AUKUS SSN: A flawed plan heading for the wrong destination

Pearls and Irritations
John Menadue’s Public Policy Journal

 


AUKUS SSN: A flawed plan heading for the wrong destination

By Peter Briggs

Feb 8, 2025

The AUKUS agreement aims to increase US, UK and Australian submarine capability in the Indo Pacific and the deterrence impact they offer. The current plan will fail for four fundamental reasons.

• Between now and 2032 the US Navy will drop from 49 nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN) to 32-35; the US will not have sufficient SSNs to be able to sell Australia 3-5 Virginia Class submarines;
• The concept mixes two versions of the Virginia class SSN with a third, new UK design. This is unworkable logistically and impractical for Australia.
• A force of eight SSNs is below critical mass for generating the experienced personnel needed to oversee its operation and inadequate for Australia’s three-ocean needs (Pacific, Indian and Antarctic Oceans).
• Australia will find it too expensive in manpower and funds to operate eight large SSNs, let alone the minimum force of 12 SSNs required for a sustainable force able to provide up to four deployable SSNs.

There is a solution, but it will require hard decisions from the three AUKUS partners. Let me elaborate on why the plan is flawed; first the US’s SSN numbers.

COVID had a dramatic impact on the two shipyards building Virginia Class submarines: General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries. In addition, many small industries in the supply chain were badly affected, resulting in a large backlog as partly built SSNs accumulated in the shipyards. There is a similar backlog in Navy shipyards undertaking maintenance on the in-service submarines.

The US is struggling to clear the backlog and achieve a tempo of 2.3 deliveries per year, in order to sell Australia three to five submarines as part of the AUKUS Pillar 1 agreement. The sale is conditional; it must not “degrade the US’s underseas capability”. Given the current shortfall in USN SSN numbers and the difficult recovery ahead, selling a submarine, up-to-date for maintenance and with at least 15 years of reactor life remaining is bound to degrade the US’s capability.

The situation in the two submarine building yards is stark. Only one SSN was laid down in 2021. No SSNs were delivered to the US Navy for the two-year period between April 2020 and May 2022. No SSNs were laid down in 2024. The USN has only requested funding for one Virginia in FY25, “due to limits on Navy’s budget topline and the growing Virginia class production backlog”.

Exacerbating the problem for the yards, the Block V submarines just ordered are 30% larger and more complex to build. The first is yet to be delivered, but a return to shorter build times appears unlikely. Even if it is achieved, the 2-plus tempo does not fill the COVID gaps now in the system. Speaking to their shareholders in October 2024, the CEOs of HII and GDEB blamed their slowing delivery tempo and reduced cash flows on supply chain and workforce issues and offered no optimistic forecasts for early improvement. Increasing costs have also impacted profitability; HII indicate that they are renegotiating the contracts for 17 Block IV and Block V SSNs. The issues are longstanding and will not be rectified quickly, despite the massive effort now underway.

Further, GDEB have diverted their most experienced workers to prevent further slippage to the USN’s highest priority shipbuilding program, the construction of the Columbia Class SSBNs in the GDEB yard, the second of which was laid down in 2024. HII is building sections of these submarines, so the priority will impact both yards. What will be the USN’s SSN situation in 2032?

Working from publicly available information, the USN currently has 50 SSNs, including 24 Los Angeles class SSNs in service. The Los Angeles are being decommissioned as they reach their end of life, typically 36 years in service from commissioning. By 2032, when the first Virginia is to be sold to Australia, the youngest, the USS Cheyenne, will be 36 years old. The first two Seawolf class SSNs will also be reaching their end of life. Whilst the much-delayed refuelling of some of these submarines may mean they have reactor life remaining; they cannot be considered frontline submarines – age catches up with us all!

The decision to sell Australia its first of three to five frontline SSNs appears likely to coincide with the nadir in USN attack submarine numbers; in 2032, the USN will have a force of 32-35 frontline SSNs, roughly 50% of the accepted requirement of 66.

The AUKUS pathway adds to the US’s problems in recovering from this situation. It will not be an easy decision. There will be significant political pressure to proceed with the sale, given all the assurances and public expectation. Should the decision be taken not to sell Australia SSNs because of the USN’s inadequate inventory, Australia will be left with no stop-gap capability to cover the withdrawal of the ageing Collins Class. Regardless of which way the decision goes, the plan is flawed, it reduces Alliance submarine capability, wastes precious resources and irreplaceable time.

What is wrong with the destination? The plan proposes an impractical mix of SSNs, which are too large and too expensive to own and crew and in insufficient numbers to be sustainable or have the strategic impact we seek.

