INDONESIA IN SERIOUS TROUBLE: CLOWNISH PRESIDENT CLUELESS OR MAYBE NOT

 

OutSyed The Box

Monday, October 26, 2026

INDONESIA IN SERIOUS TROUBLE: CLOWNISH PRESIDENT CLUELESS OR MAYBE NOT

Do read my own Conclusions at the end.

First here is a one minute video about Indonesian students in Kalimantan protesting against the indiscriminate burning of the forests. There were similar protests in Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia. (Folks, as Malaysians we need to get to know Indonesia in some detail. They are our closest neighbours in all aspects of the word).

Note that the students are saying 'Revolusi'. Their country is failing - again.

 

The Indonesian Stock Market has crashed. It did not happen overnite. It has been crashing this whole year (see chart below).  Their composite stock market index (IHDN or Indeks Harga Saham Gabungan) has dropped 45% from 9,134 points in January 2026 to 4996 points on 19 October 2026.

The Indonesian Rupiah has weakened from Rp16,801.08 (27 Feb 2026) to Rp18,089.73 (23 Oct 2026) per US$1, a 7.67% depreciation against the US dollar. Graph below.

Here is another 15 minute video. You can reset the playback speed. 1.5 times is ok. You will save time.

It gives you a snapshot of what is happening in Indonesia. This need not be the absolute truth but it gives you a pretty good idea.   

Some brief copy paste.  

Indonesia’s Stock Market Crisis: Regulatory Weakness, Political Influence and the Risk of Systemic Corruption

1. Market crash that exposes deeper problems

At the heart of the issue are the credibility of financial regulation, the transparency of listed companies, the relationship between political power and capital allocation, and the independence of institutions responsible for protecting investors.

The weaknesses have accumulated over years: inadequate market surveillance, concentrated corporate ownership, conflicts of interest, inconsistent enforcement and insufficient transparency. 

2. What actually happened?

On Friday, 16 October 2026, Indonesia’s Jakarta Composite Index (IHSG) fell 11.57%, closing at 5,185.10. Reuters reported that it was the market’s steepest single-day decline since January 1998. 

3. Regulatory weakness: The problem of enforcement

Indonesia has formal financial regulators, including the Financial Services Authority (OJK), alongside the Indonesia Stock Exchange and the central bank. The existence of these institutions, however, does not automatically guarantee effective surveillance or deterrence. (AKA: Korupsi and rasuah)

Regulators cannot or will not identify manipulation quickly, establish who controls apparently independent shareholders, trace coordinated transactions and impose penalties strong enough to discourage misconduct.

Controlling shareholders, nominees or related parties are difficult to identify, the reported free float may overstate the shares genuinely available for independent trading.

Weak deterrence. Manipulation is detected only after prices have risen sharply or investors have suffered losses.

Unequal access to information. Investors who obtain information earlier or understand opaque ownership networks may enjoy advantages over ordinary domestic and foreign shareholders.

That is the fundamental institutional test: regulation must work in practice, not simply appear in announcements and policy documents.

4. “Gorengan” stocks and the potential for market manipulation

The Indonesian term saham gorengan refers to shares whose prices may be artificially inflated through speculative promotion, coordinated trading or manipulation. 

Imagine a company in which a small group controls most shares, leaving relatively few available for trading. Aggressive buying can push the quoted price upwards without a corresponding improvement in earnings or business prospects. Retail investors may mistake rising prices for evidence of genuine value and buy near the peak. When major holders sell, the price collapse. Small investors get taken for a ride.

5. Corruption and political influence: The deeper institutional risk

Corruption is an important concern in Indonesia’s political economy. Concerns about transparency, market integrity and governance. 

The deeper risk is institutional capture: a situation in which regulatory or economic decisions become more responsive to powerful political and commercial interests than to the public interest.

