Israel Threatens Total War on the West Bank

Consortium News
Volume 31, Number 295 — Sunday, October 25, 2026


Israel Threatens Total War on the West Bank


Palestinian forces have not responded to rising settler violence, but the Netanyahu government has still been stoking tensions with the PA ahead of the Oct. 27 Israeli elections, Mohammed Altaj reports




Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the U.N. General Assembly in September. (UN Photo/Loey Felipe)

By Mohammed Altaj
in Ramallah, Palestine
Special to Consortium News




Israel is threatening “total war” against the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

With just days to go before the Israeli general election on Oct. 27, Israel’s prime minister and defense minister have threatened a full-scale attack if an Israel settler or soldier is killed by a member of the Palestinian security forces.

Defense Minister Israel Katz threatened all-out war against the West Bank at a government security meeting on Oct. 6 held to discuss lessons learned from Oct. 7, 2023. He said that the IDF was waiting for PA security personnel and associated groups to “turn their guns” against Israeli settlers and IDF troops in the West Bank.

Katz said:


“In such a case, war will be declared against the Palestinian Authority, and the IDF will launch a comprehensive offensive in accordance with an organized plan that was formulated and approved by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and by me, according to the principles outlined for the IDF.”

Katz added:


“The campaign will be short and powerful, and will include the use of ground and air forces, and the use of special means, the targeting and expulsion of senior officials, the destruction of weapons and military equipment, and the extensive evacuation of residents and destruction of terrorist infrastructure inside the cities and in all refugee camps in Judea and Samaria[West Bank] , in accordance with the Gaza and Lebanon model, alongside reinforcing forces and defending the Israeli communities.”

Katz, on left, at the Pentagon in 2025. (DoD/Noel Diaz)


During a visit to a West Bank security barrier on Oct.13, Netanyahu also warned of all out war against Ramallah. “Our enemies are thinking of testing us in these days leading up to the elections. I warn them that we are prepared for every scenario, including what is known as ‘turning the guns around,’” he said.

Netanyahu said the IDF had given him and Katz


“a powerful, robust plan. … In such a scenario, I wouldn’t advise our enemies to test us. You will encounter a level of force here that you never imagined.”

Netanyahu first raised the possibility of the Palestinians turning their guns against Israel at an Aug. 24 meeting at IDF Central Command headquarters.

Ynetnews reported: “The Palestinian security services legally possess thousands of firearms in the West Bank, with Israel’s approval. Under the scenario discussed by Netanyahu, those weapons would instead be directed against Israeli targets.”

Israeli intelligence, however, says there’s no indication of a threat to Israelis. The Jerusalem Post reported:


“IDF sources said the military had no concrete intelligence pointing to a planned rebellion by PA security forces or Fatah-affiliated Tanzim elements. They acknowledged, however, that the IDF must routinely prepare for every scenario, including highly unlikely ones.”


Non-Existent Threat

Israeli soldiers in Jenin, the occupied West Bank, in January 2025. (IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, Wikimedia Commons/CC BY-SA 3.0)


But that has not stopped Netanyahu and Katz from raising tensions further by speaking of a threat that does not exist.

In fact, during the recent upsurge in settler violence against Palestinians, there has not been a single incident recorded of PA security forces firing on settlers or the IDF to protect Palestinians and their property.

“The Palestinian Authority said it does not respond to settlers attacks, citing the potential for political repercussions if the Palestinian authorities were to get into a confrontations with the settlers or the Israeli army,” reported The New York Times in May.

The IDF, on the other hand, has fired on and killed PA security forces. For instance, earlier this month, PA National Security Forces officer Ali al-Bazari, 44, was killed near Nablus by settlers and the IDF.

Ynetnews reported:


“Senior military officers warned that the situation in the West Bank was ‘getting out of control,’ while security officials cautioned political leaders that the territory was ‘on the verge of exploding‘ because of the growing number of incidents of nationalist violence committed by extremist settlers,” and not by the PA.

If Netanyahu wants to start yet another major war to help him win the election — or to complicate the transition if he loses — he will need a significant casus belli. That would appear to be PA forces killing Israel settlers or soldiers.

With the IDF repeatedly firing on PA personnel it would only take one of them to return fire and kill an Israeli for Netanyahu to respond. So far the PA is resisting falling into that trap, even though Palestinians criticize their security forces for failing to protect them from Israeli soldiers and settlers.

A full-scale Israeli war against the Palestinians on the West Bank would be a continuation of the war of ethnic cleansing against Palestinians in Gaza, a key goal of the more than 80-year old plan to establish Greater Israel. Seizing all of historic Palestine from the Arabs is an objective set down by Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion.

Ending Oslo

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, U.S. President Bill Clinton and the PLO’s Yasser Arafat at Oslo Accords signing ceremony, Sept. 13, 1993. (Vince Musi, White House, Wikimedia Commons, Public Domain)


In this political climate, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has openly called for ending the Oslo agreements and dismantling the PA.

He has challenged Palestinian jurisdiction over Areas A and B, advocated forcibly disarming Palestinians in the West Bank and supported a military campaign modeled on Israel’s war in Gaza, just what Netanyahu and Katz are threatening.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has demanded the disarmament of Palestinian security forces and harsher measures against the Authority. He has also promoted policies intended to encourage Palestinians to leave the West Bank and Gaza.

