DAP and MCA are trapped: What are they still for? — Khoo Ying Hooi
First Published: Sunday, 19 Jul 2026 9:23 AM MYT
JULY 19 — The crisis confronting DAP and MCA is larger than the electoral fortunes of either party.
It concerns the meaning, leverage and future of political representation in Malaysia, and, more fundamentally, how both parties imagine the country they claim to serve.
For decades, DAP and MCA appeared to offer contrasting routes to political influence. MCA promised access through accommodation within the governing establishment. DAP promised change through opposition, institutional reform and a more equal conception of Malaysian citizenship.
Today, both claims are under severe strain. The deeper question is whether either party can still demonstrate that its presence meaningfully changes the direction or terms of power.
DAP and MCA increasingly offer two different routes to the same destination; participation in power without the capacity to determine the terms of participation.
DAP’s problem is that it entered government without successfully redefining what it is in government for. MCA’s problem is even more fundamental; it remains attached to a coalition whose political centre no longer depends on MCA in the way it once did.
Behind these institutional problems are two deeply embedded political mindsets.
DAP: From transforming Malaysia to managing its limits
For decades, DAP’s identity was built around resistance; opposing corruption, challenging authoritarian laws, defending institutional accountability and articulating an idea of Malaysia beyond the communal bargain represented by Barisan Nasional (BN).
Being in the government has demanded compromise from the DAP, and the party has not adequately explained the limits, purposes or achievements of those compromises.
The result is a widening gap between responsibility and influence. DAP is considered powerful enough to be blamed for government decisions, yet too restrained or too weak to alter the government’s wider direction.
At the time of writing, Anthony Loke had ruled out leaving Pakatan Harapan, arguing that slower reform was part of the price of governing and that returning to opposition would not necessarily produce better outcomes. While this is politically understandable, it reveals the party’s changing conception of power.
DAP once argued that Malaysian politics had to be restructured. It now appears increasingly convinced that the existing arrangement is too dangerous to challenge decisively.
Government stability, coalition consensus and the need to prevent a more conservative alternative have become not merely tactical considerations, but the organising logic of the party’s conduct. Every difficult decision is interpreted through the risk of destabilisation.
Every disagreement must be calibrated against the possibility of empowering PAS or PN. Every retreat can be defended as the lesser evil.
This is the central shift in DAP’s political mindset. The party no longer presents itself primarily as an agent capable of changing Malaysia. It increasingly presents itself as the responsible custodian preventing Malaysia from becoming worse.
When controversial decisions arise, DAP leaders invoke the need to work quietly from within. These considerations are real in a fragmented parliamentary system. But repeated too often, pragmatism begins to resemble an ideology of permanent retreat. It helps reproduce the trap whenever it treats the survival of the government as more important than defining the purpose of the government.
Barisan Nasional’s MCA candidate Chong Fui Ming (left) faces Pakatan Harapan’s DAP incumbent Teo Kok Seong in a straight fight for the Bahau state seat in Jempol, Negeri Sembilan. — Bernama pic
MCA: A communal bargain without bargaining power
MCA faces the opposite problem. It continues to present itself as a defender of Chinese interests, but it has lost much of the electoral constituency that would give that representation political weight.
Historically, MCA justified compromise with Umno by arguing that access to government allowed it to moderate policies, protect Chinese education and negotiate over community concerns.
That political model rested on a particular understanding of Malaysia. The country was viewed as an arrangement among distinct ethnic communities, each represented by its own elite intermediaries.
Politics took the form of negotiation among communal leaders, while ordinary citizens were expected to place their trust in those leaders’ access to power.
In this context, national unity did not require the transcendence of communal categories. It merely required careful management.
Citizenship was filtered through communal representation, and equality was pursued less through universal institutions than through negotiated allocations and protections.
That model was always hierarchical. Umno occupied the dominant position, while MCA and MIC sought concessions from within the coalition. That logic however no longer operates in the same way.
Umno does not need MCA to deliver the Chinese vote because MCA has repeatedly demonstrated that it cannot. Nor does Umno need MCA to legitimise BN as a multiethnic coalition to the same extent as in previous decades.
MCA remains organisationally established and locally relevant in certain constituencies, but its capacity to impose conditions on the coalition is severely limited.
A communal party that cannot reliably deliver the community it claims to represent becomes less a bargaining partner than a symbolic exhibit of coalition pluralism.
In December 2025, MCA resolved that it would leave BN if any BN party co-operated with DAP in the next general election, citing fundamental ideological differences. In Johor, MCA strongly supported BN’s decision to contest all 56 seats against PH.