Indonesia’s economy has long featured powerful business groups, influential political networks and companies with close connections to the state. Where ownership is concentrated, conflicts of interest can become difficult for outside investors to assess. 

My Comments:

Indonesia is a Third World country where value systems, integrity and even morality is still Work In Progress. Exactly like in this country but over here the 'lacks-thereof' can be broadly isolated into certain groups. It is not across the board.

So in Third World countries when there are electricity power supply cables running across towns and villages, the villagers who have the smarts not to get electrocuted often steal free electricity by tapping the power cables.

Or if they know how to operate drills and weld metal they drill holes in water pipes to steal water.

In Nigeria, people drilled holes in oil pipelines to steal diesel and petrol. Once in a while there would be a fire and the whole village would get toasted.

Indonesia is a bit more sophisticated in some ways. They have a stock market. And the local boys have become savvy at playing the markets (aka manipulating). But they are extremely short on the integrity, values and morality department. Much like the folks here as well. So their system is constantly collapsing.

And at the head of the pack is the Bapak Presiden - a rather clownish fellow but with serious power at his disposal. He is the president.

Here is the bottom line - Indonesia will not reform anytime soon. The fires and the haze will return again next year. Just wait until July next year. 

Their stock market and the Rupiah will keep going down or sideways. 

They have laws but their laws need not apply. Or apply equally. Does that sound familiar?

They have systems but their systems need not follow the system. It can be bengkok. Does that sound familiar?

What is needed are good values, good morality and integrity in the people. Which are lacking. Does that sound familiar? 

Never take things for granted.  Things can go from bright sunshine to disaster in the blink of an eye.  

 

The Guardian view on Lula’s comeback: a victory for Brazil and the world, as well as a Trump rebuff

Editorial

A fourth presidential victory gives Lula another chance to defend democracy, protect the Amazon and deliver for Brazil’s working people

Tue 27 Oct 2026 05.40 AEDT

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s win in Brazil’s presidential election is a triumph for him, his country and the world. The 80-year-old incumbent snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, blocked the rise of the far right and saved the planetary air-conditioning system of the Amazon from irreparable destruction. Known universally as Lula, he made history by becoming the first candidate to win a presidential run-off after finishing second in the opening round. In triumphing against Flávio Bolsonaro, the leftist stopped what could have been the most dangerous consolidation of authoritarian rule in Brazil since military rule ended. A Bolsonaro presidency could have used a rightwing Congress to extend presidential terms and pack the supreme court, entrenching power for generations.

Lula seemed to have been energised by his first-round defeat by Mr Bolsonaro. The three-time president initially pitted his extraordinary life and record against a 45-year-old senator married to controversy. But voters wanted answers to economic insecurity, rising prices and poor public services. Lula reversed course in the second round, offering immediate relief from everyday costs and indebtedness – including to the rising number of self-employed voters whom his rightwing opponent had been courting. Popular mobilisation transformed the runoff into a race to stop a Bolsonaro restoration with student protests, mass demonstrations and a 10 million-strong “Lula’s Army” WhatsApp channel. It seemed to work. Nearly 5 million more people voted in the second round of the Brazilian election than the first.

Donald Trump. Photograph: Yuri Gripas/EPA

Mr Bolsonaro’s desperate refusal to concede follows his father’s playbook. In 2022 then-president Jair Bolsonaro did the same, claiming fraud. The elder Bolsonaro’s attempted coup saw him jailed for 27 years. This time Lula’s margin of victory – 4.4m votes – over the younger Bolsonaro was twice that achieved over the father. His win has also been recognised by rightwing regional leaders, conservative newspapers and even a prominent evangelical ally of the Bolsonaros. It may be significant that defeat denied Mr Bolsonaro a presidential shield from allegations of corruption and money laundering. Whether he remains in Brazil after his term as senator expires in February remains to be seen.

