F-22, F-35 Stealth Jets Pound Iran, Strategic Bombers Rain Hell– Despite Massive Air Superiority, Why Toppling Tehran is Not Easy: OPED
By EurAsian Times Desk
-March 17, 2026
OPED by Air Vice Marshal (R) Prashant Mohan
The war in West Asia is being fought with overwhelming reliance on airpower by both sides; the US-Israeli side using expensive warplanes like F-35s, F-22s, F-15s, F-16s, F-18s, strategic bombers like B-1, B-2, and B-52, and other aircraft, while the Iranian side relying on “cheaper” drones and missiles.
The images of cratered facilities, plumes of thick black smoke, unclassified videos of precision strikes, and damaged infrastructure are all being routinely seen on all news channels. These are released by both sides to reinforce the enemy’s continued destruction and to prove their own dominance in the war.
President Trump directly addressed the Iranian people after the completion of the first wave of strikes on 28 Feb 2026. He said, “Proud people of Iran, I say tonight that the hour of your freedom is at hand…when we are finished, take over your government. It will be yours to take. This will be probably your only chance for generations.”
To the American people, while addressing a rally in Kentucky on 11 Feb 2026, he claimed, “we have won”, “it was over in the first hour.” Subsequently, in the same address, he said the campaign would continue, as “we got to finish the job.” This juxtaposition raises an obvious question. If victory has already been achieved on the first day itself, why is the war continuing into the third week now? To me, the answer to that question lies at the heart of this continuing conflict.
The answer lies in the deeper ambiguity that often accompanies modern air campaigns. Tactical success, the destruction of military targets, degradation of infrastructure, and the disruption of command-and-control networks can be, relatively speaking, measured very quickly.
Political victory, on the other hand, for which the war is being fought, is far more difficult to define. When a leader says, “we got the finish the job” the natural question the springs to mind is, what exactly is meant by ‘finish the job’.
Is it the destruction of military capability? Is it the dismantling of strategic programmes? Is it decapitating the leadership? Most of these have already been achieved in Iran. So, why continue with the war? Or is it the far more difficult objective of forcing a change in political behaviour?
These questions demand an honest inquiry. This is also a never-ending debate in military strategy circles – what can airpower achieve, but more importantly, what are its limitations?
The Promise of Airpower
Airpower has always generated great expectations as an instrument of military power due to its characteristics of flexibility, mobility, reach, versatility, flexibility, speed, reach, responsiveness, trans-domain operational capability, and precision application.
From the early theorists of strategic bombing in the 20th century to the contemporary advocates of precision warfare, airpower has often been seen as the tool that could fundamentally reshape the conduct of war. The logic is compelling.
Aircraft, missiles, and now drones allow the military to strike deep into enemy territory, regardless of terrain or obstacles, without waiting for the slow and costly advance of surface forces. Remember the days of snail mail, and the picture gets clearer.
Airpower can destroy critical infrastructure, strategic targets, military bases, logistics hubs, and command-and-control networks with remarkable speed and surprise; this allows countries to impose punishment while keeping their own casualties relatively low.
Modern technology has reinforced this perception. Precision-guided munitions, satellite navigation, advanced surveillance systems, and stand-off weapons have dramatically improved the accuracy and effectiveness of aerial strikes.
Political leaders and military planners today often assume that any major conflict will begin with a decisive air campaign to establish air superiority and neutralise the adversary’s critical assets. President Trump too echoed this sentiment when he stated that the “our forces have the capability to strike precisely and effectively.”
Statements like these reflect a widely held belief that technological superiority can deliver rapid and decisive results. Modern wars have helped reinforce this perception. Airpower has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to quickly and accurately destroy a large number of targets. It therefore came as no surprise that the current West Asian war began with a heavy reliance on airpower.
The US and Israel possess overwhelming technological superiority in surveillance, targeting, and precision strike capabilities. Their strategy naturally emphasises the destruction of military infrastructure, missile sites, and command-and-control networks through sustained aerial strikes. From a purely operational perspective, this approach has clear advantages.
Airpower can rapidly degrade critical capabilities and disrupt an adversary’s ability to coordinate military operations. It can impose high economic and military costs while limiting ground troops’ exposure. The US has until now reported a loss of only 11 combatants in 15 days, during the course of this war.
