U.S. Used Up 15-20 Percent of its Global THAAD Anti-Missile Arsenal in Just 11 Days of Mid-Intensity Combat: Cost Over $800 Million
Middle East , Missile and Space

The U.S. Army has been estimated to have consumed 15-20 of all munitions for its globally deployed arsenal of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) long range anti-missile systems, after deployment to support Israeli air defences during the country’s 11 days of hostilities with Iran. A highly specialised asset designed to intercept medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles, the U.S. Army fields seven systems across five air defence regiments, and is set to operationalise an eighth by the end of the year. The systems are depended on to counter the arsenals of five potential adversaries including North Korea, China, Russia and Belarus, as well as Iran. Video footage has shown the launch of 39 interceptors to intercept Iranian missiles from June 13-24, although only a small portion of launches were captured on film partly due to the strict wartime censorship that was put in place in Israel. Presuming at a conservative estimate that the filmed launches from THAAD batteries accounted for 50-66 percent of total launches, total expenditure of interceptors amounted to approximately 60-80 interceptors during the 11 day conflict.

The expenditure of 60-80 interceptors is significant when considering a combination of three factors: their cost, the small numbers available, and the relatively low intensity of Iranian missile strikes. With each THAAD interceptor launch costing an estimated $12-15 million, air defence operations using the system deployed in Israel cost an estimated $810 million to $1.215 billion. The expenditure of this many interceptors represents 15-20 percent of the entire U.S. Army’s arsenal, which has significant implications far beyond the Middle East, and particularly in the Pacific. The intensity of Iranian-Israeli hostilities was relatively low, with Iran having fired ballistic missiles at a modest rate well below its actual capabilities in order to maintain a proportional response to Israeli attacks, avoid escalation, and retain a capacity to respond should the United States escalate by fully entering the war. A further factor in the low intensity of operations is that the THAAD system in Israel had more support from other anti-ballistic missile systems than it would in almost any other location, with Israel’s Arrow and Barak 8 systems also optimised for intercepting such high altitude missiles, while nearby AEGIS destroyers provided support with their SM-3 anti-ballistic missiles.

Had Iran launched more intensive missile attacks, including using more missile with multiple warheads, or had it sustained bombardment beyond the 11 day conflict, the THAAD system in Israel would have seen its ability to contribute to air defence operations rapidly diminish. The system’s limitations have very significant implications for its viability both in the Middle East, and globally where it is relied on to counter arsenals that are significantly larger and more capable than that of Iran. The first foreign deployment of the THAAD system was made in June 2009 to protect Hawaii from North Korean intermediate range ballistic missiles, with a second system deployed on Guam in 2013, followed by a third in South Korea from 2016. THAAD batteries and radars have also been tested on Wake Island, which has gained growing importance in American plans for a potential war with North Korea and China, and is expected to be protected by the systems in wartime. Russia’s recent introduction of the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile, its sharing of the missiles with Belarus, and its procurement of North Korean Pukkuksong-2 medium range ballistic missiles, are expected to also lead to calls to also deploy THAAD systems in Europe. Thus the rate at which the arsenal of THAAD interceptors was depleted in Israel’s defence despite highly favourable conditions bodes ill for the systems’ viability in future medium and high intensity conflicts, as well as the affordability of its operations.
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