Opposition politician Avigdor Liberman has proposed dismantling the PA, cancelling Oslo and maintaining Israeli security control over the West Bank while preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state.

They may disagree over what should replace the Authority, but they share a fundamental assumption: that Israel has the right to decide whether Palestinian institutions should exist and what powers they may exercise.

In the West Bank, Israeli troops enter Palestinian cities and towns whenever they choose. They raid homes, arrest residents and conduct military operations even in Area A, where the Palestinian Authority is supposed to exercise internal security authority.

Armed settlers attack farmers and families, destroy property and restrict access to land, while Palestinian security personnel often remain inside their headquarters.

The division of the West Bank into Areas A, B and C under the Oslo agreements has long ceased to offer Palestinians meaningful protection. Israeli forces raid Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm and Ramallah whenever they choose. Settlers enter communities under Palestinian administration, attack residents and prevent farmers from reaching their land.

In February 2025, Israel’s Channel 12 reported that a settlement security official stopped a Palestinian police patrol near Ramallah and confiscated its weapons.

A settlement security official could disarm Palestinian police officers in territory supposedly under Palestinian security jurisdiction.

Yet Netanyahu presents those same security forces as a danger serious enough to justify preparing for war that he may well try to provoke.

***

If there is no more war, Satanyahu may have to go to jail

Netanyahu is playing with fire. Elections are no excuse for war

Hareetz Editorial

Netanyahu is playing with fire. Elections are no excuse for war


October 24, 2026



Reports of preparations for renewed strikes on Iran, days before Israel votes, should set off red flags for voters.

A report in the Financial Times should set off all the red flags in Israel’s defence establishment and among the public. According to the report, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had instructed the military to plan a major new offensive against Iran for early October but was blocked due to the opposition of US President Donald Trump.

It is hard to ignore the possibility that Netanyahu wishes to resume the war before next Tuesday’s election, or immediately after it, in a manner that may affect the results or enable him to form a unity government even if his Likud party has a poor outcome in the election.

This must be stated clearly: according to publicly available information and the repeated claims of defence officials, there is no evidence of a development in Iran’s nuclear weapons or missile programs that would necessitate an immediate Israeli attack. Iran continues to build up its forces and constitutes a significant threat, but this does not mean that any timing is suitable for launching a new offensive, certainly not during the most sensitive weeks of Israel’s democratic process.

Furthermore, following two wars with Iran, it should be asked what a third one might accomplish that its predecessors did not. Even if Israel manages to inflict heavy damage on Iran’s infrastructure, that will not guarantee that it can achieve its strategic goals.

On the other hand, the cost could be high: harm to the home front, the disruption of economic activity in Israel, an extensive mobilisation of reservists and damage to infrastructure. Even if Israel is planning a short campaign, Iran will have a decisive influence on how it unfolds, and there is no way to guarantee when and how it ends.

IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, the heads of the defence establishment, the attorney general and everyone who is involved in the decision-making process have a special responsibility. Their role is not only to present operational plans, but to demand a well-grounded, security-based justification for their execution, to examine alternatives and to clarify the costs and risks of any operation.

Obviously, in the event of a clear and present danger that must be confronted immediately, Israel must defend itself. But in the absence of such a threat, there is no justification for jeopardising the democratic process and the security of Israelis with a military operation of dubious strategic value.

An election is not a security obstacle that must be bypassed; it is a key element of Israel’s security and resilience. Launching an offensive at this time, without a clear military need, will cast a heavy shadow on the decision-making process and raise concerns about a conflation of political interests and professional considerations. Israel cannot afford another war without knowing whether it is necessary, what it is supposed to achieve and how it can be ended.



Republished from Haaretz

AUKUS has escaped proper scrutiny for five years. That is about to change

AUKUS has escaped proper scrutiny for five years. That is about to change

Doug Cameron
October 26, 2026



The independent public inquiry into AUKUS will report on 4 November after examining the project’s implications for Australia’s security, economy, sovereignty and international standing.

Five years on from the announcement of AUKUS, a project founded on subterfuge and evasion, the public inquiry into AUKUS will launch its report at the National Press Club in Canberra on 4 November. This inquiry has gone where both the Coalition and the ALP have failed to go. It has revealed the depth and breadth of this project for Australia’s national security, economy and international credibility.

I am proud to have been part of the Inquiry Secretariat providing support to our eminent and talented team of inquiry commissioners. In my view it is now clear that AUKUS is about militarising Australia in the interests of the US, ensuring the grifters in defence and the arms industry are well fed. It is an act of self-harm and madness on the part of the Australian government.

The secrecy that lies at the heart of this $368 billion fiasco was maintained by federal or state governments that refused to appear before the public inquiry to make the case for the biggest transfer of sovereign wealth in Australia’s history. That is some kind of contempt for the Australian community.

To recap, if this project goes well it will result in the cost of $368 billion, plus over $120 billion to manage the weapons-grade nuclear waste. It will put at least four Australian cities in the cross-hairs in the event of a conflict between the US – now an international wrecking ball – and our largest trading partner, China.

