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‘This is also America’s war’: Why the U.S. isn’t stopping Israel’s Gaza onslaught
Israelis and Palestinians are making a terrible mistake by looking exclusively to Washington to solve their problems, says former negotiator Daniel Levy.
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Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses Congress in Washington, DC, July 24, 2024. (Amos Ben Gershom/GPO)
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In the wake of Hamas’ October 7 massacres, U.S. President Joe Biden traveled to Israel for a solidarity visit. But a few days before he arrived, as the war effort intensified, he issued a blunt warning: “I made it clear to the Israelis I think it’s a big mistake for them to think they’re going to occupy Gaza and maintain Gaza,” he told reporters.
Since then, Biden has reiterated that Israel must prevent a humanitarian crisis and avoid harming civilians, urging its leaders not to repeat the errors that the United States made in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Israel invaded the southern city of Rafah, Biden threatened back in March, Washington would stop providing offensive weapons.
Israel ignored all these warnings: it occupied Gaza, invaded Rafah, wreaked unfathomable devastation, and sabotaged every ceasefire agreement by insisting that its forces remain in the Strip. And rather than impose any consequences, the United States has twice deployed its own military to the region in order to “clean up” after its ally carried out high-level assassinations in Damascus, Beirut, and Tehran.
Is the United States unable or simply unwilling to impose its demands on Israel? Does this war prove that Israel is a burden rather than a strategic asset, as many in Washington have long argued? And given the growing opposition within Democratic Party to unconditional support for Israel, and resentment among Democratic voters in the leadup to the November elections, why hasn’t the Biden administration changed course?
The answer to these questions is very simple, says Daniel Levy, the president of the U.S./Middle East Project: Washington is not stopping Israel, because this is its own war, too.
A former advisor to the Israeli negotiation team during the Oslo peace process, and now widely known as a sharp critic of Israel, Levy spoke with +972 and Local Call about the need to temper expectations around the shifts occurring in American politics and society vis-a-vis Israel. Instead of waiting for Washington to change its policies, he stressed, both Palestinians and the Israeli left need to recognize the different geopolitical realities around them, and abandon the fantasy that America can solve their problems.
This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
Daniel Levy, President of USMEP and former Israeli negotiator, speaking at the UN Security Council in New York. (Courtesy of USMEP)
I don’t remember the Palestinian issue ever overshadowing a Democratic National Convention, or being such a controversial issue in American politics, as it is right now. Israel has always had bipartisan support — there was no debate. Am I wrong?
You’re completely right. The question for me, therefore, is how do we have 10 months of a horrific war? With everything we know about Netanyahu, Smotrich, and Ben Gvir, and with everything we know about American public opinion and Democrat voters — how can it be that the Democratic Party is totally unwilling to undergo meaningful change in the public narrative or in the policy of impunity? It literally lets Israel get away with anything.
Let’s go back a step. What has changed in American public opinion vis-a-vis Israel-Palestine in the last 10 months?
What has happened is an acceleration of an existing, longer-term trend [in the decline of Americans’ support for Israel]. One of the primary things [driving this trend] are the [political] changes in Israel, and in the U.S, Americans are connecting the dots to see Israel-Palestine as a question of racial justice and intersectionality.
We had an expression [for liberal Americans who remained pro-Israel]: “PEP” — Progressive Except Palestine. But now, on the progressive side, you pay a price if your politics on Palestine and Israel are way out of sync with the rest of your politics.
So now it’s PEP — Progressive Especially Palestine?
I wouldn’t say so. But that interacts with the changes in Israel. The most obvious one is an Israeli leadership that doesn’t even try to disguise its apartheid nature or its racism. Secondly, there’s no parliamentary Zionist left in Israel that can talk not only to progressives, but even a mainstream center left in America with any credibility, because their positions are so horrible, so unprogressive, even illiberal.
