FMT:
The question facing PKR’s leadership: what now?
No one is immortal and, sooner or later, PKR must decide what it stands for above and beyond being Anwar Ibrahim’s party
From Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad
After a tumultous history — born in Malaysia’s political wilderness in 1999, a merger with the leftist Parti Rakyat Malaysia as well as numerous setbacks, defections and splits — PKR is now, finally, in the country’s driver’s seat.
Anwar Ibrahim is prime minister and the emergence of a sure-fire challenger to this position is far from certain.
PKR emerged as arguably the biggest “winner” in the Cabinet reshuffle last month. Discounting the promotion of deputy ministers, the only real “new” minister was from PKR, namely Taufiq Johari as youth and sports minister.
And while these things are of course subjective, the party also was seen as having gained “strategic” portfolios such as human resources (R Ramanan) and Sabah and Sarawak affairs (Mustapha Sakmud).
Besides Anwar being prime minister and finance minister (and ongoing criticism by civil society of him holding both posts, something Pakatan Harapan [PH] was also opposed to in the past), key posts like home affairs, economy, education, communications as well as science, technology and innovation are all held by PKR members.
Perhaps sensing the restlessness of his base over the perceived slow pace of institutional reform, Anwar marked the New Year by announcing a slew of potential reforms, including some long sought-after changes like separating the roles of the attorney-general and public prosecutor (which proponents argue will make criminal prosecutions more independent and transparent) as well as, significantly, term limits for the prime minister’s post.
Anwar and his supporters previously rebutted criticisms of the slow pace of reforms by broadly arguing that PH is constrained given that the government he leads is essentially a grand coalition of coalitions that are not only ideologically different but virulently opposed to each other not so long ago.
He has also cited the need to repair Malaysia’s economy from the dislocations of Covid-19 and current uncertainties, while warning that reforms need to be sequenced.
Nevertheless, the fact is that PKR is, like it or not, now part of Malaysia’s political establishment, if not at its very head.
This was the culmination of a process that began with the watershed 2008 general elections when it won an unprecedented 31 parliamentary seats as well as control of the wealthy Selangor state, among others.
There is some truth to Rafizi Ramli’s contention that the party is facing the “test of power”. Power, as the old adage goes, corrupts.
How Malaysia’s former grand old party Umno lost touch with the rapidly evolving Malay ground, losing its once-unassailable grip on the community here and there to PAS, PKR and Bersatu, is well known.
Even Bersatu and PAS’s current difficulties over who will lead Perikatan Nasional (PN) can be seen as an example of the infighting that being in power can cause.
While Anwar’s personal magnetism remains relevant, the perhaps rosy picture outlined for PKR at the start cannot easily be assigned to anything else but the weakness of its opponents and belies the serious faultlines the party and its coalition face.
Unhappiness over the slow pace of reform, even perceived backsliding in areas such as corruption and impunity, have been discussed umpteenth times.
The fact that PKR and PH have made no real electoral gains since 2022 is telling. Despite having Anwar at the helm, PH arguably lost ground in the 2023 state elections. Its victories in the various by-elections were all defensive.
The prospect of making further gains in the four PN-governed states (Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu) remain uncertain.
And regardless of the reasons why urban Sabah voters swung to Warisan, the fact remains PH was massively defeated there with only one PKR candidate winning a seat.
This is to say nothing of the divisive 2025 PKR party elections, which, among other things, saw controversy over the conduct of the division polls and a bitter contest for the deputy presidency which saw Anwar’s daughter, Nurul Izzah, defeating Rafizi.
To be fair, the PKR component of the Cabinet reshuffle suggests that Anwar understands the importance of presenting a united front.
Strategy-wise, the lack of return on investment of Anwar’s attempts to triangulate conservative Malay-Muslim voters by treading cautiously on institutional reform and social policy has also caused anxiety over the possible drift of PH supporters.
The loss of more moderate urban voters and the non-Malay PH base, if not to other parties or coalitions than to absenteeism, is potentially fatal. This is made worse with our first-past-the-post electoral system.
But PKR can also be said to be over-reliant on its allies. Its engagements with the non-Malay demographic appear to have largely been assigned, for better or worse, to DAP, which is puzzling when PKR is supposed to be a multiracial party.
These are serious, existential weaknesses which must be addressed sooner or later, not only to ensure PKR and PH keep their pole position in the next general election (GE16), but also to define itself politically, especially in an era where voters are at risk of being disillusioned at what they perceive is the cartelisation of politics.
This is crucial if PKR is to be able to chart a course for itself post-Anwar.
Again, criticisms of its overreliance on his charisma, not only electorally but even in the business of government, need not be repeated here.
Suffice to say that while he undeniably and masterfully navigated the reality of decades-long coalition politics successfully, the regrettable fact is that no one is immortal and that sooner or later, PKR must decide what it stands for above and beyond being Anwar’s party.
The continuing breakdown of the certainties that marked Malaysian coalitional politics from 2015 onwards (when the conflict between PAS and DAP brought Pakatan Rakyat to its end) also means that this direction must be set with even greater urgency.
This is not even a question of personnel so much as what the “reforms” the party has said are its lodestar really means.
Malaysian voters deserve this certainty. It will help not only PKR and PH’s base, but even those sitting on the fence to make their choices. Authenticity and clarity are not an asset to be scoffed at.