That’s if these nuclear submarines ever materialise. AUKUS is looking increasingly like a distraction from the main game, which is about turning Australia into a compliant base for the US military.

Meanwhile the Australian government continues to dodge any accountability and simply responds to criticisms by muttering about protecting sea lanes and our alliance with the US. Meanwhile AUKUS critics have been variously accused of communism, appeasement and failing to understand ‘changed circumstances’.

The government’s determination to avoid any scrutiny reached absurd proportions when delegates to the ALP National Conference were denied the opportunity to debate AUKUS (and Palestine) at the national conference.

So, I was shocked to see that while federal and state governments are unwilling to have an honest conversation with the people funding this project, us, they were very forthcoming in the submissions the federal and South Australian governments gave to the UK Parliament through the UK defence committee inquiry.

Forelock tugging to the ‘mother country’ while denying Australians the right to government accountability on AUKUS is reprehensible, undemocratic and politically dumb.

Despite these submissions putting an unjustified gloss on AUKUS, and our almost pleading submissions, the UK defence committee has given our parliamentarians a masterclass in scrutiny, honesty and accountability.

Among the findings of this UK inquiry are that the alliances that have underpinned global security for decades can no longer be taken for granted; that even the UK public has little confidence in the project; that the investment pipeline is already faltering; and that the development of new SSN facilities in Adelaide and Perth could pose a risk to workforce retention at the UK’s equivalent facilities in Barrow-in-Furness and Plymouth.

The town critical to the delivery of the SSN-AUKUS, Barrow-in-Furness, is in dire need of total regeneration, with major issues of poverty, crime, alcohol and drug abuse and unemployment. Convincing the highly skilled workforce to move there is considered a huge challenge to the project. The report found this will require additional funding from central government to provide the investment in housing, healthcare, transport and education which the town urgently needs.

The AUKUS deal demands the UK increase port visits and later rotate an Astute-class submarine out of Australia to maintain credibility within AUKUS. But the UK report notes that the arrival of HMS Anson in Western Australia, while welcome, pushed the Astute class beyond its limits.

Nor did Pillar 2 escape criticism, with the report finding that progress to date has been disappointing and inadequate. It now faces an uphill battle to restore credibility. In the short term, the UK government must press for swift agreement within the trilateral on priority projects which provide tangible benefit to the “war fighter”, and their subsequent delivery at pace. It concludes the UK’s approach to Pillar 2 has so far been disjointed.

This was a report on the UK’s side of the agreement. This is the country we have committed over $4.5 billion to, and they are still struggling with almost every element of the project.

The scale of the problems in the UK further demonstrates that AUKUS is a defence, economic and social disaster for Australia. It is driven by naïve politicians, lobbyists, arms industry think tanks and a revolving door of retired politicians, public servants and military personnel.

Jargon such as “progressive patriotism”, “steady progress, all on track, historic opportunities, creating jobs”, beggars belief when compared with the faltering UK and US submarine industries that are destined to fail to deliver.

It is time for the Australian community to tell the Albanese government to stop treating all of us as mugs; enough is enough with this madness.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.


Doug Cameron


Doug Cameron, Former Federal Senator for New South Wales

HELLO MENTERI KESIHATAN: Chinese cancer drug sudah on sale. Murah saja.

 

OutSyed The Box

Sunday, October 25, 2026

HELLO MENTERI KESIHATAN: Chinese cancer drug sudah on sale. Murah saja.

‘Saved my mum’s life’: Chinese cancer drug on sale in US after Americans travel to buy it.  Saturday, 24 Oct 2026

In recent months, desperate Americans have travelled to China to obtain the Chinese-made cancer drug that was approved by the US Food and Drug Administration but remained unavailable in the country for more than a year, according to a cancer-treatment awareness advocate who made the journey while his mother was battling the disease.

“I’m very thankful to all the development that companies in China have done because it saved my mum’s life,” Max Doppelt, chief executive of Patient Data Vault, a consultancy that connects cancer patients to clinical trials, told the South China Morning Post.

He added that he knew of at least 30 other Americans who had made the same trip.

Developed by China’s Dizal Pharmaceutical, sunvozertinib is a targeted lung cancer drug designed to treat adults with an advanced form of the illness, offering another treatment option for patients.

Doppelt said he decided to travel to Shanghai to obtain the drug after his mother’s lung cancer spread to her brain in January 2025, when she had about 10 tumours.

At a lung cancer conference, a doctor told him that if his mother “happened to have lived in China, she could just get it”, as the country had approved the drug in 2023.

“I became pretty obsessed over it because my first reaction was, well, why don’t we go to China?”

China’s Dizal Pharmaceutical developed the lung cancer drug sunvozertinib, which received US regulatory approval in July 2025. 

He flew to China and returned home with 26 boxes of the China-made drug.

AstraZeneca said on Thursday that sunvozertinib would be commercially available in the United States under the brand name Zegfrovy, after securing worldwide rights to develop and sell the drug from China’s Dizal Pharmaceutical.

The deal included a US$600 million upfront payment to Dizal, with a further US$900 million potentially payable upon meeting specific regulatory clearances, as well as tiered royalties on global sales of Zegfrovy.