In this equation, you also have to put the tightening of the alliance between the Israeli right and the American right, which began to open more space for Democrats to ask, “What is this game?” Israel is a global right-wing cause, but especially so in America; and almost the entirety of the Zionist camp has embraced that [fact] in Israel, even those who say they have to be more bipartisan.
The other thing [that has shifted public opinion] is time: the occupation is so permanent, and Oslo has become so transparent a mechanism for Bantustanization.
I don’t remember the Palestinian issue ever overshadowing a Democratic National Convention, or being such a controversial issue in American politics, as it is right now. Israel has always had bipartisan support — there was no debate. Am I wrong?
You’re completely right. The question for me, therefore, is how do we have 10 months of a horrific war? With everything we know about Netanyahu, Smotrich, and Ben Gvir, and with everything we know about American public opinion and Democrat voters — how can it be that the Democratic Party is totally unwilling to undergo meaningful change in the public narrative or in the policy of impunity? It literally lets Israel get away with anything.
Let’s go back a step. What has changed in American public opinion vis-a-vis Israel-Palestine in the last 10 months?
What has happened is an acceleration of an existing, longer-term trend [in the decline of Americans’ support for Israel]. One of the primary things [driving this trend] are the [political] changes in Israel, and in the U.S, Americans are connecting the dots to see Israel-Palestine as a question of racial justice and intersectionality.
We had an expression [for liberal Americans who remained pro-Israel]: “PEP” — Progressive Except Palestine. But now, on the progressive side, you pay a price if your politics on Palestine and Israel are way out of sync with the rest of your politics.
So now it’s PEP — Progressive Especially Palestine?
I wouldn’t say so. But that interacts with the changes in Israel. The most obvious one is an Israeli leadership that doesn’t even try to disguise its apartheid nature or its racism. Secondly, there’s no parliamentary Zionist left in Israel that can talk not only to progressives, but even a mainstream center left in America with any credibility, because their positions are so horrible, so unprogressive, even illiberal.
In this equation, you also have to put the tightening of the alliance between the Israeli right and the American right, which began to open more space for Democrats to ask, “What is this game?” Israel is a global right-wing cause, but especially so in America; and almost the entirety of the Zionist camp has embraced that [fact] in Israel, even those who say they have to be more bipartisan.
The other thing [that has shifted public opinion] is time: the occupation is so permanent, and Oslo has become so transparent a mechanism for Bantustanization.
Pro-Palestinian protesters in Washington demonstrate against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his speech to the U.S. Congress, July 24, 2024. (Arie Leib Abrams/Flash90)
How much of a factor was October 7 and what followed?
There was the juxtaposition of an administration that [when it came to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine] claimed to be the “the upholders of the international law and the rules-based international order” — and then it absolutely sidelined and marginalized all of that [after October 7], and a president who was so incapable of attributing humanity to Palestinians against the backdrop of such a horrendous reality.
The Biden administration is doing precisely the opposite to what it was saying for so long on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — so of course that generates a counter-reaction. All these things were bubbling under the surface, waiting to come up.
In her speech at the DNC, Kamala Harris emphasized Israel’s right to defend itself but also spoke about the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza, vowing to work so that “the Palestinian people can realize their right to dignity, security, freedom, and self-determination.” The audience cheered that sentence more than any other in her whole speech.
I saw two analyses of the speech: for the Israeli news site Ynet, Nadav Eyal wrote that Israel got exactly what it wanted from Harris; the progressive American news site Vox, meanwhile, wrote that Harris presented a different approach to the conflict compared to that of Biden, more supportive of the Palestinians. How do you see her speech?
I think she achieved what she wanted: that both of those kinds of reporting could come out, and that both AIPAC and J Street could endorse it. But if we shift attention to the Palestinian rights movement or the Uncommitted Movement, there is nothing there for them. The way the DNC treated the issue tells you everything you need to know about the ways things aren’t changing — for instance, [the fact there was] no Palestinian speaker or perspective on the stage.