Having said this, it is also pertinent to note that a study of past wars shows that wars are not decided by technology and airpower alone; war is merely the continuation of policy by other means. Wars are not limited to a contest of military capabilities; ultimately, they are a contest of political will. And this is where the limitations of airpower begin to emerge.
The Limitations of Airpower
History is proof that airpower, despite its overwhelming destructive capability, has rarely delivered decisive political outcomes on its own. Vietnam and Afghanistan are two prime examples of the enormous role played by airpower, and yet the end state desired at the end of the conflict was never achieved.
The US became involved in the Vietnam War with the aim of stopping the spread of communism. It possessed overwhelming aerial and economic power.
The US undertook massive bombing campaigns and destroyed many of the North Vietnamese supply routes, infrastructure, and military facilities. Vast quantities of ordnance were dropped over the course of the war. Yet despite the scale of destruction inflicted from the air, the campaign failed to break the political will and resolve of the North Vietnamese forces.
Eventually, after the pullout of US forces from the region, the North Vietnamese were able to conquer the South and unify the country. The American strategic aim of stopping the spread of communism failed, despite winning most tactical battles with airpower.
A similar pattern emerged in Afghanistan. In response to the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 Sep 2001, popularly known as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US declared a global war on terrorism on 14 Sep 2001 – the target being the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and networks like Al Qaeda that had a haven there. It successfully overthrew the Taliban regime by December 2001; airpower played an important role in supporting special forces and Afghan militias in the initial stages.
For nearly two decades, the coalition forces dominated the skies, possessing unmatched surveillance and strike capabilities. However, once the conflict transitioned into an insurgency, the effectiveness of airpower declined after the initial success, as insurgent groups avoided large concentrations of troops, blended into the local population, and operated through decentralised networks.
Taliban positions were repeatedly targeted from the air, and their networks disrupted. Yet the movement’s political resolve remained intact, outlasting that of the far more powerful coalition aligned against it. After nearly two decades of fighting the Taliban regime, the US finally handed over power to the Taliban and withdrew.
US President Donald Trump (R) and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shake hands as they arrive to speak to journalists during a joint press conference at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago residence in Palm Beach, Florida, on December 29, 2025. US President Donald Trump hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Florida on December 29 for crucial talks on moving to the next stage of the fragile Gaza truce plan.
The two leaders also discussed Iran, with Trump saying that if Tehran rebuilt its nuclear facilities the United States would “knock them down.” (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP)
Beyond the Battlefield
Seventeen days into this war, even though the U.S. President declared victory on day one, it’s worth asking if there are deeper issues beyond the fighting and daily reports.
The situation prompts a closer and more thoughtful examination of the war’s underlying dynamics. It is essential to move beyond immediate military engagements and public messaging to explore the broader strategic, political, and ideological dimensions shaping the direction and ultimate outcomes of this conflict.
Political & Ideological Foundations
Understanding the current conflict in West Asia demands looking past the images and narratives of live battles. Instead, it requires an examination of the political and ideological foundations of the Iranian state, which play a crucial role in shaping the wider context of the war.
Iran is one of the old civilisations that has outlasted many changes to its political system. The modern Iranian state emerged from one of the most consequential political revolutions of the twentieth century. In the last days of March 1979, following the overthrow of the Shah, Iranians voted in a national referendum to determine the future character of their country.
98.2% of the voters supported the creation of an Islamic Republic under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had just returned from exile. In Dec 1979, a new constitution was approved through another national referendum.
This referendum institutionalised the principle of Velayat-e-Faqih, the guardianship of the Islamic jurist, in the constitution, placing ultimate political authority in the hands of the Supreme Leader. This was not an ordinary change of the political system.
The Constitution was consciously constructed, with the approval of the people, as an ideological state rooted in political theology. Over time, institutions and structures were created to reinforce this identity; religious seminaries, political organisations, security institutions, and governance structures evolved within this ideological framework.
Following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, Ali Khamenei assumed the position of Supreme Leader, the Rahbar. He continued in this role for nearly 37 years, during which time the religious, military, and political institutions became deeply embedded within the Iranian society and governance.
This ideological architecture needs to be factored in when assessing the ongoing war, as a state built explicitly around a revolutionary and ideological worldview may prove far more resilient to external pressure than conventional strategic calculations might suggest.