After the Bolsonaro clan, the next biggest loser from the results of the Brazilian election is Donald Trump. Lula’s win broke a run of seven rightwing presidential wins across Latin America, a regional advance for which Mr Trump had claimed credit. While rightwing leaders in Chile, Paraguay and Peru congratulated Lula on his victory, the White House remained silent. The US president has only himself to blame: he tried to use tariffs to pressure Brazil over the elder Bolsonaro’s prosecution and its courts’ enforcement actions against American tech companies. Mr Trump’s meddling handed Lula a winning argument for Brazil’s sovereignty.

Brazil remains divided, with a rightwing Congress ready to obstruct Lula – particularly on the environment. But few are better placed to negotiate than the former trade unionist who founded the Workers’ party. Lula’s victory provides an elected counterweight and that matters for labour rights, public services, Indigenous communities and global climate policy. The win shows the wider democratic left that a broad coalition can defeat the right. Can governing produce the secure livelihoods, strong state provision and meaningful opportunities that make that coalition durable? The next four years in Brazil may provide an answer.

Israeli military breaks silence on purported feud with Benjamin Netanyahu

Israeli military breaks silence on purported feud with Benjamin Netanyahu

By Middle East correspondent Matthew Doran


Posted about 2h ago

Israeli media is reporting a feud between the Israel Defense Forces and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. (Reuters: Kevin Coombs)

In short:

The Israel Defense Forces say their operations are based "solely on security, professional, objective and national considerations".

The IDF statement comes amid reports of a feud between the military and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Senior IDF personnel are reportedly uncomfortable with attacking Iran in the final days of a hotly contested Israeli election.

The Israeli military has broken its silence on a widely reported feud with the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, insisting it will only make decisions about attacks against Iran based on national security considerations.

In the past few days of the Israeli election campaign, Mr Netanyahu has ratcheted up his public rhetoric on the threat posed by Iran, including posting an AI-generated image of Tel Aviv being hit with a nuclear bomb.

Weeks of speculation about whether Mr Netanyahu had been pushing for fresh strikes on Iran ahead of, or to coincide with, the national poll culminated in stunning leaks to the Israeli media on Sunday night.

Channel 12, Israel's most popular television network and an outlet often derided by the Netanyahu government, reported that the prime minister was at loggerheads with Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff Eyal Zamir.

The suggestion was that the IDF was uncomfortable at the prospect of being used to attack the Iranian regime based on party-political calculations.

Israel's Defence Minister Israel Katz rejected the reporting.

Polling shows Gadi Eisenkot could be stiff competition for Benjamin Netanyahu at Israel's upcoming election. (Reuters: Amir Cohen)

Soon after, CNN reported General Zamir had told his US counterpart that any strikes ahead of the Israeli election would delay the vote, prompting the White House to refuse to give Israel the green light to launch the attacks.

"The IDF is focused on its missions and remains on high alert in every arena, in light of various warnings and the sensitivity of the current period," the military said in a statement.

"The IDF's operational activities and decisions are based solely on security, professional, objective and national considerations.

"Any other discussion is misleading and irrelevant."
Netanyahu warnings on Iran 'might ring hollow'

Analysts said tension between the government and the military had been common over the past few years, as competing interests on the wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran boiled over.

"It's not a surprise in Israel because the conflict between the two, the political and the military echelons, is there for the last three years in many, many junctures," Sima Shine, a former high-ranking Mossad officer and now senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies told the ABC.

Ms Shine warned Mr Netanyahu's sudden insistence Iran posed a significant threat to Israel might ring hollow, even with legitimate concerns about Tehran's stockpiles of nuclear material.

Former Mossad agent Sima Shine says the Israeli public may not place much trust on Benjamin Netanyahu's most recent warnings about Iran. (ABC News: Hamish Harty)


"You know, after two wars that both President Trump and the prime minister have said that they obliterated the program, now we are again with this threat of the nuclear program," she said.

"There is less, I would say less confidence or trust would be better to say, less trust in what is being said on this issue."