Harris can talk about bad things that have happened to Palestinians, but from her words you wouldn’t know who caused it — a natural disaster? An earthquake? When Hamas does something bad, they are named and shamed; but when bad things happen to Palestinians, there is never any acknowledgement that they are caused by Israel.
The nuances and differences between Biden and Harris do exist, and they matter, but we always have to go deeper. The expectation is totally misplaced that the United States will solve this.
How much of a factor was October 7 and what followed?
There was the juxtaposition of an administration that [when it came to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine] claimed to be the “the upholders of the international law and the rules-based international order” — and then it absolutely sidelined and marginalized all of that [after October 7], and a president who was so incapable of attributing humanity to Palestinians against the backdrop of such a horrendous reality.
The Biden administration is doing precisely the opposite to what it was saying for so long on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — so of course that generates a counter-reaction. All these things were bubbling under the surface, waiting to come up.
In her speech at the DNC, Kamala Harris emphasized Israel’s right to defend itself but also spoke about the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza, vowing to work so that “the Palestinian people can realize their right to dignity, security, freedom, and self-determination.” The audience cheered that sentence more than any other in her whole speech.
I saw two analyses of the speech: for the Israeli news site Ynet, Nadav Eyal wrote that Israel got exactly what it wanted from Harris; the progressive American news site Vox, meanwhile, wrote that Harris presented a different approach to the conflict compared to that of Biden, more supportive of the Palestinians. How do you see her speech?
I think she achieved what she wanted: that both of those kinds of reporting could come out, and that both AIPAC and J Street could endorse it. But if we shift attention to the Palestinian rights movement or the Uncommitted Movement, there is nothing there for them. The way the DNC treated the issue tells you everything you need to know about the ways things aren’t changing — for instance, [the fact there was] no Palestinian speaker or perspective on the stage.
Harris can talk about bad things that have happened to Palestinians, but from her words you wouldn’t know who caused it — a natural disaster? An earthquake? When Hamas does something bad, they are named and shamed; but when bad things happen to Palestinians, there is never any acknowledgement that they are caused by Israel.
The nuances and differences between Biden and Harris do exist, and they matter, but we always have to go deeper. The expectation is totally misplaced that the United States will solve this.
U.S. President Joe Biden during a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Tel Aviv, October 18, 2023. (Miriam Alster/Flash90)
This is a failure of at least part of the Israeli progressive camp that looks to America to save Israel from itself — it’s highly unrealistic, fantasyland stuff. This is also America’s war. Israel couldn’t have done this without all the weapons America provided. Unless American politics and the reading of its own national interest change, there’s no reason to think this is going to be different in any significant way.
This may be America’s war, and it’s true that no one from the Uncommitted movement spoke, but Palestine was and still is the most divisive issue in the Democratic Party today. How do you see these shifts?
I’m definitely not saying that there isn’t a story here. There are very positive and important signs that will build, they’re not going away. But I don’t think we are close to a tipping point.
When we misread the depth and pace of change in America, it’s an own goal in two ways. First, Americans themselves get the impression that just by [politicians] sending these little hints — that Harris is a three-degree shift to this side of Biden — that they have done enough, that this is actually going to have a practical effect.
Second, when you build up this unrealistic expectation, it helps [bolster in Israel] the narrative of “Bibi the Magician” — that somehow, although the Americans were so close to punishing Israel, it didn’t happen. It doesn’t happen because it was never going to happen in the first place. But in the Israeli narrative, it’s another win for Netanyahu: the magician prevented it.
Let’s stick to changes that took place in the United States vis-a-vis Israel. Were you able to talk about these issues in in Democratic Party 20 years ago?
No, but where were we 20 years ago? Prominent human rights organizations, including Israeli ones, have now made apartheid designations [regarding Israel], along with many states and [arguably] the ICJ itself. But it is still forbidden to talk about this in Democratic political circles — that there’s a genocide plausibly going on, and Israel’s crimes and illegal actions are so transparent. Israel has largely lost the narrative, but don’t underestimate how much things can still be policed by the brutality of money and pro-Israel forces.