“By making Zegfrovy available in the US, we are bringing an oral, mutation-specific treatment option to a distinct patient population with substantial unmet need,” 

“The world has flipped. It’s remarkable how China has become a powerhouse in drug discovery and is now leading,” 

-- SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST

MY COMMENTS: Dizal Pharma the Chinese pharmaceutical company has been marketing this lung cancer drug - oral application - in China since 2023.

It means lung cancer patients in China have access to a cure for lung cancer. 

The Americans have been delaying selling this drug in the US and other markets. The US drug company AstraZeneca has bought a franchise to sell this cancer drug in the US under a new brand name Zegfrovy. They also claim they have global rights to the same brandname  Zegfrovy.

Hello Menteri Kesihatan - tanyalah Dizal Pharma in China kalau Malaysia boleh beli ubat lung cancer ini under the original Chinese brand name sunvozertinib ? Deal direct dengan China.  

If you do not know then ask the people who know.

Jangan pula kita tunggu 10 tahun pun ubat baru ini tak sampai ke Malaysia. They are already seling this new cancer cure in China, the US and I am sure in other countries too.

World According to Sam: Wan Saiful Porking Policy Proposal in Parliament"

 

OutSyed The Box

Sunday, October 25, 2026

World According to Sam: Wan Saiful Porking Policy Proposal in Parliament"

 

Brazil’s right turn poses a danger to Asean too — Phar Kim Beng

Brazil’s right turn poses a danger to Asean too — Phar Kim Beng



Summary

• Brazil's presidential election highlights the rise of right-wing politics globally, impacting regions like Asean with its ideological and political trends.
• Brazil's ongoing political divisions reflect broader global challenges, such as nationalism and economic insecurity, which can influence narratives in Southeast Asia.
• Asean must focus on maintaining economic security, institutional legitimacy, and social cohesion amidst an increasingly polarised international political landscape.

First Published: Sunday, 25 Oct 2026 2:00 PM MYT


OCTOBER 25 — Brazil’s presidential election on October 25, 2026, is more than a contest between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former president Jair Bolsonaro. It is another important test of the direction of contemporary politics, where the political right has acquired increasing influence across several regions of the world.

For Asean, the implications deserve serious scrutiny.

Brazil may be geographically distant from Southeast Asia, but the ideological currents shaping its politics are not.

Nationalism, economic insecurity, political polarisation, hostility towards established institutions and dissatisfaction with traditional political parties are increasingly visible across continents.


The latest opinion polls demonstrate how closely divided Brazil has become.



Supporters of Brazil's right-wing Senator and presidential candidate Flavio Bolsonaro attend a campaign rally on the eve of the second round of the presidential election at the Barra da Tijuca neighbourhood of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 24, 2026. — AFP pic




A CNT/MDA survey released on October 24 places Flávio Bolsonaro at 46.3 per cent against Lula’s 45 per cent.

The survey, conducted between October 21 and 23 among 2,032 respondents, has a margin of error of 2.2 percentage points.


The statistical difference is therefore insufficient to establish a clear leader.

Lula has also narrowed the gap in recent surveys, suggesting that Brazil’s electorate remains deeply contested rather than decisively committed to either political direction.


Yet the broader significance is unmistakable.

The Bolsonaro political movement has remained electorally substantial despite the controversies surrounding Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency and his subsequent conviction over an attempted coup.

Its continued appeal raises an important question about the durability of right-wing populism in democratic societies.

The Brazilian experience suggests that political movements can survive the departure of their founders when their underlying constituencies remain dissatisfied with existing institutions.

This phenomenon is hardly confined to Latin America.

Across Europe, right-wing parties have drawn support from anxieties over immigration, national identity, economic stagnation and the perceived failures of political elites.

In the United States, President Donald Trump has demonstrated how nationalism and economic grievances can be combined into an enduring political movement.

Brazil belongs within this larger transformation, although each country’s political circumstances remain distinct.

The danger for Asean is not that Southeast Asian societies will mechanically reproduce Brazil’s political trajectory.

Rather, political developments elsewhere can strengthen narratives that already exist within the region.

When political movements abroad emphasise national identity, cultural insecurity and resentment towards established elites, similar arguments may acquire greater visibility in Southeast Asia.

Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have different political systems and histories.

Nevertheless, all must contend with the relationship between economic expectations, identity politics and democratic accountability.

In Malaysia, the interaction between ethnicity, religion and political competition is particularly important.

The country’s political landscape has long been shaped by negotiations among Malay-Muslim political interests, minority communities, regional identities and competing visions of national development.

A more polarised international political environment could complicate these negotiations.

Political actors may increasingly frame economic dissatisfaction through questions of identity rather than public policy.

Such tendencies can narrow the space for compromise, especially in a plural society where constitutional arrangements depend upon sustained intercommunal understanding.

Indonesia faces a different challenge.

As the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy, Indonesia must reconcile its democratic institutions with nationalism, religious mobilisation and the demands of economic transformation.

Its experience demonstrates that nationalism is not inherently incompatible with democratic pluralism.

Much depends upon whether political leaders employ national identity to strengthen inclusive institutions or to marginalise competing voices.

Thailand, meanwhile, continues to confront tensions between conservative institutions, reformist movements and competing understandings of political legitimacy.

