysia, political polarisation has been closely tied to ethnic voting along racial or religious lines, with ideology secondary.
The nationalism that has gained traction in Malaysia has been an ultra-Malay nationalism, exclusively forging ethnic nationalism and Islamism, in a pattern that divides rather than unifies Malaysians.
The “enemy” is inside rather than outside. Increasingly, parties are pandering to this divisive discourse as a means to gain electorally, with little appreciation of the impact on the nation’s social fabric and negative electoral consequences in Malaysia’s multi-ethnic, regionally diverse society.
For Anwar’s Pakatan Harapan coalition, which has relied on non-Malay support, an electoral erosion has been evident and increasing. In contrast, Anutin created a new inclusive identity politics narrative, winning because of it.
Reformers go soft
If there was also another new identity, it was that of Thailand’s progressives, the People’s Party. Making a Faustian agreement or a convenient political deal with Anutin to call for an early election and push for constitutional reform last backfired on the party, especially among its core ideological base.
Limits on discussions of lèse-majesté laws and the role of the military also undercut the People’s Party’s reform narrative.
The effect is that the People’s Party lost some of its reform momentum. That the party leadership has had to face repeated charges, disqualifications and restrictions as part of what is known as “lawfare” did not help.
Voters recognised that the system “fix” was unlikely to allow them to govern. They lost significant ground in the popular party list vote, down almost a third to 10 million votes from 14.4 million in 2023.
Yet, importantly, those who voted for them did so despite knowing they would likely not be able to govern, a testimony to the strength of the reform call.
The other “opposition” party Pheu Thai faced even more serious erosion of support, perceived as ineffective in its management of the economy while in office after 2023, compromised in politically deal-making and on the receiving end of “lawfare” decisions resulting in leaders imprisoned and removed.
The most “popular” party for nearly two decades, Pheu Thai won only 74 seats, down almost by half from the 141 in the 2023 polls.
Malaysian parties touting reform may face similar potential consequences for failing to deliver meaningfully on reform. A two-term PM or a “task force” on entrenched mafia-like corruption is not going to cut it after decades of promising “change”.
Unlike in Thailand, there are arguably fewer structural constraints on implementing reforms, with a strong majority in parliament to pass legislation. The main obstacle is political will, raising questions about whether calls for reform were a means to power rather than a goal.
Power of change
In both Thailand's and Japan’s recent polls, the victors promised change and used a combination of campaign strategies to win significant victories.
Demands for change have been a main electoral force in the region for some time.
Yet, the electoral tide is turning toward more conservative parties, who are taking advantage of dissatisfaction and preparing for polls by building local support and calibrating unifying nationalist narratives.
While at first glance, Anutin’s victory as an incumbent may have offered some optimism to those in power in Malaysia who remain confident of securing a second term for the prime minister, a closer look at the drivers of the outcome suggests they should look again, and, importantly, recognise that with more informed and demanding electorates a “surprise” cannot be ruled out.
BRIDGET WELSH is an honorary research associate of the University of Nottingham’s Asia Research Institute, a senior research associate at Hu Fu Centre for East Asia Democratic Studies, and a senior associate fellow at The Habibie Centre. Her writings can be found at bridgetwelsh.com