So Israel lost its case, but this is countered by money?
Money, narratives on antisemitism (a concerted effort that has been very successful), and the fact that the American Jewish establishment has stayed in lockstep with Israel. There’s not one major dissenting Jewish legacy organization. The Anti-Defamation League is very important in the weaponization and instrumentalization of antisemitism and the criminalization of Palestinian freedom of expression.
This is a failure of at least part of the Israeli progressive camp that looks to America to save Israel from itself — it’s highly unrealistic, fantasyland stuff. This is also America’s war. Israel couldn’t have done this without all the weapons America provided. Unless American politics and the reading of its own national interest change, there’s no reason to think this is going to be different in any significant way.
This may be America’s war, and it’s true that no one from the Uncommitted movement spoke, but Palestine was and still is the most divisive issue in the Democratic Party today. How do you see these shifts?
I’m definitely not saying that there isn’t a story here. There are very positive and important signs that will build, they’re not going away. But I don’t think we are close to a tipping point.
When we misread the depth and pace of change in America, it’s an own goal in two ways. First, Americans themselves get the impression that just by [politicians] sending these little hints — that Harris is a three-degree shift to this side of Biden — that they have done enough, that this is actually going to have a practical effect.
Second, when you build up this unrealistic expectation, it helps [bolster in Israel] the narrative of “Bibi the Magician” — that somehow, although the Americans were so close to punishing Israel, it didn’t happen. It doesn’t happen because it was never going to happen in the first place. But in the Israeli narrative, it’s another win for Netanyahu: the magician prevented it.
Let’s stick to changes that took place in the United States vis-a-vis Israel. Were you able to talk about these issues in in Democratic Party 20 years ago?
No, but where were we 20 years ago? Prominent human rights organizations, including Israeli ones, have now made apartheid designations [regarding Israel], along with many states and [arguably] the ICJ itself. But it is still forbidden to talk about this in Democratic political circles — that there’s a genocide plausibly going on, and Israel’s crimes and illegal actions are so transparent. Israel has largely lost the narrative, but don’t underestimate how much things can still be policed by the brutality of money and pro-Israel forces.
So Israel lost its case, but this is countered by money?
Money, narratives on antisemitism (a concerted effort that has been very successful), and the fact that the American Jewish establishment has stayed in lockstep with Israel. There’s not one major dissenting Jewish legacy organization. The Anti-Defamation League is very important in the weaponization and instrumentalization of antisemitism and the criminalization of Palestinian freedom of expression.
Protesters outside the Verizon Center where Donald Trump addressed AIPAC, Washington DC, March 21, 2016. (Susan Melkisethian/CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
Does that include J Street?
J Street offers a soft critique. It has become more and more important inside the Democratic Party, but less and less cutting edge and meaningful. JStreet can get more [Congressional] members on the letter, but the content of that letter is so pareve.
They don’t call for sanctions or for conditioning aid?
In the most minor of ways. This isn’t just about Israel; the Democratic Party has allowed what are called “independent expenditure campaigns” in primary elections. The most expensive primary in congressional history happened this cycle in order to kick out Jamaal Bowman and also Cori Bush. At the end of the day, those primaries were decided by money, and it has a huge influence: other politicians say: “I’d like to be on their side, but I’m not going to lose my seat over this issue.” The Democratic establishment did not stand up for Bowman or Bush, even though it cost them enthusiasm and mobilization among their voting base.
So as the movement for Palestinian rights has built up one kind of popular power, pro-Israel forces have doubled down on financial power. The Democratic Party could have said they will not allow independent expenditure campaigns, because they are a travesty and a disgrace to democracy, but they didn’t — and so they have enabled those pro-Israel forces.
What I’m saying is this is an important movement and it will grow, but if you blow it out of proportion, you come out with the wrong political analysis.