Firstly, the impractical aspect. The plan proposes a mix of two versions of the Virginia class SSN and a third, new UK design. This is unworkable and impractical logistically for Australia’s small navy and limited nuclear support workforce/establishment. The submarines’ designs would be a mix of two blocks of Virginia-class submarines, more than 14 years apart in design and yet-to-be-designed SSN-AUKUS, using Britain’s yet-to-be-tested PWR3 reactor. These submarines will embody two different regulatory authorities, design standards and philosophies. The difficulty in training crews and building up experience in three designs of submarines would add to the obvious supply chain challenges in achieving an operational force.

Second, displacing more than 10,000 tonnes, SSN-AUKUS submarines will be too big for Australia’s needs. Their size will increase their detectability, cost and crews. The Royal Australian Navy is already unable to crew its ships and grow to meet future demands. It will have great difficulty in crewing Virginias, which need 132 people each, and SSN-AUKUS too, if their crews equal the 100-odd needed for the current British Astute class. Bear in mind that Australia has a population of 26.8 million, 38% of the UK or 8% of the US.

It is highly likely that the SSN-AUKUS program, like the Astute program, will run late and deliver a first-of-class boat with many problems. Knowing that Britain’s Strategic Defence Review is grappling with serious funding shortfalls hardly instills confidence. Meanwhile, Britain’s submarine support establishment is having difficulties in getting SSNs to sea. A recent fire affecting the delivery of the final Astute class SSN can only add to these woes.

My final argument against the current plan is that eight SSNs will not give Australia enough ready submarines for an effective deterrent. A decision to stop at eight overlooks a number of critical strategic, industrial and personnel considerations in deciding on the number of submarines Australia acquires.

First, the strategic considerations. Since the 2009 Defence White Paper, successive reviews have affirmed the need for 12 submarines, supported by a base on each coast, providing the specialised infrastructure, workshops and a submarine squadron staff. While nuclear propulsion provides much greater mobility, a submarine can only be in one place at a time. Added to the reality of our geography, a force should be able to provide at least two deployed submarines on each coast, ie at least 12 SSNs would seem a minimum requirement to provide ongoing certainty and, if needed, operational impact.

Industrial issues are significant factors in the cost of ownership and effectiveness of the force. Australia intends to build the AUKUS SSNs in Adelaide. This is a thoroughly commendable idea, but we should expect delays and difficulties as we learn how to do it. All shipbuilding programs experience this. The time and cost of successive vessels reduces as the workforce and processes are optimised.

Shipbuilders can only maintain their skills if the building program is continuous. Stop/start shipbuilding is a well-known recipe for prolonged delays and grossly inflated costs as demonstrated by the Astute class – 57 months late and 53% over budget.

Once we have mastered the complexities of building SSNs, as I am sure we will, we should not stop building.

Personnel are a major consideration. My study of UK, France and US submarine crewing policies, summarised in ASPI Special Report 129, published in October 2018, concluded that a force of 10 SSNs with 10 crews was essential to generate the minimum critical mass of experienced personnel. A smaller force will not generate sufficient highly experienced personnel to oversee the safe technical and operational aspects of the program. Two ocean basing with the additional over 200 highly experienced squadron staff, a key link in the operational and safety chain, would require at least 12 SSNs to sustain.

A force of eight SSNs, requiring 6-7 crews, is below critical mass, vulnerable to personnel shortfalls, will struggle to sustain two SSNs deployed and cannot sustain our needs for two-ocean basing.

Even more problematic is the likelihood that Australia can achieve an operational, sustainable and deployable SSN capability from eight SSNs made up of a mix of Virginia and AUKUS designs. The mix of classes adds to complexity, costs and risk; including two supply chains, differing major onboard equipments/systems, spares and training systems/simulators! Operational work up, testing and evaluation and sea training is also made more complex by the mix of classes.

In conclusion; Australia requires at least 12 SSNs to sustain a two-ocean basing policy, able to provide two deployable submarines on each coast in the good times. To ease logistic, training and supervisory challenges they should all be the same class.

It is time to look for another solution.

The French Suffren class SSN was the reference design for the diesel Attack class that Australia intended to buy before switching to SSNs. It offers the solution to our AUKUS problems. It is in production by Naval Group, with three of the planned six submarines commissioned in the French Navy.