The Philippines has its own experience of personality-driven politics, where family networks, popular mobilisation and law-and-order narratives have shaped electoral competition.

None of these countries can be reduced to a Brazilian political template.

Nevertheless, developments in Brazil provide another opportunity to examine how democratic competition changes when ideological polarisation becomes deeply embedded.

There is also a significant geopolitical dimension.

Brazil is a founding member of BRICS, a grouping that has become increasingly relevant to debates over multipolarity, international economic governance and the distribution of global influence.

Malaysia and Indonesia have sought closer engagement with BRICS as part of their wider diplomatic diversification.

Under Lula, Brazil has emphasised South-South cooperation, multilateral diplomacy and greater representation for developing economies.

A Bolsonaro administration could adopt different priorities, particularly regarding relations with Washington, environmental governance and the political orientation of BRICS.

These possibilities should not be confused with established policy decisions.

They would depend upon the composition of any new administration, domestic institutional constraints and Brazil’s economic interests.

Even so, Asean cannot assume that the strategic preferences of major emerging economies will remain unchanged after elections.

Brazil’s political contest also has implications for climate diplomacy.

The Amazon rainforest remains crucial to global biodiversity and climate stability.

Environmental policy has consequently become one of the important dividing lines between Lula and the Bolsonaro political movement.

Lula’s administration has pursued reductions in Amazon deforestation, while environmental campaigners have expressed concern over the implications of a possible return to Bolsonaro-family leadership.

For Southeast Asia, where deforestation, haze, biodiversity loss and extreme weather already present serious challenges, the international direction of climate policy is consequential.

A weakening of global environmental cooperation could make regional sustainability objectives more difficult to achieve.

Yet Asean must also recognise that right-wing politics is not a uniform phenomenon.

Conservative parties may support constitutional government, market reform and national sovereignty without embracing exclusionary nationalism or weakening democratic institutions.

The distinction between democratic conservatism and illiberal populism therefore matters.

Treating all right-wing movements as identical would obscure the very political developments that Asean needs to understand.

Similarly, Lula’s political difficulties cannot be explained exclusively through the ideological appeal of his opponents.

Concerns over living costs, crime, economic opportunity and dissatisfaction with government performance are legitimate electoral issues. The Associated Press has identified these concerns as central to the Brazilian campaign.

Governments that fail to address such grievances may find that voters increasingly turn towards alternative political movements.

The deeper lesson for Asean is therefore institutional rather than partisan.

Democratic resilience depends upon governments delivering economic security, maintaining public confidence, respecting constitutional procedures and preserving the legitimacy of political competition.

Asean’s own principles of consensus, inclusiveness and respect for diversity remain relevant, but they must be supported by practical governance.

Regional stability cannot rest exclusively upon diplomatic declarations while domestic societies experience rising economic anxiety and declining confidence in political institutions.

Brazil’s election should also remind Asean that multipolarity does not necessarily produce ideological moderation.

A world containing several centres of power may simultaneously experience sharper nationalism, more contested international institutions and greater competition over political values.

This is especially significant for Asean’s pursuit of centrality.

Asean cannot exercise even its circumscribed power effectively if its member states become increasingly divided by domestic ideological conflicts or external political alignments.

The Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific offers a framework for cooperation, inclusiveness and open regionalism.

Its credibility will depend upon whether member states continue to uphold these principles amid intensifying global competition.

Brazil’s presidential runoff has not yet produced a final verdict. Its close polling figures underscore the uncertainty of the contest.

Regardless of the outcome, the strength of competing political movements illustrates the depth of Brazil’s political divisions.

For Asean, the central concern is not simply whether Brazil moves further right or remains under Lula.

It is whether the broader international environment becomes increasingly polarised, leaving less room for compromise, pluralism and effective multilateral cooperation.

A global movement towards more confrontational politics would not stop at the geographical boundaries of Southeast Asia.

Asean must therefore understand the changing ideological landscape without assuming that political developments abroad will inevitably determine its own future.

Brazil’s election is a reminder that economic security, institutional legitimacy and social cohesion are essential foundations of political stability.

The challenge for Asean is to preserve these foundations while the international political landscape continues to change.

For a region built upon diversity, accommodation and diplomatic flexibility, that challenge is already substantial.

And it will not disappear when Brazil finishes counting its votes.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of Asean Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of the Institute of International and Asean Studies (IINTAS).

Why India Rejected F/A-18 Super Hornets Despite Its Navy Loaded With American Military Platforms?

Sunday, October 25, 2026


Why India Rejected F/A-18 Super Hornets Despite Its Navy Loaded With American Military Platforms?

By Sakshi Tiwari

Dassault Rafale-M


The Indian Navy is conducting trials of the French Dassault Rafale-M, the naval aircraft that edged out the American F/A-18E/F Super Hornet in a tight contest.

Interestingly, the Indian Navy already operates a substantial number of American platforms. Against that backdrop, Boeing had expected to secure yet another major Indian contract.

Why did the French Rafale-M ultimately edge out the Super Hornets?

In April 2025, India ordered 26 Rafale Marines to replace the Russian-origin MiG-29K, which currently operates from Indian aircraft carriers– INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant.