If you had to assess the weight of each of these various elements preventing change vis-a-vis Israel-Palestine, which would you say is the biggest factor?
I would try the following analogy: gun control has been won as a [popular] issue with much of the American electorate, much more than Palestine. Yes, there are second amendment rights and a culture around [gun ownership], but what largely keeps gun control in check in terms of legislative and policy changes is the financial power of the gun lobby. Without money in politics, things would look different.
It’s also important to point out that it’s a different world. In the 1990s, we lived in a unipolar world — this was the American moment, post-Soviet Union, pre-9/11, pre-China. Today, we still see the world through America — but a smart strategy would build on the fact that America is not the friend of peace in the Middle East, but an enemy.
A different geopolitics helps us recognize this issue. Global South countries, led by South Africa, were behind the push for the genocide case at the ICJ. Global South countries led on the ICJ’s advisory opinion regarding the entirety of the occupation, with depositions from Indonesia, Namibia, Malaysia, and some Arab states [among many others].
Does that include J Street?
J Street offers a soft critique. It has become more and more important inside the Democratic Party, but less and less cutting edge and meaningful. JStreet can get more [Congressional] members on the letter, but the content of that letter is so pareve.
They don’t call for sanctions or for conditioning aid?
In the most minor of ways. This isn’t just about Israel; the Democratic Party has allowed what are called “independent expenditure campaigns” in primary elections. The most expensive primary in congressional history happened this cycle in order to kick out Jamaal Bowman and also Cori Bush. At the end of the day, those primaries were decided by money, and it has a huge influence: other politicians say: “I’d like to be on their side, but I’m not going to lose my seat over this issue.” The Democratic establishment did not stand up for Bowman or Bush, even though it cost them enthusiasm and mobilization among their voting base.
So as the movement for Palestinian rights has built up one kind of popular power, pro-Israel forces have doubled down on financial power. The Democratic Party could have said they will not allow independent expenditure campaigns, because they are a travesty and a disgrace to democracy, but they didn’t — and so they have enabled those pro-Israel forces.
What I’m saying is this is an important movement and it will grow, but if you blow it out of proportion, you come out with the wrong political analysis.
If you had to assess the weight of each of these various elements preventing change vis-a-vis Israel-Palestine, which would you say is the biggest factor?
I would try the following analogy: gun control has been won as a [popular] issue with much of the American electorate, much more than Palestine. Yes, there are second amendment rights and a culture around [gun ownership], but what largely keeps gun control in check in terms of legislative and policy changes is the financial power of the gun lobby. Without money in politics, things would look different.
It’s also important to point out that it’s a different world. In the 1990s, we lived in a unipolar world — this was the American moment, post-Soviet Union, pre-9/11, pre-China. Today, we still see the world through America — but a smart strategy would build on the fact that America is not the friend of peace in the Middle East, but an enemy.
A different geopolitics helps us recognize this issue. Global South countries, led by South Africa, were behind the push for the genocide case at the ICJ. Global South countries led on the ICJ’s advisory opinion regarding the entirety of the occupation, with depositions from Indonesia, Namibia, Malaysia, and some Arab states [among many others].
Bethlehem Municipality employees raise a South African flag in support of their lawsuit against Israel to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the West Bank city of Bethlehem, January 16, 2024. (Wisam Hashlamoun/Flash90)
I’m not suggesting there’s a better global hegemon waiting to replace America. Every state is a friend of their own interests, not necessarily of some vague notion of peace. But we live in a world where America can’t always assert its own interests. And so the crucial question, especially for the Palestinians, is why continue to look to America exclusively to lead? It’s a terrible mistake by the Palestinians, and one that Israelis should also avoid falling into.
When I think about Israel, there will have to be a combination of change from within and pressure from without. Perhaps we should think about America in the same way: one needs to push for change from within, but there also needs to be costs for America from the outside for continuing down this route. America can get away with this because there’s not enough cost, but I think that dynamic is changing.