Mr Netanyahu's political opponents have lashed out at his recent references to the Iranian threat, with one challenger Avigdor Liberman even demanding he be investigated for treason over the clashes with the IDF's top brass.

Tensions high in Israel ahead of pivotal election




Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sought to play on national security fears just days out from the election.

Iran's foreign ministry spokesman, Esmaeil Bagahei said the outcome of the Israeli poll was a moot point.

"It makes no difference to us who ultimately takes the helm of the regime in such an atmosphere, in such an election, when its track record shows that it has had no other outcome for our region but violence and killing," he said in Tehran.

Mr Netanyahu has also published an AI-generated video on his social media channels, showing a journalist asking Iran's reclusive Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamanei who he would vote for.

Lying in bed, with his arms and legs in casts, Ayatollah Khamanei said anyone but "Bibi", suggesting another term of Mr Netanyahu's prime ministership would likely mean he met the same fate as his father – killed on the first day of the US and Israel's war against Iran in late February.

Final stretch of critical election

Mr Netanyahu has also been leaning heavily on the endorsement he received from US President Donald Trump.

A fresh billboard has been spotted in Tel Aviv, showing the two men standing side-by-side with fighter jets flying overhead and the slogan "we have one chance to win".

Buses are also adorned with quotes from Mr Trump, backing Mr Netanyahu.

Benjamin Netanyahu has been promoting Donald Trump's endorsement of his leadership in the final days of the Israeli election campaign. (ABC News: Hamish Harty)

In Jerusalem's Machane Yehuda markets, voters the ABC spoke to were divided on who they would be voting for.

One shopkeeper declared, "There's no person in this country who can lead us except for Bibi."

A shopper said she would be voting for Gadi Eisenkot, the leading challenger from the anti-Netanyahu camp.

"I've been a very big supporter of Bibi but now I really believe that we need a change."

Others backed controversial far-right national security minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, ultra-Orthodox Jewish party Shas — further evidence of how fractured the Israeli political system is.

Polling shows Eisenkot's Yashar party is on track to become the largest in the 120-seat Israeli Knesset, slightly ahead of Mr Netanyahu's Likud.

But both men will need to rely on complicated coalition arrangements to form government, meaning it could be weeks before an outcome of the election is known.

***

Satanyahu's wicked deceit oozes out in copious volumes, so much so that even his own Israeli Armed Forces don't trust him an iota - he's just sheer duplicitous and self-serving, and would/have-already killed his own soldiers for his political interests.

Malaysia, the Philippines and the 2026 continental shelf dispute

Malaysia's #1 Content Aggregator


Malaysia, the Philippines and the 2026 continental shelf dispute

26 Oct 2026 • 7:22 AM MYT

Twentytwo13





For more than six decades, the Sabah dispute has strained relations between Malaysia and the Philippines. In 2026, it has gained fresh strategic significance as a Philippine continental shelf submission, Malaysian objections and military developments in Palawan converge in the South China Sea.

Manila bases its claim on an 1878 agreement between the Sultan of Sulu and British interests represented by Gustavus Baron de Overbeck and Alfred Dent, whose interests later formed the British North Borneo Company. Malaysia regards Sabah as an integral part of the federation. Despite the unresolved claim, both countries have largely prevented the dispute from derailing their wider relationship.

Malaysia must protect its legal position, strengthen maritime enforcement and maintain credible defence capabilities without exaggerating the threat from Manila or underestimating the risks posed by an unresolved dispute amid changing military deployments.

From the Sultan of Sulu to the Continental Shelf

The Philippines treats the 1878 agreement as a lease, while Malaysia regards it as a cession. Sabah became part of Malaysia on Sept 16, 1963, following the Cobbold Commission’s assessment of local opinion on the proposed federation. Manila has never accepted that this extinguished its claim.

For decades, both governments generally kept the dispute from derailing wider ties, recognising the importance of trade, maritime security, cooperation against cross-border crime and the Mindanao peace process.

