Why Akmal’s Call for UMNO to Exit PH Is Loud but Implausible

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Betty Teh:

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Why Akmal’s Call for UMNO to Exit PH Is Loud but Implausible

By Betty Teh

Dr. Muhamad Akmal Saleh, the chief of UMNO Youth, has been one of the most vocal critics of his party's role in Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's unity government. At a special UMNO Youth convention held on January 3, 2026, in Kuala Lumpur attended by around 1,500 members, Akmal delivered a fiery speech urging UMNO to withdraw support from the government and revive the Muafakat Nasional (MN) pact with the Islamist opposition party PAS. 

He cited repeated crossings of "red lines" on issues involving Islam, the Malay community, and the monarchy, arguing that Malay unity required UMNO and PAS, the two largest Malay-based parties, to lead the charge.

Calls for political realignment are not new in UMNO. What is new, however, is the growing frequency and volume with which Dr Akmal Saleh has urged UMNO to abandon the unity government, exit PH, and reposition itself alongside PAS in the opposition.

The convention resolved to formally propose this shift to the party's supreme council and upcoming general assembly, positioning UMNO Youth as a bridge for renewed cooperation with PAS.

Backed by Najib Razak loyalists, his provocative style seen in past episodes like the KK Mart controversy resonates with those demanding a fiercer defence of Malay rights.

Akmal is UMNO Youth chief a role that carries visibility, media access, and grassroots reach. It allows him to shape narratives and channel discontent among younger, more conservative party members.

What it does not grant, however, is decision making authority over coalition strategy. Akmal may set the tone and amplify frustration, but he does not command the numbers.

He holds no seat on the supreme council, and UMNO's 26 parliamentary seats give him limited leverage over MPs. Party elders, including president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, have tolerated his rhetoric but emphasised that any convention outcomes must pass through formal channels: the supreme council and the general assembly scheduled for mid January 2026.

As one supreme council member noted, decisions require maturity, not just volume. UMNO’s exits and entries into government have never been determined by its youth wing. They are decided by the party’s supreme council, parliamentary bloc, and senior leadership; actors whose calculations are grounded in survival and pragmatism, not pure symbolism.

More importantly, Akmal's proposal faces steep structural hurdles and offers little strategic advantage to UMNO. Exiting the unity government would not revitalize UMNO, it would likely accelerate its decline, eroding access to power, resources, and state level influence in a federal system heavily tilted toward Putrajaya.

Feasibility remains low for several reasons. Electorally, PAS holds dominance in rural Malay heartlands with 43 seats, far outpacing UMNO. Any revived MN which collapsed in 2020 amid infighting risks making UMNO the subordinate partner, diluting its brand without guaranteed vote consolidation.

Past collaborations fragmented rather than unified Malay support, often benefiting the then opposition Pakatan Harapan.

Elite interests further anchor UMNO in government. Senior leaders, many with ongoing legal challenges, value stability, ministerial portfolios, and executive protections. The party's post 2018 opposition years were marked by defections, funding shortages, and irrelevance: lessons not easily forgotten. Voter fatigue compounds this: Malaysians have witnessed multiple coalition flips, breeding cynicism toward opportunistic realignments.

Akmal frames the move as building a "credible opposition," insisting PAS is indispensable for Malay consolidation. This argument falters on closer scrutiny.

PAS's ideological rigidity appeals to conservatives but limits broader, multiracial outreach. If credibility demands policy substance and reform, UMNO could achieve more by internal renewal than by tethering itself to a stronger rival. Needing PAS underscores UMNO's vulnerability, not strength.

Reactions from UMNO elites reveal caution. While Zahid reportedly endorsed the convention's holding, leaders like Zambry Abd Kadir and Ahmad Maslan stressed that proposals must be deliberated properly.

Internal critics, including some Youth members, warned that exit would weaken UMNO further.
PAS leaders welcomed the overture, but with Perikatan Nasional ties intact, their incentive for equal partnership remains questionable.

The most severe downside lies in UMNO's state level power, inextricably linked to federal incumbency. Malaysia's system funnels development funding roads, hospitals, flood mitigation through discretionary federal allocations. UMNO controlled or influential states benefit from direct lobbying by ministers and MPs. In opposition, approvals slow, projects delay, and allocations shrink, as historically seen in non-aligned states.

Patronage networks, central to UMNO's machinery, rely on federal appointments to government linked companies and statutory bodies. Without them, grassroots mobilization falters, loyalty erodes, and funding dries up. States lack independent borrowing or broad taxation powers, making them dependent on federal transfers. Governing without Putrajaya means constrained delivery, blame for underperformance, and electoral backlash; precisely why UMNO has always prioritised federal control.

Triggering early elections via exit would compound risks: UMNO cast as the destabilizer, stripped of incumbency advantages like policy announcements and resource distribution. With Malay votes split among PAS, Bersatu, and others, UMNO lacks the default appeal it once held. PAS, as a disciplined opposition, would likely emerge dominant in any alliance.
Akmal's motives appear layered: personal positioning for future leadership by appealing to hardliners, differentiating Youth as the "bad cop" for senior deniability, and rhetorically competing with PAS to retain drifting voters. It may also serve as leverage for concessions within the government rather than a serious exit strategy.

If Akmal’s proposal had genuine traction, it would already be reflected in elite behaviour. Instead the January 3 convention amplified Akmal's voice but changed little structurally. His proposal is loud in ideology but implausible in execution, more about internal branding and base consolidation than viable coalition reform.

For UMNO, retaining federal power, compromises notwithstanding offers survival and leverage. Exiting would not forge a stronger party; it would hollow out its remaining influence across Parliament and the states.

Akmal is not steering UMNO toward PAS; he is carving his own path to relevance in whatever landscape emerges next. Pragmatism, not provocation, remains UMNO's safest bet in a fragmented political terrain.
The noises Akmal makes may be loud, but it's not lethal, the impact on UMNO however is little, for now minimal, implausible.