After Blinken failed spectacularly in his most recent visit to Israel and praised Netanyahu instead of pressuring him, even the Israeli security establishment began to realize that salvation will not come from the United States, describing it as a death sentence for the chance to reach a deal to release the hostages and end the war. So even in Israel, we’re seeing this shift.
I think Blinken had a mandate from his boss that didn’t allow for any progress, but he took it to a whole new level of stupidity and amateurishness. It would be helpful if people [in Israel] stopped expecting the United States to solve all their problems, then one actually might have a proper opposition.
But at the moment, you’ve got nothing. Liberman keeps going up in the polls while saying that we should starve Gaza. Gantz says we should have been in a wider war with Hezbollah long ago. Lapid goes around the world saying that every Palestinian protest is antisemitic and that BDS is the most antisemitic.
After it became clear that Netanyahu again refused the American request to withdraw troops from the Philadelphi Corridor, I saw a segment on Al Jazeera where the host asked his interviewee: “How can it be that Israel says no to the strongest country in the world, and comes away unscathed?” How do you think Israel’s refusal impacts U.S. status in the region?
The realist school of American national security thinking considers this to be a disaster for American interests and deeply damaging to America’s reputation — that America could get sucked into a far greater military action by its ally. This has generated yet another global round of anger against America, because this is America’s war as well.
Israel also has to think whether it has an interest in feeding into the weakening of America. The fact that Israel is able to show the U.S. who’s boss actually impacts how America is perceived globally. Bibi’s narrative that “We’ll defend ourselves by ourselves, we don’t need anyone else,” has been proven to be the biggest load of bullshit. So how is it in Israel’s interest to weaken America just when it needs America more? And at a time when Israel looks weaker militarily, and the Axis of Resistance has grown in capacity, Israel is both undermining and more reliant on America.
I’m not getting the impression [Israeli decision makers are having] this conversation behind closed doors. Maybe they do, but I’m surprised we’re not seeing more of a strategic analysis.
I’m not suggesting there’s a better global hegemon waiting to replace America. Every state is a friend of their own interests, not necessarily of some vague notion of peace. But we live in a world where America can’t always assert its own interests. And so the crucial question, especially for the Palestinians, is why continue to look to America exclusively to lead? It’s a terrible mistake by the Palestinians, and one that Israelis should also avoid falling into.
When I think about Israel, there will have to be a combination of change from within and pressure from without. Perhaps we should think about America in the same way: one needs to push for change from within, but there also needs to be costs for America from the outside for continuing down this route. America can get away with this because there’s not enough cost, but I think that dynamic is changing.
After Blinken failed spectacularly in his most recent visit to Israel and praised Netanyahu instead of pressuring him, even the Israeli security establishment began to realize that salvation will not come from the United States, describing it as a death sentence for the chance to reach a deal to release the hostages and end the war. So even in Israel, we’re seeing this shift.
I think Blinken had a mandate from his boss that didn’t allow for any progress, but he took it to a whole new level of stupidity and amateurishness. It would be helpful if people [in Israel] stopped expecting the United States to solve all their problems, then one actually might have a proper opposition.
But at the moment, you’ve got nothing. Liberman keeps going up in the polls while saying that we should starve Gaza. Gantz says we should have been in a wider war with Hezbollah long ago. Lapid goes around the world saying that every Palestinian protest is antisemitic and that BDS is the most antisemitic.
After it became clear that Netanyahu again refused the American request to withdraw troops from the Philadelphi Corridor, I saw a segment on Al Jazeera where the host asked his interviewee: “How can it be that Israel says no to the strongest country in the world, and comes away unscathed?” How do you think Israel’s refusal impacts U.S. status in the region?
The realist school of American national security thinking considers this to be a disaster for American interests and deeply damaging to America’s reputation — that America could get sucked into a far greater military action by its ally. This has generated yet another global round of anger against America, because this is America’s war as well.