At 5300 tonnes and with a 70-day endurance, capacity for 24 torpedoes or missiles, four torpedo tubes and a crew of 60, it would be significantly cheaper to build, own and crew than the Virginia or SSN-AUKUS. The design is more modern than Astute or Virginia, with electric propulsion, X configuration after control surfaces and retractable bow planes, providing better stealth and manoeuvrability; features likely to be incorporated Astute and Virginia’s successors. Suffren’s smaller size and better manoeuvrability makes it more capable in the shallow and confined waters present to Australia’s north. It is a flexible design and optimised for anti-submarine warfare and intelligence gathering, with a good anti-surface ship capability from dual-purpose torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles. It has less focus on land attack than the larger submarines, but can also carry land-attack cruise missiles, mines and special forces.

When I visited Suffren during construction in 2013, I was struck by the level of automation to reduce crew workloads and care taken to provide good access for maintenance or removal of components. It is a digital design, supported by a 3D ship’s model to facilitate planning such activities.

The Suffren class uses Low Enriched Uranium fuel and needs refuelling every 10 years, whereas the US and British designs, with Highly Enriched Uranium, are intended never to be refuelled. The Suffren reactor is designed to allow refuelling. It could be completed during a scheduled refit in Australia. Far from being a disadvantage, LEU offers significant benefits for Australia:

• Transporting, storing and securing reactors containing highly enriched uranium from the manufacturer in the UK to South Australia, where the submarines are to be built would be a complex, expensive and high-risk evolution;
• The Suffren reactor can be installed without fuel, early in the construction process and fuelled later in the build when required for tests and trials;
• Handling low enriched nuclear waste would be significantly easier than the highly enriched fuel used in the UK and US submarines;
• LEU avoids non-proliferation treaty issues; and
• Used LEU fuel can be removed and reprocessed, simplifying decommissioning at the end of life.

True, the Suffren design does not have the weapon load, vertical launch missile tubes or 90-day endurance of the Virginia and, presumably, SSN-AUKUS. However, as a nuclear-powered relative of the Attack class it is much closer to the original Australian requirement for a replacement for the Collins class than SSN-AUKUS is shaping up to be. Suffren offers adequate capability for Australia’s needs, one we can afford to own and crew.

Australia could operate 12 Suffren and still need fewer crew members than we would under the AUKUS plan and it would be significantly cheaper.

Comparing the cost of submarines is difficult; each program cost has different components, avoiding an apples with oranges comparison is difficult. Further, the price paid to purchase a submarine from its home industry is not the sales price offered to another nation. Finally, no prices have been set; we do not know what SSN-AUKUS or the Virginia class submarines, to be sold to Australia, will cost. We will have to pay what is asked. A flawed plan indeed. Fabrice Wolf writing in the French magazine Meta-Defense on 19 November 2024 concluded that:

“A Suffren costs, in fact, 35% less to produce than an Astute, and more than 60% less than an American Virginia”.

An added benefit of ordering the Suffren would be a firm contracted price. A plus compared to the open-ended arrangement we are currently involved in.

A shift to the Suffren design, should have no impact on training and maintenance programs now underway with the USN and RN. We should also go ahead with establishing an intermediate repair facility that would support UK and US SSNs as well as ours and with rotating them through Western Australia – all these skills will be required to operate and sustain Australia’s ‘Suffroos’.

As for the AUKUS acquisition plan, we need to begin urgent preparations for jointly building Suffren with France. Australia cannot wait for the US to finally say Virginias will be unavailable.

It is extraordinary that the secretive and politically focused selection process rejected the opportunity to convert the then existing contract with Naval Group to a nuclear powered Suffren, avoiding a break fee of $835 million and a total project cost of $3.4 billion for no result. Not to mention the time lost since 2021! It is time to accept that we got this wrong and to rectify our mistake.

Difficult, challenging and politically courageous? Sure, given the powerful rhetoric surrounding AUKUS. As I have shown in this article, this is rhetoric divorced from the realities of the USN’s SSN numbers and the cost and crew numbers Australia can afford.

The Suffren option provides a better chance of getting an adequate, operational SSN capability which Australia can afford to own and crew, than under the current, flawed AUKUS SSN plan which is heading for the wrong destination.

The AUKUS partners should jointly recognise the need to switch to a solution which relieves the US of the obligation to sell Australia three to five frontline SSNs, provides a sustainable force in a form which Australia can man and afford. We should adopt a solution which increases the Alliance’s overall submarine capability, not reduces it.





Peter Briggs

Rear Admiral Peter D Briggs AO(Mil) OAM CSC RAN Rtd Peter had a 40 year career in the Navy specialising as a submariner, including two submarine commands. He is a past President of the Submarine Institute of Australia and led the Silent Anzac project to protect, preserve and tell the story of HMAS AE 2. More recently he led the successful search to find and examine HMAS AE1.