More than a year after signing the contract, the Indian Navy is running Rafale-M trials at the Shore-Based Test Facility (SBTF) at INS Hansa in Goa and is reportedly considering some minor modifications to its aircraft carriers to accommodate the French aircraft.

According to the reports, the service is considering these small modifications because the Rafale-M fighters were originally designed to operate from CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) carriers—such as the French carrier Charles de Gaulle—whereas Indian carriers use a Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) system.

Additionally, the Rafale-M has a wingspan of almost 10.9 meters, and unlike the MiG-29K, it is not designed to fold its wings to take up less space on the deck. This creates a larger deck or hangar footprint. So, the Navy is purportedly examining minor procedural workarounds, such as temporarily detaching the wingtip missile launch rails to reduce the effective span to roughly 9.6 meters, along with handling and stowage adjustments.

Rafale-M deliveries are expected to begin in 2028 and likely conclude by 2030, marking the first time in a decade that the Indian Navy will operate a non-Russian or Western fighter. Its last Western carrier fighter was the British Sea Harrier aircraft, which it retired in 2016 after more than three decades of service.

Notably, the Indian Navy has operated French equipment before, though never on this scale.

Earlier, it acquired 12 Breguet Alizé carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft that participated in the 1961 Goa operations and the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and served the Navy until 1991. The service has also operated the HAL Chetak, a French-designed light utility helicopter produced in India for decades, though it is now being phased out in favor of more advanced indigenous aircraft.

By contrast, the Indian Navy operates a range of US-origin equipment, from helicopters to spy aircraft, making the choice of a French carrier-based jet particularly interesting.File Image: Rafale-M
Indian Navy: Full of US-Origin Weapon Systems

Despite the push for indigenization, the Indian Navy has steadily acquired American platforms and weapons over the past few decades.

One of the most important items on this list is the P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft. India first ordered eight P-8I aircraft in January 2009, becoming the type’s first international customer.

It signed a follow-on order for four additional aircraft in 2016, significantly enhancing its maritime surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and ISR capabilities and positioning it as a critical asset in the Indian Ocean Region. In February 2026, the Defense Acquisition Council (DAC) officially cleared an additional P-8I purchase.

In addition to the Poseidon, the Indian Navy ordered 24 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-mission naval helicopters in February 2020. It has since received 21, and the rest are expected to arrive in 2027. These helicopters can conduct anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, shipborne multi-role operations, and networked operations, arming the Navy with the capability to detect and neutralize underwater and surface threats in the Indian Ocean.

The Navy has also leased two MQ-9B Sea Guardian drones from US-based General Atomics since 2020. It is supplementing these by leasing two more as per a contract signed in August 2026. These drones have supported maritime surveillance and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions in the Indian Ocean Region, complementing the Navy’s P-8I and helping maintain vigilance.

India also signed a $3.3 billion deal with the US in October 2024 to acquire 31 MQ-9B High-Altitude Long-Endurance UAVs. Of the 31 Sea Guardians the MoD purchased, the Indian Navy will receive 15 drones, while the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force will each receive 8 to strengthen surveillance along the northern and western borders.

The Indian Navy operates one US-acquired INS Jalashwa (the former USS Trenton), an Austin-class amphibious transport dock with a sealift capability for over 3,500 troops and a squadron of armored vehicles.

Furthermore, the service has also acquired several lethal US munitions over the years, including the AGM-84 Harpoon Block II anti-ship missile, Mk 54 lightweight torpedoes, and the AGM-114 Hellfire, to name just a few.

Despite these rather high-value acquisitions, the Indian Navy has never purchased or operated an American fighter jet. When it finally got the chance to buy a US aircraft, i.e., the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the service chose the Rafale-M instead.
Tour Navy Ships


Why did India Opt For Rafales over Super Hornets?

When India opened the contest for a carrier-based fighter to replace the MiG-29K jets, Boeing offered its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Block III.

In 2022, Boeing India marketed the F/A-18 Super Hornet Block III as a carrier-based fighter designed for high-load, high-stress operations, and stressed that the multi-role naval fighter would be fully compatible with Indian Navy carriers.

Boeing pitched the Super Hornet as a jet that required minimal support equipment and had a remarkably low cost per flight hour while maintaining high mission readiness. It tried to woo the Indian Navy by emphasizing that the aircraft would become a force multiplier because it could interface with the P-8I and other US-origin systems the service operates.

To sweeten the deal, Boeing also announced a roadmap to significantly increase its investments in line with the “Make in India” initiative and pledged to transfer cutting-edge technologies to Indian industry if the Super Hornet was selected.

However, the Super Hornet had to dogfight with the French Rafale, a cutting-edge fighter for India’s carrier-borne aircraft tender.

In a tightly fought contest, both jets underwent extensive testing at a shore-based facility, including take-off trials from both ski-jump and catapult launchers. Both aircraft reportedly met the Indian Navy’s requirements, but the Rafale-M ultimately won.

Speaking to the EurAsian Times earlier, an ex-Indian Navy pilot who had flown both the Super Hornet and Rafale said both aircraft were extremely capable and on a level playing field. “The only issue I can think of is that the F-18 is a heavier aircraft, and the Rafale M is lighter. So, when it comes to arrested landing on the aircraft carrier, Rafale has more flexibility,” the naval aviator said at the time, requesting anonymity.

