PM term limit bill ignores the true check on power

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PM term limit bill ignores the true check on power

3 hours ago
Letter to the Editor

Events showed the bill was never meant to pass: it misunderstands the Westminster system, undermines the king’s discretion and ignores parliamentary confidence as the true check on power

From Badlisyah Abdul Ghani


Proponents of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, which sought to limit the prime minister’s tenure to 10 years, hailed the proposal as a landmark reform. Yet the events of March 2026 revealed a fundamental lack of preparation, showing that the bill was never meant to pass.


While curbing concentrated power is laudable, the chosen method fundamentally misunderstands how power is checked in a Westminster democracy. Among several amendments, this proposal mistook political symbolism for genuine institutional reform.


The cardinal sin

The bill’s most profound legal flaw was its direct assault on the discretionary powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. The constitution vests in the king discretion to appoint a prime minister who “in his judgment” commands the majority’s confidence. Amending Article 43 to bar 10-year-veteran prime ministers from reappointment would have padlocked the king’s judgment.

Imagine a prime minister reaching the cap yet remaining the only figure still capable of commanding confidence. This amendment would force His Majesty to ignore his own assessment and turn to a less capable leader. Effectively, it would say to the king: “Your judgment is subordinate to a clock.”

Proponents argued that the amendment did not touch royal privileges under Article 38(4). Legally, this is a distinction without a difference. To constrain the discretion that defines a constitutional monarchy is to diminish its “position, honour, and sovereignty” in practice, if not in explicit text.


Westminster paradox

During the debate, the government framed the term limit as a guard against corruption and “prolonged concentration of power.” This reveals a startling lack of faith in the system that lawmakers are sworn to uphold.

The ultimate term limit already exists: loss of confidence. The primary check on a prime minister is not a calendar, but the will of the party and Parliament. Malaysian history proves this:

Tunku Abdul Rahman lost power after 13 years due to a loss of confidence from his party, Umno.

Hussein Onn’s departure was party-driven.

Dr Mahathir Mohamad resigned after 22 years, handing over to his deputy.

Abdullah Badawi resigned when his party told him his time was up.

Najib Razak’s tenure ended at the ballot box.

Mahathir’s second stint collapsed after 22 months of coalition infighting.

Muhyiddin Yassin lost office after 17 months when his coalition withdrew support.

Ismail Sabri Yaakob’s 15-month tenure ended amid Cabinet disunity.

Seven of nine prime ministers served for under a decade, while Tun Abdul Razak’s term was cut short by his terminal illness. The two who exceeded it left not by clock, but by party will. The Westminster system has never failed to “tell the time.”


Solution in search of a problem

How did this term-limit proposal come to be? It was pushed to appease coalition partners threatening to quit the Cabinet if their electoral commitments were unmet.

It reeks of political expediency: policy-making by focus group, not constitutional statesmanship. Dressing an untested populist promise in sacred language does not make it a solution.

No Westminster parliament has ever imposed such a limit; not even in the UK, where a 2014 private member’s bill died after its first reading. Yet here, a 10-year cap was presented as a cure for governance ills.


Opposition misdiagnosis

Barring the prime minister from holding the post of finance minister commits the same error: mistaking title for power. The prime minsiter already heads the Treasury by virtue of his office. Malaysia follows the Westminster practice: the prime minister is de facto First Lord of the Treasury; the finance minister, Second Lord.

Malaysia does not use these titles, but in reality, the practice is identical. Barring him from the finance ministry denies only a label, leaving power untouched. Authority over finance resides in the office, not the portfolio.

The proposal also misunderstands fiscal power. Parliament can reject or reduce the budget, but not substitute its own. Rejecting the budget withdraws confidence and brings down the government, because the executive commands a parliamentary majority.

This proposal treats the prime minister as an American-style President facing Congress. But the president is the apex of a single branch: the executive.

The prime minister’s power flows through the Cabinet and public services. One cannot surgically remove “finance” any more than “foreign policy” or “defence.” The prime minister remains first among equals, and that position always carries the decisive voice.


Clock, crown, confidence

The proposed term limit was an inelegant, legally dubious graft from a presidential system to a parliamentary body. It would have handcuffed the king, shackling the institution charged with deciding who becomes prime minister.

The bill fails to see that every prime minister, from Tunku Abdul Rahman to Ismail Sabri (save Tun Abdul Razak), was subject to a far more sophisticated, politically legitimate term limit: shifting sands of confidence. A fixed term creates perverse incentives: a lame-duck prime minister faces a rush to secure legacy or enrich allies.

The opposition’s counteroffer misunderstands this as well. The prime minister remains first among equals. The question is whether institutions are strong enough to check power openly and accountably.

Our constitution’s strength lies not in limits on tenure, but in the resilience of its institutions. In coalition governments, a prime minister dependent on fractious partners becomes a lame duck twice over. To codify a decade in stone or restrict portfolios ignores the Westminster system as constitutionally enshrined.

The abstentions of unity government MPs confirmed it: this term limit bill was never meant to pass.



Badlisyah Abdul Ghani is a lawyer and seasoned financial services veteran.

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Well argued and written 👍👍👍