What does PKR stand for? And where does it want to go? The question facing its leadership is the “what now”?
Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad is MP for Setiawangsa. He was a PKR vice-president and natural resources and environmental sustainability minister.
Anwar Ibrahim is prime minister and the emergence of a sure-fire challenger to this position is far from certain.
PKR emerged as arguably the biggest “winner” in the Cabinet reshuffle last month. Discounting the promotion of deputy ministers, the only real “new” minister was from PKR, namely Taufiq Johari as youth and sports minister.
And while these things are of course subjective, the party also was seen as having gained “strategic” portfolios such as human resources (R Ramanan) and Sabah and Sarawak affairs (Mustapha Sakmud).
Besides Anwar being prime minister and finance minister (and ongoing criticism by civil society of him holding both posts, something Pakatan Harapan [PH] was also opposed to in the past), key posts like home affairs, economy, education, communications as well as science, technology and innovation are all held by PKR members.
Perhaps sensing the restlessness of his base over the perceived slow pace of institutional reform, Anwar marked the New Year by announcing a slew of potential reforms, including some long sought-after changes like separating the roles of the attorney-general and public prosecutor (which proponents argue will make criminal prosecutions more independent and transparent) as well as, significantly, term limits for the prime minister’s post.
Anwar and his supporters previously rebutted criticisms of the slow pace of reforms by broadly arguing that PH is constrained given that the government he leads is essentially a grand coalition of coalitions that are not only ideologically different but virulently opposed to each other not so long ago.
He has also cited the need to repair Malaysia’s economy from the dislocations of Covid-19 and current uncertainties, while warning that reforms need to be sequenced.
Nevertheless, the fact is that PKR is, like it or not, now part of Malaysia’s political establishment, if not at its very head.
This was the culmination of a process that began with the watershed 2008 general elections when it won an unprecedented 31 parliamentary seats as well as control of the wealthy Selangor state, among others.
There is some truth to Rafizi Ramli’s contention that the party is facing the “test of power”. Power, as the old adage goes, corrupts.
How Malaysia’s former grand old party Umno lost touch with the rapidly evolving Malay ground, losing its once-unassailable grip on the community here and there to PAS, PKR and Bersatu, is well known.
Even Bersatu and PAS’s current difficulties over who will lead Perikatan Nasional (PN) can be seen as an example of the infighting that being in power can cause.
While Anwar’s personal magnetism remains relevant, the perhaps rosy picture outlined for PKR at the start cannot easily be assigned to anything else but the weakness of its opponents and belies the serious faultlines the party and its coalition face.
Unhappiness over the slow pace of reform, even perceived backsliding in areas such as corruption and impunity, have been discussed umpteenth times.
The fact that PKR and PH have made no real electoral gains since 2022 is telling. Despite having Anwar at the helm, PH arguably lost ground in the 2023 state elections. Its victories in the various by-elections were all defensive.
The prospect of making further gains in the four PN-governed states (Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu) remain uncertain.
And regardless of the reasons why urban Sabah voters swung to Warisan, the fact remains PH was massively defeated there with only one PKR candidate winning a seat.
This is to say nothing of the divisive 2025 PKR party elections, which, among other things, saw controversy over the conduct of the division polls and a bitter contest for the deputy presidency which saw Anwar’s daughter, Nurul Izzah, defeating Rafizi.
To be fair, the PKR component of the Cabinet reshuffle suggests that Anwar understands the importance of presenting a united front.
Strategy-wise, the lack of return on investment of Anwar’s attempts to triangulate conservative Malay-Muslim voters by treading cautiously on institutional reform and social policy has also caused anxiety over the possible drift of PH supporters.
The loss of more moderate urban voters and the non-Malay PH base, if not to other parties or coalitions than to absenteeism, is potentially fatal. This is made worse with our first-past-the-post electoral system.
But PKR can also be said to be over-reliant on its allies. Its engagements with the non-Malay demographic appear to have largely been assigned, for better or worse, to DAP, which is puzzling when PKR is supposed to be a multiracial party.
These are serious, existential weaknesses which must be addressed sooner or later, not only to ensure PKR and PH keep their pole position in the next general election (GE16), but also to define itself politically, especially in an era where voters are at risk of being disillusioned at what they perceive is the cartelisation of politics.
This is crucial if PKR is to be able to chart a course for itself post-Anwar.
Again, criticisms of its overreliance on his charisma, not only electorally but even in the business of government, need not be repeated here.
Suffice to say that while he undeniably and masterfully navigated the reality of decades-long coalition politics successfully, the regrettable fact is that no one is immortal and that sooner or later, PKR must decide what it stands for above and beyond being Anwar’s party.
The continuing breakdown of the certainties that marked Malaysian coalitional politics from 2015 onwards (when the conflict between PAS and DAP brought Pakatan Rakyat to its end) also means that this direction must be set with even greater urgency.
This is not even a question of personnel so much as what the “reforms” the party has said are its lodestar really means.
Malaysian voters deserve this certainty. It will help not only PKR and PH’s base, but even those sitting on the fence to make their choices. Authenticity and clarity are not an asset to be scoffed at.
What does PKR stand for? And where does it want to go? The question facing its leadership is the “what now”?
Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad is MP for Setiawangsa. He was a PKR vice-president and natural resources and environmental sustainability minister.
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