The latest controversy centres on a process under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). On June 14, 2024, the Philippines submitted information to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) concerning an extended continental shelf in the West Palawan region under Article 76.

Malaysia lodged an initial communication on June 27, 2024, followed by a further communication on July 24, 2026. On Aug 8, 2026, Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Mohamad Hasan rejected suggestions that Kuala Lumpur had remained silent on the issue.

The legal distinction matters. An extended continental shelf concerns a coastal state’s sovereign rights over the seabed and subsoil beyond 200 nautical miles, where the continental margin extends that far and the requirements of UNCLOS are met. It does not confer sovereignty over land or determine maritime boundaries. Nor does the CLCS decide competing claims to Sabah.

Malaysia must scrutinise the submission’s coordinates and implications for its continental shelf rights. Its challenge is to defend those rights without escalating the dispute.


Why 2026 Matters

A CLCS submission is a formal legal and technical step, not merely political rhetoric. Malaysia must assess its implications on their merits rather than assume that every Philippine maritime initiative targets Sabah.

China has also objected to the Philippine submission. Malaysia must base its response on its own legal rights and interpretation of UNCLOS, rather than the positions taken by other countries. This is essential to preserving its independence of judgement and avoiding the perception that Kuala Lumpur is aligning itself with Beijing.

Balabac Island is one of nine locations designated under the Philippines’ Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) arrangements with the United States. Philippine officials have pursued runway construction there and discussed naval facilities, although plans for a naval base have evolved. The runway project predates the island’s designation as an EDCA site.

Balabac’s strategic location near the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea adds to the importance of the surrounding waters. These developments reinforce the need for Malaysia to maintain effective surveillance and rapid-response capabilities. They do not, in themselves, establish an intent to threaten Malaysia.

The 2013 Lahad Datu incursion demonstrated that historical claims and cross-border networks can have serious security consequences. The legal dispute does not, by itself, constitute an imminent military threat, but Malaysia must prepare for a range of contingencies.

Philippine Modernisation

The Philippines is shifting towards external defence, acquiring anti-ship weapons, improving surveillance and strengthening strategic partnerships. It took delivery of the first batch of BrahMos coastal defence missile systems from India in April 2024, under a procurement agreement signed in 2022.

These developments are aimed primarily at China, but their implications extend beyond their intended purpose.

Malaysia must assess Philippine capabilities alongside Chinese maritime activity. The answer is not an arms race, but ensuring that the country can monitor its maritime approaches, respond to incursions, protect offshore assets and maintain an effective presence at sea.


Malaysia’s Defence Challenge

Malaysia’s challenge lies not simply in the number of platforms it possesses, but in its ability to deploy and sustain them. The Navy, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and the Air Force must share intelligence, coordinate operations and respond quickly. New vessels offer limited value without reliable maintenance, weapons integration, trained personnel and logistical support.

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme illustrates the risks. In July 2026, Malaysia suspended new defence procurement from Norway after the Norwegian government cancelled an export licence for Naval Strike Missiles intended for the LCS vessels.

The episode highlights the need to account for export restrictions, supply-chain vulnerabilities, maintenance and the availability of ammunition and spare parts. Procurement must follow a clear operational concept and ensure equipment remains serviceable throughout its operational life.

Malaysia’s exposure extends beyond Sabah. Its coastline, offshore energy fields and sea lanes through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea demand surveillance, logistical support and response capabilities that existing resources only partly provide. Strengthening these capabilities is a national necessity, not a reaction to any single neighbour.

Cooperation with China, Malaysia’s largest trading partner, could complement these efforts through maritime safety dialogue, search-and-rescue exercises and equipment servicing. Chinese suppliers should be assessed against the same criteria as Western, South Korean and Turkish suppliers.