Israel also has to think whether it has an interest in feeding into the weakening of America. The fact that Israel is able to show the U.S. who’s boss actually impacts how America is perceived globally. Bibi’s narrative that “We’ll defend ourselves by ourselves, we don’t need anyone else,” has been proven to be the biggest load of bullshit. So how is it in Israel’s interest to weaken America just when it needs America more? And at a time when Israel looks weaker militarily, and the Axis of Resistance has grown in capacity, Israel is both undermining and more reliant on America.
I’m not getting the impression [Israeli decision makers are having] this conversation behind closed doors. Maybe they do, but I’m surprised we’re not seeing more of a strategic analysis.
An Israeli tank seen near the Gaza border fence, March 26, 2024. [Chaim Goldberg/Flash90]I think there’s an understanding among Israel’s upper echelons that things are not going in the right direction, but they don’t have the courage or ability to change them. But doesn’t the United States see this process? They’re not all stupid. And why does Washington need Israel at all?
I’m sure there’s an Israel analyst somewhere in the Pentagon who has written this paper about just how endangered Israel is by what it’s doing. Do we think that makes it all the way up the food chain? I doubt it.
But on endangering U.S. interests, I think it’s one of those things where America says: yes, people have been telling us that for ages, and it doesn’t happen. America still thinks that it can absorb the cost it is paying.
Then there is the problem of how Israel is reading the world and the region, and the kind of alternative being offered to Netanyahu. The opposition seems to suggest they can make common cause to work with America and [allied] Arab states against the Axis of Resistance, and to do so, they have to give something, even very minor, to the Palestinians.
While it’s true most Arab states are not fans of Iran, they don’t want a war. Saudi Arabia and Iran have reached understandings under a Chinese diplomatic umbrella. Saudi is at least hedging its bets with Iran. The UAE has very strong economic relations with Iran. Iran is now much more locked into its cooperation with China and Russia, as we saw in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran is now joining the BRICS. Geopolitics has really shifted, so we have to think how to get a comprehensive de-escalation, and Iran’s going to need to be on the inside of that.
Here you see the real change: the geopolitical dynamics in the region and the weakening of the United States.
Yes, exactly.
And do you think it has an impact already?
I think it does. Iran needs the West less, as the alternative axis is getting stronger. The Arab elites are quite embedded in their Western orientation and luxury, but the realities of the global economy — the global supply chains and raw materials, the [Chinese] Belt and Road Initiative — those are hard, tangible realities, and they mean that the center of gravity is shifting.
I’m sure there’s an Israel analyst somewhere in the Pentagon who has written this paper about just how endangered Israel is by what it’s doing. Do we think that makes it all the way up the food chain? I doubt it.
But on endangering U.S. interests, I think it’s one of those things where America says: yes, people have been telling us that for ages, and it doesn’t happen. America still thinks that it can absorb the cost it is paying.
Then there is the problem of how Israel is reading the world and the region, and the kind of alternative being offered to Netanyahu. The opposition seems to suggest they can make common cause to work with America and [allied] Arab states against the Axis of Resistance, and to do so, they have to give something, even very minor, to the Palestinians.
While it’s true most Arab states are not fans of Iran, they don’t want a war. Saudi Arabia and Iran have reached understandings under a Chinese diplomatic umbrella. Saudi is at least hedging its bets with Iran. The UAE has very strong economic relations with Iran. Iran is now much more locked into its cooperation with China and Russia, as we saw in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran is now joining the BRICS. Geopolitics has really shifted, so we have to think how to get a comprehensive de-escalation, and Iran’s going to need to be on the inside of that.
Here you see the real change: the geopolitical dynamics in the region and the weakening of the United States.
Yes, exactly.
And do you think it has an impact already?
