Brazil’s right turn poses a danger to Asean too — Phar Kim Beng
Summary
- Brazil's presidential election highlights the rise of right-wing politics globally, impacting regions like Asean with its ideological and political trends.
- Brazil's ongoing political divisions reflect broader global challenges, such as nationalism and economic insecurity, which can influence narratives in Southeast Asia.
- Asean must focus on maintaining economic security, institutional legitimacy, and social cohesion amidst an increasingly polarised international political landscape.
First Published: Sunday, 25 Oct 2026 2:00 PM MYT
OCTOBER 25 — Brazil’s presidential election on October 25, 2026, is more than a contest between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former president Jair Bolsonaro. It is another important test of the direction of contemporary politics, where the political right has acquired increasing influence across several regions of the world.
For Asean, the implications deserve serious scrutiny.
Brazil may be geographically distant from Southeast Asia, but the ideological currents shaping its politics are not.
Nationalism, economic insecurity, political polarisation, hostility towards established institutions and dissatisfaction with traditional political parties are increasingly visible across continents.
The latest opinion polls demonstrate how closely divided Brazil has become.
Supporters of Brazil's right-wing Senator and presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro attend a campaign rally on the eve of the second round of the presidential election at the Barra da Tijuca neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 24, 2026. — AFP pic
A CNT/MDA survey released on October 24 places Flávio Bolsonaro at 46.3 per cent against Lula’s 45 per cent.
The survey, conducted between October 21 and 23 among 2,032 respondents, has a margin of error of 2.2 percentage points.
The statistical difference is therefore insufficient to establish a clear leader.
Lula has also narrowed the gap in recent surveys, suggesting that Brazil’s electorate remains deeply contested rather than decisively committed to either political direction.
Yet the broader significance is unmistakable.
The Bolsonaro political movement has remained electorally substantial despite the controversies surrounding Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency and his subsequent conviction over an attempted coup.
Its continued appeal raises an important question about the durability of right-wing populism in democratic societies.
The Brazilian experience suggests that political movements can survive the departure of their founders when their underlying constituencies remain dissatisfied with existing institutions.
This phenomenon is hardly confined to Latin America.
Across Europe, right-wing parties have drawn support from anxieties over immigration, national identity, economic stagnation and the perceived failures of political elites.
In the United States, President Donald Trump has demonstrated how nationalism and economic grievances can be combined into an enduring political movement.
Brazil belongs within this larger transformation, although each country’s political circumstances remain distinct.
The danger for Asean is not that Southeast Asian societies will mechanically reproduce Brazil’s political trajectory.
Rather, political developments elsewhere can strengthen narratives that already exist within the region.
When political movements abroad emphasise national identity, cultural insecurity and resentment towards established elites, similar arguments may acquire greater visibility in Southeast Asia.
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have different political systems and histories.
Nevertheless, all must contend with the relationship between economic expectations, identity politics and democratic accountability.
In Malaysia, the interaction between ethnicity, religion and political competition is particularly important.
The country’s political landscape has long been shaped by negotiations among Malay-Muslim political interests, minority communities, regional identities and competing visions of national development.
A more polarised international political environment could complicate these negotiations.
Political actors may increasingly frame economic dissatisfaction through questions of identity rather than public policy.
Such tendencies can narrow the space for compromise, especially in a plural society where constitutional arrangements depend upon sustained intercommunal understanding.
Indonesia faces a different challenge.
As the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy, Indonesia must reconcile its democratic institutions with nationalism, religious mobilisation and the demands of economic transformation.
Its experience demonstrates that nationalism is not inherently incompatible with democratic pluralism.
Much depends upon whether political leaders employ national identity to strengthen inclusive institutions or to marginalise competing voices.
Thailand, meanwhile, continues to confront tensions between conservative institutions, reformist movements and competing understandings of political legitimacy.
The Philippines has its own experience of personality-driven politics, where family networks, popular mobilisation and law-and-order narratives have shaped electoral competition.
None of these countries can be reduced to a Brazilian political template.
Nevertheless, developments in Brazil provide another opportunity to examine how democratic competition changes when ideological polarisation becomes deeply embedded.
There is also a significant geopolitical dimension.
Brazil is a founding member of BRICS, a grouping that has become increasingly relevant to debates over multipolarity, international economic governance and the distribution of global influence.
Malaysia and Indonesia have sought closer engagement with BRICS as part of their wider diplomatic diversification.
Under Lula, Brazil has emphasised South-South cooperation, multilateral diplomacy and greater representation for developing economies.
A Bolsonaro administration could adopt different priorities, particularly regarding relations with Washington, environmental governance and the political orientation of BRICS.
These possibilities should not be confused with established policy decisions.
They would depend upon the composition of any new administration, domestic institutional constraints and Brazil’s economic interests.
Even so, Asean cannot assume that the strategic preferences of major emerging economies will remain unchanged after elections.
Brazil’s political contest also has implications for climate diplomacy.
The Amazon rainforest remains crucial to global biodiversity and climate stability.
Environmental policy has consequently become one of the important dividing lines between Lula and the Bolsonaro political movement.