Such engagement must serve Malaysia’s legal rights and national interests. Strategic autonomy requires avoiding excessive dependence on any supplier and ensuring that defence partnerships do not compromise independent decision-making.


As such, what must Malaysia do?

1. Strengthen the naval and MMEA presence in Sabah and Sarawak. Review basing, maintenance, fuel supplies and spare parts, and assess Kudat as a potential forward facility. Improve coordination among enforcement, naval, air and intelligence agencies, with clear procedures for responding to incursions.

2. Prioritise readiness over acquisition. Ensure vessels have functioning sensors, communications, defensive systems and weapons, backed by trained personnel and reliable logistics. Maintain sufficient MMEA capacity for routine maritime policing, consider long-endurance unmanned systems and coastal radar, and improve vessel tracking. The objective is to make pressure on Malaysia harder to sustain and easier to detect, not to match other countries platform for platform.

3. Strengthen the legal response. Assess the Philippine submission technically, document Malaysia’s position, lodge further objections where warranted and pursue consultations with Manila. The CLCS assesses scientific and technical data to establish the outer limits of continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles; it does not delimit maritime boundaries or decide sovereignty over Sabah. Malaysia must keep these legal issues distinct.

4. Prevent maritime incidents from escalating. Establish channels for communication, verification and consular access. Address fisheries management and traditional fishing arrangements without prejudice to either country’s legal position.

5. Sustain regional cooperation. Continue working with the Philippines on maritime safety, cross-border crime, kidnapping and search and rescue. Maintain defence ties with Australia, the United States and other partners. Continue participating in the Five Power Defence Arrangements while preserving strategic autonomy. Within Asean, promote adherence to UNCLOS and communication among claimants, and resist attempts to turn Sabah into a contest between external powers.


Three Possible Outcomes

Legal stalemate. Objections persist without agreement. As the CLCS does not resolve sovereignty disputes or delimit maritime boundaries, bilateral negotiations may eventually be needed to address outstanding issues.

Managed disagreement. Both governments maintain their positions while expanding technical consultations and maritime communication, allowing cooperation in other areas to continue.

A security-focused relationship. Military modernisation in Palawan and persistent tensions prompt Malaysia to strengthen surveillance and its maritime presence. Any response should be guided by assessed risks, not assumptions about Philippine intentions.

Malaysia should neither dismiss Manila’s actions as political theatre nor treat them as evidence of preparations for confrontation. It must respond to the established facts: a formal legal disagreement, an evolving security environment and the need for credible defence capabilities.

The priorities are clear: improve readiness, strengthen surveillance and enforcement in Sabah, protect Malaysia’s legal position, manage fishing incidents, sustain partnerships and ensure defence procurement delivers operational capabilities.

Malaysia must also avoid being drawn into a polarised regional alignment. Its objections to the Philippines must rest on its own legal rights, just as its approach to China must be guided by international law and national interests.

Sovereignty cannot be protected by diplomatic protests alone, nor by military spending without strategy.

The Sabah dispute may remain unresolved for years. Malaysia must ensure it does not become a weakness in the country’s maritime security, strategic autonomy or regional relationships.



The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not represent those of Twentytwo13.

Pinoy's Tarriela’s main job isn’t protecting the waters of Philippines but demonizing the Chinese

 Nury Vittachi

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MUCH LAUGHTER BROKE OUT across Asia as Philippines' water warlord Jay Tarriela “forgot” to mention the nationality of a repulsed vessel in his latest rant.

Sea-tyrant Tarriela’s job is to create friction with Chinese sailors and then blame the victims.

So there was much surprise when he didn’t mention the nationality of the latest ship his people were repelling.

That’s because the vessel turned out to be Vietnamese, not Chinese.

The incident confirmed what everyone already knew. Tarriela’s main job isn’t protecting the waters of the Philippines but playing politics: demonizing the Chinese.

A US study showed that there is now MORE reclamation being done in that part of the sea by the Vietnamese than the Chinese.