I think it does. Iran needs the West less, as the alternative axis is getting stronger. The Arab elites are quite embedded in their Western orientation and luxury, but the realities of the global economy — the global supply chains and raw materials, the [Chinese] Belt and Road Initiative — those are hard, tangible realities, and they mean that the center of gravity is shifting.
President Joe Biden stands beside leaders of the GCC, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan at the Jeddah Security and Development Summit, Saudi Arabia, July 17, 2022. (The White House)
Just before October 7, there was an announcement on the margins of the G20 meeting in Delhi about the creation of an India-Middle-East-Europe Corridor, including Israel, as a competitor to the Belt and Road Initiative. Nothing’s coming of it. The Belt and Road Initiative is real; this IMEC, a train from Delhi to Tel Aviv, is a nice dream.
If I was designing a new peace effort today, I would do everything to break the American monopoly. That means that Palestinians have to fundamentally shift their thinking away from a U.S.- or Western-centricism, and have to use geopolitics to their advantage.
That resonates with my belief that the most significant element of U.S. support for Israel is not the weapons it sends but the political cover it provides: a veto at the UN Security Council against anti-Israel resolutions, including those that could come from the ICJ. Pressure on America can affect exactly this.
I agree with you. And there is another thing: the American side could perhaps be very cynical in part of its thinking. They look at Israel as militarily powerful, and as doing some of what America needs to prevent a hostile regional hegemon [Iran] — so in that respect, they think Israel’s great. And if the Israelis destroy themselves, then Washington will find another solution.
That’s the problem. Look at America with Ukraine: they’re happy to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. So maybe it’s not out of some kind of deep love, but that Israel is useful: you fight Hamas and Hezbollah, and if it ends up disastrous for you, we’ll find another way of dealing with them.
Just before October 7, there was an announcement on the margins of the G20 meeting in Delhi about the creation of an India-Middle-East-Europe Corridor, including Israel, as a competitor to the Belt and Road Initiative. Nothing’s coming of it. The Belt and Road Initiative is real; this IMEC, a train from Delhi to Tel Aviv, is a nice dream.
If I was designing a new peace effort today, I would do everything to break the American monopoly. That means that Palestinians have to fundamentally shift their thinking away from a U.S.- or Western-centricism, and have to use geopolitics to their advantage.
That resonates with my belief that the most significant element of U.S. support for Israel is not the weapons it sends but the political cover it provides: a veto at the UN Security Council against anti-Israel resolutions, including those that could come from the ICJ. Pressure on America can affect exactly this.
I agree with you. And there is another thing: the American side could perhaps be very cynical in part of its thinking. They look at Israel as militarily powerful, and as doing some of what America needs to prevent a hostile regional hegemon [Iran] — so in that respect, they think Israel’s great. And if the Israelis destroy themselves, then Washington will find another solution.
That’s the problem. Look at America with Ukraine: they’re happy to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian. So maybe it’s not out of some kind of deep love, but that Israel is useful: you fight Hamas and Hezbollah, and if it ends up disastrous for you, we’ll find another way of dealing with them.
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https://t.me/reBurningBright/1567
For months, we've been telling you that Muh Russia narratives were going to escalate like never before entering the final days of the election cycle, and we know this because if you track what Russia's actual plans are, as publicly stated, you already know what's coming, and how the Media Industrial Complex is going to spin it.
Russia's nuclear submarine drills (of which the new rerun of the Cuban Missile Crisis Lite was one) have been planned for over two years for October, and ALL world governments with naval power projection have been told when they are occurring and WHY.
We're told these are a mix of repositioning and tactical drills, and while it makes total sense for the US and allied militaries to keep an eye on things, even "drills," as they can be used to forward subterfuge, the fact remains ALL of this information has been known publicly by the MIL AND Media for months, at least.
When the Scare Event narratives begin in earnest (and they WILL,) it's your choice to defect.
https://badlandsmedia.tv/us-warns-of-increased-russian-naval-activity-near-undersea-cables-raising-sabotage-concerns/