Lula’s administration has pursued reductions in Amazon deforestation, while environmental campaigners have expressed concern over the implications of a possible return to Bolsonaro-family leadership.
For Southeast Asia, where deforestation, haze, biodiversity loss and extreme weather already present serious challenges, the international direction of climate policy is consequential.
A weakening of global environmental cooperation could make regional sustainability objectives more difficult to achieve.
Yet Asean must also recognise that right-wing politics is not a uniform phenomenon.
Conservative parties may support constitutional government, market reform and national sovereignty without embracing exclusionary nationalism or weakening democratic institutions.
The distinction between democratic conservatism and illiberal populism therefore matters.
Treating all right-wing movements as identical would obscure the very political developments that Asean needs to understand.
Similarly, Lula’s political difficulties cannot be explained exclusively through the ideological appeal of his opponents.
Concerns over living costs, crime, economic opportunity and dissatisfaction with government performance are legitimate electoral issues. The Associated Press has identified these concerns as central to the Brazilian campaign.
Governments that fail to address such grievances may find that voters increasingly turn towards alternative political movements.
The deeper lesson for Asean is therefore institutional rather than partisan.
Democratic resilience depends upon governments delivering economic security, maintaining public confidence, respecting constitutional procedures and preserving the legitimacy of political competition.
Asean’s own principles of consensus, inclusiveness and respect for diversity remain relevant, but they must be supported by practical governance.
Regional stability cannot rest exclusively upon diplomatic declarations while domestic societies experience rising economic anxiety and declining confidence in political institutions.
Brazil’s election should also remind Asean that multipolarity does not necessarily produce ideological moderation.
A world containing several centres of power may simultaneously experience sharper nationalism, more contested international institutions and greater competition over political values.
This is especially significant for Asean’s pursuit of centrality.
Asean cannot exercise even its circumscribed power effectively if its member states become increasingly divided by domestic ideological conflicts or external political alignments.
The Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific offers a framework for cooperation, inclusiveness and open regionalism.
Its credibility will depend upon whether member states continue to uphold these principles amid intensifying global competition.
Brazil’s presidential runoff has not yet produced a final verdict. Its close polling figures underscore the uncertainty of the contest.
Regardless of the outcome, the strength of competing political movements illustrates the depth of Brazil’s political divisions.
For Asean, the central concern is not simply whether Brazil moves further right or remains under Lula.
It is whether the broader international environment becomes increasingly polarised, leaving less room for compromise, pluralism and effective multilateral cooperation.
A global movement towards more confrontational politics would not stop at the geographical boundaries of Southeast Asia.
Asean must therefore understand the changing ideological landscape without assuming that political developments abroad will inevitably determine its own future.
Brazil’s election is a reminder that economic security, institutional legitimacy and social cohesion are essential foundations of political stability.
The challenge for Asean is to preserve these foundations while the international political landscape continues to change.
For a region built upon diversity, accommodation and diplomatic flexibility, that challenge is already substantial.
And it will not disappear when Brazil finishes counting its votes.
Nationalism, economic insecurity, political polarisation, hostility towards established institutions and dissatisfaction with traditional political parties are increasingly visible across continents.
The latest opinion polls demonstrate how closely divided Brazil has become.
Supporters of Brazil's right-wing Senator and presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro attend a campaign rally on the eve of the second round of the presidential election at the Barra da Tijuca neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 24, 2026. — AFP pic
A CNT/MDA survey released on October 24 places Flávio Bolsonaro at 46.3 per cent against Lula’s 45 per cent.
The survey, conducted between October 21 and 23 among 2,032 respondents, has a margin of error of 2.2 percentage points.
The statistical difference is therefore insufficient to establish a clear leader.
Lula has also narrowed the gap in recent surveys, suggesting that Brazil’s electorate remains deeply contested rather than decisively committed to either political direction.
Yet the broader significance is unmistakable.
The Bolsonaro political movement has remained electorally substantial despite the controversies surrounding Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency and his subsequent conviction over an attempted coup.
Its continued appeal raises an important question about the durability of right-wing populism in democratic societies.
The Brazilian experience suggests that political movements can survive the departure of their founders when their underlying constituencies remain dissatisfied with existing institutions.
This phenomenon is hardly confined to Latin America.
Across Europe, right-wing parties have drawn support from anxieties over immigration, national identity, economic stagnation and the perceived failures of political elites.
In the United States, President Donald Trump has demonstrated how nationalism and economic grievances can be combined into an enduring political movement.
Brazil belongs within this larger transformation, although each country’s political circumstances remain distinct.
The danger for Asean is not that Southeast Asian societies will mechanically reproduce Brazil’s political trajectory.
Rather, political developments elsewhere can strengthen narratives that already exist within the region.
When political movements abroad emphasise national identity, cultural insecurity and resentment towards established elites, similar arguments may acquire greater visibility in Southeast Asia.
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have different political systems and histories.
Nevertheless, all must contend with the relationship between economic expectations, identity politics and democratic accountability.
In Malaysia, the interaction between ethnicity, religion and political competition is particularly important.