In this image released by the US Department of Defense, an F/A-18F Super Hornet launches from the flight deck of the world’s largest aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, October 11, 2023. (Photo by Triniti Lersch / US Department of Defense / AFP) /

The Rafale-M shared a very high degree of commonality with the 36 Rafale jets operated by the Indian Air Force (IAF). This meant several parts, tools, and test equipment could be interchanged, and India could share ground-support systems, simulators, and diagnostic software.

Additionally, India had already established maintenance infrastructure, trained technicians, and supply chains for the IAF Rafales, which could support the Rafale-Ms.

The Navy would have assessed that Rafale-Ms would reduce costs by creating an inventory of maintenance facilities, spare parts, logistics, and potential future overhauls. Meanwhile, introducing the Super Hornet would require building an entirely separate support ecosystem.

In this scenario, the air force can familiarize itself with the Marine aircraft, while naval pilots can transition to the IAF’s twin-seat Rafales.

The IAF is now poised to acquire 114 Rafale multi-role fighters, most of which will be manufactured locally. Therefore, one could argue that the decision to choose French jets for the Indian Navy may have been driven by the need for uniformity and interoperability, which are crucial in fast-paced conflict zones.

A secondary factor could have been the Infrared Search and Track (IRST) system, which provides a stealthy advantage in detecting and engaging threats, including potential low-observable aircraft. The Rafale-M came with an integrated IRST, whereas the Super Hornet Block III lacked one, although Boeing offered a podded solution.

Moreover, the Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile on the Rafale also offered superior standoff capability compared to the Super Hornet’s AIM-120 AMRAAM.

More importantly, however, strong defense ties between India and France, smoother government-to-government negotiations even in past deals, the potential for indigenous weapons integration, and the presence of French fighter jets in the IAF played a crucial role in the decision.

India has never acquired US fighter jets for several reasons, including export controls and restrictions on their use.

Despite its best efforts to market the Block III jet to potential customers such as Canada, Finland, Germany, Poland, and Switzerland, Boeing failed to secure any new contracts and kept losing out to rivals such as Saab Gripen, Dassault Rafale, and the Lockheed Martin F-35.

Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com

Is UMNO the bad kid on the block?

Murray Hunter


Is UMNO the bad kid on the block?

Destabilising Madani, Sideling Partners, with the Arrogance of Entitlement






UMNO is once again showing its true colours as the disruptive force within Malaysian politics. What was once the dominant partner in Barisan Nasional has, under Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi’s chairmanship, increasingly behaved like the coalition’s internal saboteur, prioritising self-preservation and elite interests over institutional stability, coalition discipline, or any coherent national ethic.

This pattern has been consistent consistent since the end of 2022, when Anwar Ibrahim became prime minister.

UMNO has repeatedly tested and strained the Madani government from within, extracting concessions while publicly posturing as a responsible partner. The relentless push to secure preferential treatment for Datuk Seri Najib Razak, culminating in the optics of house arrest is the clearest recent example.

This is not merely a legal or political manoeuvre, it is a profound symbolic failure. In a country where ordinary citizens are expected to accept the full weight of the law, the spectacle of elite accommodation reeks of hypocrisy. It signals that loyalty to the system is for the rakyat, while the connected operate under a different set of rules.

The Madani administration’s willingness to accommodate these pressures has left it looking weakened and compromised, less a government of principle than a temporary arrangement held together by necessity and calculation.

This same entitlement has now spilled into the Melaka state election.

On Saturday night at the Melaka International Trade Centre, BN announced candidates for 21 of the 28 seats it intends to contest on 14 November. MCA was allocated just two seats, Machap Jaya’s Datuk Ngwe Hee Sem and Klebang’s Datuk Lim Ban Hong.

The Chinese-based party, which contested seven seats in the 2021 Melaka polls, was neither properly consulted nor given prior notice that the event would include candidate announcements. MCA president Datuk Seri Dr Wee Ka Siong and his leaders walked out before Zahid’s keynote. Outside the hall, Wee was blunt, without the party’s top leadership signing off, MCA would not recognise the candidates. Announcing them unilaterally, he said, was unacceptable, especially when seats previously contested by MCA had apparently been reallocated.

Wee’s position is straightforward and institutionally sound. Political parties operate through their own nomination processes and central leaderships. Treating a long-standing partner as a junior appendage whose consent can be assumed, or whose dignity can be ignored, is pure arrogance.

The MCA has been UMNO’s partner for decades. Reducing its stake so sharply without finalised negotiations and then springing the announcement under the guise of an “election machinery launch” is not coalition management, it is dominance theatre. Wee has called on BN’s central leadership to intervene and resolve the dispute fairly.

Several days remain before nomination, and he has left the door open to a settlement. Whether that door stays open depends on whether UMNO is capable of treating partners as equals rather than subordinates.

The broader pattern is not confined to Melaka. Accusations that UMNO elements have attempted to engineer and legitimise irregular monarchical outcomes in Negeri Sembilan fit the same logic of power-over-process.

When a party that once defined itself as the guardian of constitutional order begins treating institutions, coalition agreements, party SOPs, even the symbolism of the rule of law as disposable instruments, it ceases to be a stabilising force and becomes the source of instability.

