Commentary: If the US is a ‘landlord seeking rent’, how must Southeast Asia rethink defence?

Commentary: If the US is a ‘landlord seeking rent’, how must Southeast Asia rethink defence?


Southeast Asia has remained off US President Donald Trump’s radar in his first weeks in office - but this may not last long, says ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s William Choong

US President Donald Trump speaks during a joint press conference with Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer in the East Room at the White House Feb 27, 2025, in Washington. (Carl Court/Pool Photo via AP)


William Choong
03 Mar 2025 06:00AM

Updated: 03 Mar 2025 

SINGAPORE: Speaking at the Munich Security Conference recently, Singapore Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen gave a clear-eyed assessment of the new world order under the second term of United States President Donald Trump.

Mr Ng said that “America’s primacy has become the overriding consideration” in its foreign policy, at the expense of bilateral and multilateral ties. He added that Asia’s image of the US has “changed from liberator to great disruptor to a landlord seeking rent”.

What does Washington’s transactional approach to foreign policy mean for the rest of the world?

In Europe, two things are apparent. First, Mr Trump has a laser-like focus on countries with trade surpluses with the US. Second, as per Ukraine, he will shake down countries to stump up the cash in bearing shared security burdens - even in the face of long-standing US defence commitments.

And if this is not debilitating enough, Mr Trump has threatened to take over Greenland and is negotiating with the Russians on a peace deal for Ukraine without consulting European allies and Kyiv.

On Feb 24, the US sided with Russia instead of its European allies in pushing for a resolution that called for an end to the war in Ukraine. In contrast to the previous administration, the Trump administration did not condemn Russia’s invasion or insist on Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

PAYING "RENT" TO WASHINGTON FOR SECURITY

It is unlikely, at least for now, that the US will pursue the same tack in Asia - that is, work with China to come up with a quid pro quo that ignores the interests of regional states.

Sino-US competition is so protracted and intense, that the two major economies are at risk of decoupling, as noted by Nicholas Burns, a former US ambassador to China. But it is quite likely that the US will press Asian countries to pay “rent” for US security commitments.

The good thing for now is that Southeast Asia has remained off Mr Trump’s radar in his first weeks in office. But this would not last long, given the large trade surpluses enjoyed by several countries, including Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.

In the meantime, there are ways to dodge the Trump bullet. Take Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. In a high-level summit in February, Mr Ishiba adopted what was essentially the three Ps of handling Mr Trump.

He praised Mr Trump for surviving assassination attempts, removing restrictions on US fossil fuel extraction and encouraging Japan’s investment in its military. He pandered to Mr Trump by pledging to purchase more energy from the US and investing in the country. He postured Japan by securing US commitment to the two countries’ long-standing alliance.

That said, however, there is no guarantee that Mr Trump would not slap tariffs on Japan (he said as much during the summit). It should be remembered that in his first term, Mr Trump asked Japan and Korea to raise host-nation support for US troops on their soil. It is likely that he would do the same.


NO MAGIC BULLET FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

For Southeast Asian countries, there is no magic bullet beyond the three Ps.

Singapore ran a US$40 billion trade deficit with the US in 2022, and is the third-largest investor in the US and a gateway for 6,000 US firms into the region.

Singapore also plays a key role in the projection of US power into the region. During the first Trump administration in 2019, the two countries renewed a Memorandum of Understanding to extend Washington’s use of Singapore’s air and naval bases by 15 years.

Even so, Mr Trump’s trade tariffs could affect Singapore indirectly, as the tariffs are levied on countries which would affect supply chains and global trade.

The Philippines, one of Washington's long-standing allies in Southeast Asia, has a minimal trade surplus with the US (US$4 billion in 2023). But Mr Trump would not look favourably on predecessor Joe Biden’s US$500 million plan to boost Philippine military capabilities, in addition to the US$1 billion delivered over 2015 to 2022.

Vietnam would prove to be the ultimate test of his intentions. Last year, it enjoyed the third largest trade surplus with the US, after China and Mexico.

But Vietnam is a frontline state in a US-led network surrounding China’s periphery. It remains to be seen if it will get a free pass.


DEALING WITH A CHANGED AMERICA

From a wider perspective, Asian countries have options if the US decides to upend its economic and security role in the region. One, it has been suggested that countries in the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework go it alone without the US, which is likely to ditch the deal.

Second, regional countries will have to work with middle powers, such as Quad members Australia, India and Japan. In January, for example, Japan and Indonesia boosted bilateral cooperation in defence, energy and food security.

Third, some countries eyeing China - say, the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea - might have to recalibrate their hardline positions towards Beijing or establish guardrails to prevent the outbreak of conflict.

While these are reasonable options, Mr Trump’s penchant for deal-making raises the dreary prospect that he could strike deals with China on critical hotspots such as Taiwan and the South China Sea, quite literally over the heads of regional countries.

One thing is certain: If the US walks back on regional leadership and security commitments that have been in place since the end of World War II, Asian countries will have to recalibrate their positions.

Speaking in 2020 (the last year of Mr Trump’s first term), then Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted that the world had benefited much from US leadership for decades. “If America is in a different mode, we will get by and I think other configurations will eventually work out, but it would be a loss,” he said.

The same dilemma rings true today.

William Choong is a Senior Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, and the Managing Editor of Fulcrum, the institute’s commentary and analysis website on Southeast Asia.