Yet ahead of the Negeri Sembilan election, disagreement emerged within MCA over BN’s apparent cooperation with Perikatan Nasional (PN). MCA Youth secretary-general Saw Yee Fung was reportedly instructed to stay out of the campaign after publicly questioning the arrangement.
This raises a basic question. What exactly are MCA’s non-negotiable principles? MCA’s tragedy is therefore not simply that it has lost Chinese support.
It is that it cannot convincingly explain what political bargain voters receive in return for restoring that support.
Two competing and inadequate views of Malaysia
The deeper difference between DAP and MCA lies in how they conceive Malaysia.
DAP’s “Malaysian Malaysia” once represented a direct challenge to unequal citizenship and communal political ordering.
It imagined a nation in which political membership would not be mediated primarily by race. But DAP has struggled to translate this principle into a contemporary governing programme that connects constitutional equality with wages, housing, public education, healthcare, social protection and economic insecurity.
DAP’s demographic problem is therefore not merely a shortage of Malay candidates. It is the absence of a sustained political language showing Malay voters that accountable institutions, equal protection and constraints on arbitrary power are not minority interests. They are forms of security for everyone.
Anthony Loke’s recent acknowledgement that DAP cannot depend solely on Chinese support is important. But broadening the party’s appeal requires more than fielding candidates from different communities or softening rhetoric.
It requires DAP to articulate a Malaysia in which democratic reform is connected to the everyday vulnerabilities of the majority.
MCA’s understanding of Malaysia is almost the reverse. Its original purpose was rooted in communal representation through elite interethnic bargaining.
But that model assumed a stable political order in which each party could credibly claim to represent a distinct ethnic constituency.
That order has collapsed. The Chinese electorate no longer accepts MCA’s monopoly over representation. Malay politics is itself fragmented among Umno, Bersatu, PAS, PKR, Amanah and regional actors.
The federal government is formed through shifting coalition arrangements rather than a permanent Alliance-style bargain.
MCA is therefore defending a political architecture whose foundations have already eroded.
One risks turning “Malaysian Malaysia” into a moral brand without sufficient political content. The other risks turning “Chinese representation” into an organisational claim without sufficient bargaining power.
Neither proposition adequately answers the question of what Malaysia should become.
Beyond the competition for Chinese support
This is why merely asking which party better represents the Chinese is increasingly inadequate. The question assumes that Malaysian Chinese constitute a single political bloc whose primary concern is communal protection.
They do not.
Malaysian Chinese are divided by class, generation, geography, language, education and political outlook.
Younger voters may be concerned with housing, employment, wages, corruption, climate change, educational mobility and institutional fairness as much as with conventionally defined “Chinese issues”.
Many do not want a return to old-style communal bargaining. But they are also becoming sceptical of a multiracial reformism that invokes national ideals while delivering few visible structural changes.
The challenge is therefore not simply to recover “the Chinese vote”. Such language can itself reproduce the communal assumptions that both parties need to overcome.
The more important question is whether DAP and MCA can contribute to a form of politics in which minorities exercise influence not merely as ethnic voting blocs attached to larger Malay-led coalitions, but as equal citizens participating in the formation of national policy.
That requires more than Chinese ministers, more than seats allocated to component parties and more than statements on vernacular education or cultural rights.
It requires parties capable of connecting minority security with democratic institutions, socioeconomic justice and genuinely shared citizenship.
Moving forward, the answer cannot simply be for DAP to leave the government or for MCA to leave BN.
Both parties must move beyond the assumption that voters can be retained through fear; fear of PAS, fear of PN, fear of Umno, fear of instability, fear of marginalisation or fear that abandoning one party will strengthen something worse.
Fear may secure reluctant votes. It cannot restore political conviction.
The central question is no longer whether DAP or MCA can win back Chinese support. That is not merely a crisis for DAP or MCA. It is a crisis of political imagination.
Neither has yet answered the most important question. What kind of Malaysia does it still believe is possible and what is it actually prepared to risk in order to bring that Malaysia into being?
* Khoo Ying Hooi, PhD, is an associate professor at Universiti Malaya.
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The truth, as I see it, is that Chinese voters have frigged both MCA and DAP, whilst both parties have also been less than correct.
In MCA's days the corruption in the nation was nauseating while in DAP's days the "balls" have to a frequent degree been missing. Chinese voters have been praised for their political astuteness but in reality they have through their 'punishment' voting (of either MCA and DAP, and indeed even Gerakan) emasculated both MCA and DAP (and Gerakan) to near-eunuch status.
However, one fact must be accepted - Chinese in Malaysia today constituted only 22% of the population (one-fifth), and not the near 50% it used to be, so accept that the majority Malays will politically dominate - now's for you to choose either PAS or UMNO, wakakaka. 😂😁😀😓😢 [😭 if your choice is similar to RTA and Wong]
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