Malaysia’s multi-ethnic political compact has always been fragile. It rested, imperfectly, on negotiated power-sharing and at least a pretence of mutual respect among partners. UMNO’s current behaviour suggests that pretence is fraying.

The party appears more focused on securing its own position, protecting its convicted former leader, and maximising short-term electoral control than on building durable governance or restoring public trust. The Madani government, by tolerating or enabling these dynamics, risks being remembered less as a reformist interlude than as a vessel that allowed a saboteur without national ethics to operate from inside.

The Melaka episode is small in scale but revealing in character. If MCA’s dignity can be casually overridden, if candidate announcements can be sprung without consent, and if the optics of elite exceptionalism around Najib can be prioritised over equal application of the law, then the “bad kid on the block” label is not rhetorical excess. It is a description of conduct. Malaysian politics has long suffered from elite impunity and coalition bullying. UMNO’s latest contributions simply make the pattern harder to ignore.

When children learn to exclude, adults must ask why

When children learn to exclude, adults must ask why


The concern was raised in Parliament by Puncak Borneo MP Willie Mongin, who said a teacher had approached him about students refusing to sit next to Christian classmates because they eat pork and wear a cross

Updated 5 days ago · Published on 20 Oct 2026 8:20AM

Telling children to respect one another is easy. Teaching them what that means in practice is harder. - October 20, 2026

by The Vibes Says



A CHILD refusing to sit beside a classmate because of their religion is not something adults should dismiss as a childish disagreement.

The concern was raised in Parliament by Puncak Borneo MP Willie Mongin, who said a teacher had approached him about students refusing to sit next to Christian classmates because they eat pork and wear a cross.

The account raises an uncomfortable question for Malaysia: how do children come to see another person’s faith as a reason to keep their distance?

Children learn about the world from the adults around them. They listen to conversations at home, observe how people behave towards those who are different and increasingly encounter opinions and claims through social media.

They may not understand the origins of prejudice, but they can absorb it long before they are old enough to question it.

We do not know what prompted the behaviour described by Willie, or how widespread such incidents might be. But the concern itself deserves attention.

If a child regards a classmate’s religious practices as a reason for exclusion, there is a lesson to be taught — not only to the child, but to the adults responsible for helping them understand the world around them.

Telling children to respect one another is easy. Teaching them what that means in practice is harder.

Malaysia’s schools bring together pupils from different backgrounds, but being in the same classroom does not necessarily mean children understand one another. Meaningful interaction matters.

So does the example set by parents, teachers and other adults, particularly when conversations about race and religion become divisive.

Children should be able to practise their own faith without being made to feel that respecting another person’s beliefs somehow compromises their own.

A Christian child wearing a cross, for instance, should not have to defend that choice to classmates. Nor should a child’s dietary practices become a reason to exclude them.

Respect does not require everyone to share the same beliefs. It requires recognising that others have the same right to their beliefs and dignity.

That lesson becomes harder to teach when children encounter hostility towards other communities beyond the school gates.

Public arguments about race and religion, along with provocative online content, can reinforce the idea that differences are something to fear.

Children who lack the maturity to assess what they see may accept stereotypes without understanding the harm they cause.

This is where digital literacy must mean more than knowing how to use the internet safely.

Young people also need to learn how to question what they read, recognise misleading claims and distinguish criticism from prejudice.

National Unity Minister Datuk Aaron Ago Dagang told Parliament that the government adopts a whole-of-government approach to promoting unity.

He cited the Communications Ministry’s Safe Internet Campaign and its network of 1,099 National Information Dissemination Centres (NADI), alongside programmes such as Jejak Harmony, Rukun Negara Youth Tour and Harmony Dialogue.

These initiatives may provide useful opportunities to build understanding.

But their existence alone cannot tell us whether children are learning to treat one another differently.

The more pressing question is what happens in schools and communities when prejudice surfaces. Are teachers equipped to address it?

Do pupils have opportunities to build friendships with classmates from different backgrounds?

And when a child repeats a stereotype, do adults challenge it or allow it to pass as harmless talk?

Teachers should not be expected to handle these situations without support.

A child who excludes a classmate needs to understand why the behaviour is wrong, while the child on the receiving end should not be left to defend their religion or carry the responsibility of educating others.

The response also needs to go beyond punishment.

Children are still learning, and correcting their behaviour is an opportunity to help them understand the consequences of their actions.

But that opportunity is lost if adults ignore the incident or treat it as insignificant.

Nor can schools be expected to undo attitudes reinforced elsewhere.

Families, community leaders and public figures have a part to play in ensuring that differences in faith and culture are not presented to children as reasons for suspicion.

Malaysia has long spoken about the importance of living together across racial and religious lines.

The harder task is making that principle meaningful in everyday life, particularly for the next generation.

The concern raised in Parliament does not establish that Malaysian schoolchildren are becoming less tolerant.

It does, however, offer a reason to examine how they learn to regard people outside their own communities.

Unity is not measured by the number of programmes launched or the speeches delivered in its name.

It is reflected in how people treat one another when no one is watching — including in a classroom, where a child should never have to wonder whether their faith makes them unwelcome. – October 20, 2026