The country’s political landscape has long been shaped by negotiations among Malay-Muslim political interests, minority communities, regional identities and competing visions of national development.
A more polarised international political environment could complicate these negotiations.
Political actors may increasingly frame economic dissatisfaction through questions of identity rather than public policy.
Such tendencies can narrow the space for compromise, especially in a plural society where constitutional arrangements depend upon sustained intercommunal understanding.
Indonesia faces a different challenge.
As the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy, Indonesia must reconcile its democratic institutions with nationalism, religious mobilisation and the demands of economic transformation.
Its experience demonstrates that nationalism is not inherently incompatible with democratic pluralism.
Much depends upon whether political leaders employ national identity to strengthen inclusive institutions or to marginalise competing voices.
Thailand, meanwhile, continues to confront tensions between conservative institutions, reformist movements and competing understandings of political legitimacy.
The Philippines has its own experience of personality-driven politics, where family networks, popular mobilisation and law-and-order narratives have shaped electoral competition.
None of these countries can be reduced to a Brazilian political template.
Nevertheless, developments in Brazil provide another opportunity to examine how democratic competition changes when ideological polarisation becomes deeply embedded.
There is also a significant geopolitical dimension.
Brazil is a founding member of BRICS, a grouping that has become increasingly relevant to debates over multipolarity, international economic governance and the distribution of global influence.
Malaysia and Indonesia have sought closer engagement with BRICS as part of their wider diplomatic diversification.
Under Lula, Brazil has emphasised South-South cooperation, multilateral diplomacy and greater representation for developing economies.
A Bolsonaro administration could adopt different priorities, particularly regarding relations with Washington, environmental governance and the political orientation of BRICS.
These possibilities should not be confused with established policy decisions.
They would depend upon the composition of any new administration, domestic institutional constraints and Brazil’s economic interests.
Even so, Asean cannot assume that the strategic preferences of major emerging economies will remain unchanged after elections.
Brazil’s political contest also has implications for climate diplomacy.
The Amazon rainforest remains crucial to global biodiversity and climate stability.
Environmental policy has consequently become one of the important dividing lines between Lula and the Bolsonaro political movement.
Lula’s administration has pursued reductions in Amazon deforestation, while environmental campaigners have expressed concern over the implications of a possible return to Bolsonaro-family leadership.
For Southeast Asia, where deforestation, haze, biodiversity loss and extreme weather already present serious challenges, the international direction of climate policy is consequential.
A weakening of global environmental cooperation could make regional sustainability objectives more difficult to achieve.
Yet Asean must also recognise that right-wing politics is not a uniform phenomenon.
Conservative parties may support constitutional government, market reform and national sovereignty without embracing exclusionary nationalism or weakening democratic institutions.
The distinction between democratic conservatism and illiberal populism therefore matters.
Treating all right-wing movements as identical would obscure the very political developments that Asean needs to understand.
Similarly, Lula’s political difficulties cannot be explained exclusively through the ideological appeal of his opponents.
Concerns over living costs, crime, economic opportunity and dissatisfaction with government performance are legitimate electoral issues. The Associated Press has identified these concerns as central to the Brazilian campaign.
Governments that fail to address such grievances may find that voters increasingly turn towards alternative political movements.
The deeper lesson for Asean is therefore institutional rather than partisan.
Democratic resilience depends upon governments delivering economic security, maintaining public confidence, respecting constitutional procedures and preserving the legitimacy of political competition.
Asean’s own principles of consensus, inclusiveness and respect for diversity remain relevant, but they must be supported by practical governance.
Regional stability cannot rest exclusively upon diplomatic declarations while domestic societies experience rising economic anxiety and declining confidence in political institutions.
Brazil’s election should also remind Asean that multipolarity does not necessarily produce ideological moderation.
A world containing several centres of power may simultaneously experience sharper nationalism, more contested international institutions and greater competition over political values.
This is especially significant for Asean’s pursuit of centrality.
Asean cannot exercise even its circumscribed power effectively if its member states become increasingly divided by domestic ideological conflicts or external political alignments.
The Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific offers a framework for cooperation, inclusiveness and open regionalism.
Its credibility will depend upon whether member states continue to uphold these principles amid intensifying global competition.
Brazil’s presidential runoff has not yet produced a final verdict. Its close polling figures underscore the uncertainty of the contest.
Regardless of the outcome, the strength of competing political movements illustrates the depth of Brazil’s political divisions.
For Asean, the central concern is not simply whether Brazil moves further right or remains under Lula.
It is whether the broader international environment becomes increasingly polarised, leaving less room for compromise, pluralism and effective multilateral cooperation.
A global movement towards more confrontational politics would not stop at the geographical boundaries of Southeast Asia.
Asean must therefore understand the changing ideological landscape without assuming that political developments abroad will inevitably determine its own future.
Brazil’s election is a reminder that economic security, institutional legitimacy and social cohesion are essential foundations of political stability.
The challenge for Asean is to preserve these foundations while the international political landscape continues to change.
For a region built upon diversity, accommodation and diplomatic flexibility, that challenge is already substantial.
And it will not disappear when Brazil finishes counting its votes.
* Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of Asean Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).
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