Capability Vs Political Will
The deeper limitation of airpower lies in a fundamental distinction in strategic theory and its practical application; the difference between destroying capability and breaking of the political will that was the primary reason for the initiation of the war. Airpower excels at the former task; it can destroy military capabilities and assets, degrade the infrastructure that sustains them, and disrupt command-and-control networks, striking deep strategic targets with exemplary efficiency.
It can weaken an adversary’s operational capacity and impose severe economic costs. What it cannot do is to compel an adversary to abandon its political objectives, especially if they are deeply rooted in identity, ideology, or regime survival. In conflicts where one or more of these are perceived to be at stake, societies have often demonstrated a remarkable degree of resilience.
Populations endure extreme hardships; governments absorb punishment and, with the help of political ideology, adapt to resist and eventually overcome external pressures imposed by military force.
In such circumstances, airpower and the broader military campaign may weaken an adversary but rarely produce the desired decisive political outcomes. The present war in West Asia appears increasingly likely to move in precisely this direction.
A handout picture provided by the Iranian Army office on December 31, 2022, shows Iranian troops during a military drill in Makran beach on the Gulf of Oman, near the Hormuz Strait. (Photo by Iranian Army office / AFP) / === RESTRICTED TO EDITORIAL USE – MANDATORY CREDIT “AFP PHOTO / HO / IRANIAN ARMY OFFICE” – NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS – DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS ===
Iran: An Asymmetric Response
The military balance in the present conflict is highly uneven, with the US-Israel possessing overwhelming superiority in airpower, intelligence, and precision strike capabilities.
Iran cannot match this huge technological advantage in a conventional confrontation. Its air force is limited, and its air defence networks are degraded to an extent that the US-Israeli assets are comfortable switching from the expensive long-range standoff weapons employed in the opening phase of the war to relatively less expensive close-in weapons. Iran lacks this freedom due to technological inferiority.
They have thus long invested in strategies designed to offset these conventional disadvantages in the employment of airpower; rather than attempting to match their adversary’s aircraft-for-aircraft, they have focused on asymmetric capabilities, comprising ballistic missiles, drones, dispersed & mobile launch platforms, and proxy networks.
One of the most striking features of this war has been this asymmetric response. It shows that relatively low-cost drones and missiles can impose significant operational pressures even on technologically superior adversaries.
The hits on many of the targets in Israel, the Gulf states with US bases, and others in the region that have a US presence, and the shipping that Iran considers in service of powers allied with the US or Israel, are proof.
Even if these low-cost drones and missiles are intercepted, they compel the defender to expend far more expensive air defence systems in response. Similarly, dispersed and mobile launch systems and hardened or underground facilities reduce the vulnerability of military infrastructure to air strikes.
Even when individual facilities are destroyed, the broader network can continue to function. The result of all this is a strategic dynamic in which technological superiority and heavy destruction have not necessarily produced a quick or decisive victory, as hoped before the war’s initiation or in its opening phase.
Instead, the war risks evolving into a contest of endurance and attrition, in which time always favours the weaker but ideologically driven side.
The Escalatory Logic of Airpower
Airpower carries an inherent escalatory dynamic because of its speed, flexibility, accuracy, lethality, and ability to target tactical, operational, and strategic-level targets simultaneously, using the same assets.
Aerial strikes can be conducted rapidly and repeatedly. This generally creates pressure for retaliation and counterretaliation. Each wave of attacks invites a response, and this cycle of escalation can become difficult to control.
In the present conflict, this pattern is already visible. Initial strikes targeting military facilities have been followed by attacks on broader infrastructure and strategic supply networks. Even as the campaign has expanded, the political messaging by the leadership on both sides continues to emphasise resolve.
The US President threatened that if Iran chose to respond, “they should know we have options they have not yet seen.” Newly appointed Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei’s first statement issued on 12 Mar 2026 also showed resolve to continue fighting, wherein he threatened to open new fronts of war across the region, with particular emphasis on blocking the Strait of Hormuz.
He also specifically referenced the Islamic Republic’s proxy forces in Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. He called for revenge against Israel and the US and endorsed the continuation of attacks against neighbouring countries that are hosting American and Israeli “financial and military” systems.
Impact on Critical Infrastructure
When armed conflicts escalate beyond conventional military targets and begin to directly impact critical infrastructure essential for everyday human life, the consequences become far more severe and far-reaching. This includes vital sectors such as banking systems, energy production, storage, and transportation networks, as well as facilities crucial for survival, like desalination plants that provide clean water.
The deliberate or collateral targeting of these systems can trigger humanitarian crises by disrupting access to essential services, undermining economic stability, and threatening the basic needs of civilian populations.
Furthermore, such actions can significantly alter the geopolitical dynamics of a conflict, rapidly broadening both its scope and nature, as the struggle shifts from the battlefield to include the survival and well-being of entire societies.
Airpower as Facilitator, Not Decider
None of the above can be interpreted as diminishing the importance of airpower; airpower remains one of the most potent and effective tools available to modern militaries. It can degrade/ destroy capabilities, disrupt command-and-control structures, and impose enormous costs on adversaries.
It can shape the battlefield and create the conditions for other forms of military action to operate on the surface/ ground. However, history suggests that airpower rarely decides wars on its own.
Instead, it functions most effectively as part of a broader strategy that combines multiple instruments of state power – diplomacy, economic pressure, information campaigns, and ground/ surface operations. In other words, airpower often facilitates outcomes beyond the realm of military application in a conventional war. It will not be able to ensure victory under such conditions.
Implications for the War in West Asia
The war in West Asia now appears to be entering a phase where these strategic realities are becoming increasingly relevant. Airpower will remain central to the military strategy of the US and Israel because their technological advantages ensure it continues to shape the battlefield.
Yet the resilience of Iran’s ideological capabilities suggests that the conflict may not produce quick or decisive results. Instead, it could evolve into a prolonged contest in which each side seeks to impose costs, even while avoiding full-scale escalation. Such conflicts often produce uncertain outcomes.
Military superiority in one domain does not automatically translate into strategic success if the adversary retains the political will and asymmetric tools to continue resisting, which is the present state of this war.
In addition, the US Constitution divides war powers between Congress and the President. Only Congress can declare war and appropriate military funding, yet the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.
This is interpreted by the legislature and the executive in their own way, leading to ambiguity. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, after the Vietnam War, “is a congressional resolution designed to limit the US President’s ability to initiate or escalate military actions abroad.”
Further, it stipulates that the president must notify Congress within 48 hours of military action and prohibits armed forces from remaining more than 60 (+30) days. This is one check-and-balance looming for the US over the next 1.5 months.
Conclusion
Airpower remains one of the most powerful instruments of modern military power in general, and warfare, in particular. It offers flexibility, mobility, speed, precision, and the ability to strike deep with devastating effect.
Political leaders understandably emphasise this power. As the US President declared while addressing the nation, “America has the most capable military in the world.” That statement is indeed true. Yet history suggests that even the most powerful militaries must confront the enduring limits of force.
Airpower can destroy/ degrade military capabilities, disable infrastructure, disrupt command-and-control networks, and impose high costs; it can provide air superiority, shape the battlefield, and influence the course of a conflict.
However, wars driven by ideology, identity, and political resolve rarely end successfully. In such cases, airpower may facilitate outcomes, as it has done in this case. It may not be able to deliver victory, even after prolonging the war.
Is it time to consider alternative tools of statecraft to help restore peace in the region? Genuine dialogue and diplomacy, whether channelled through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations or facilitated discreetly by countries trusted by both parties, offer possible paths forward. Nations like Oman, Egypt, and India are well-positioned to serve as intermediaries due to their credibility and relationships with both sides.
The central question remains whether the parties involved are willing to embrace these diplomatic avenues or if they still believe that persisting with the conflict will ultimately lead to victory.
The outcome is uncertain; only time will reveal which approach resonates most with the stakeholders. Meanwhile, the ongoing war continues to drive significant geopolitical changes worldwide, affecting energy resources, international trade, supply chain stability, and tightening financial conditions.
Air Vice Marshal (R) Prashant Mohan, a fighter pilot, superannuated from IAF on 31 Mar 25. A Qualified Flying Instructor commanded a frontline fighter squadron and two frontline fighter bases. The Air Officer was India’s Defence and Air Attaché to the UK from May 19 to Oct 22.
