OPINION | PAS’s Gambit to Lead Perikatan Nasional — And Why Bersatu May Still Emerge on Top
5 Jan 2026 • 7:00 PM MYT
TheRealNehruism
An award-winning Newswav creator, Bebas News columnist & ex-FMT columnist
Image credit: The Vibes
PAS president Abdul Hadi Awang has now confirmed what many in Malaysian politics had anticipated but few expected to be declared so bluntly: PAS intends to take charge of Perikatan Nasional (PN). Following Muhyiddin Yassin’s resignation as PN chairman effective Jan 1, Hadi announced that a meeting will be held next week to decide on Muhyiddin’s successor, adding that PAS has “many candidates” from among its religious scholars and technocrats.
A meeting will be held with Bersatu. But it is up to Bersatu leaders who resigned from posts in PN whether or not they would like to attend,” he was quoted as saying.
This declaration came in the immediate aftermath of the Perlis political crisis, which exposed deep fissures within PN. Muhyiddin’s resignation triggered a domino effect, with Bersatu leaders stepping down from coalition posts, including Azmin Ali as PN secretary-general and Ahmad Faizal Azumu as Perak PN chairman. The crisis itself saw PAS’s Shukri Ramli resign as menteri besar after eight PN assemblymen withdrew support, paving the way for Bersatu’s Abu Bakar Hamzah to take over.
Against this backdrop, PAS Youth chief Afnan Hamimi openly accused Bersatu of weakness and betrayal, calling for PAS to assume leadership of PN. Soon after, PAS election director Sanusi Nor received the blessing of ulama council chief Ahmad Yahaya to be considered PN chairman, while names like Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man and Terengganu menteri besar Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar were also floated.
On the surface, PAS’s move appears decisive and assertive. In reality, it is fraught with consequences — not least for Bersatu, but also, paradoxically, for PAS itself.
If PAS pushes through with its intention to formally lead PN and relegates Bersatu to subordinate status within the coalition, the biggest beneficiary may well be Umno.
Bersatu’s internal cohesion rests on a single assumption: that it remains the leading Malay party within PN and, someday, a plausible anchor of federal power. The moment PAS decisively destroys that assumption, Bersatu’s raison d’ĂȘtre begins to collapse. Many of its members did not leave Umno to become permanent junior partners in a coalition dominated by PAS. Once Bersatu’s pathway to leadership is foreclosed, defections become inevitable.
Where would these members go? PAS is one option, but Umno is the more natural destination. Ideologically, culturally, and institutionally, Bersatu is far closer to Umno than it is to PAS. A PAS-led PN that sidelines Bersatu risks accelerating an exodus that strengthens Umno — the very party PAS has spent years trying to neutralise.
Worse still for PAS, a hollowed-out Bersatu could force PAS into two unappealing choices: going solo, or reviving Muafakat Nasional with Umno. Neither option is clearly superior to the current arrangement. Umno, unlike Bersatu, sees itself unambiguously as a dominant Malay party. Any revived PAS–Umno alliance would almost certainly place PAS in a far more constrained position than it currently occupies within PN.
There is, of course, a third — and more intriguing — scenario.
If PAS and Umno both cannibalise Bersatu to the point where it becomes politically unsustainable within PN, Bersatu may attempt to survive by crossing over into the unity government, filling the space vacated by Umno should Umno decide to exit and re-align with PAS under a revived Muafakat Nasional. In that scenario, Bersatu’s justification would be that by making the jump, it will no longer be opposition leadership, but junior participation in government power.
This might be an acceptable compromise that will allow Bersatu to continue to exist within the framework of its reason of being.
So in conclusion, to aim to lead Perikan might trigger a high-risk chain reaction that will leave PAS worse of than before, and PAS understands this.
Malaysian politics operates under a peculiar but consistent rule: the strongest party in a coalition often cannot lead without triggering national upheaval. This is why DAP, despite being the most powerful component of Pakatan Harapan, ceded leadership to Anwar Ibrahim. A DAP-led federal government would almost certainly have provoked instability, particularly in Semenanjung.
PAS understands this dynamic as well. That is precisely why it initially ceded PN leadership to Muhyiddin Yassin.
However, for a junior partner to lead a coalition successfully, its leader must possess exceptional strength, charisma, and political fighting spirit. Anwar Ibrahim has fulfilled this role in government. Muhyiddin Yassin, by contrast, failed abysmally in opposition.
Muhyiddin’s lethargic, insipid, and indecisive leadership did not merely fail to correct the unnatural hierarchy within PN — it amplified it. His continued insistence on remaining Bersatu president even after stepping down as PN chairman has made it structurally impossible for Bersatu to offer an alternative leader capable of commanding PAS’s confidence.
Seen in this light, PAS’s declaration that it will lead PN may not be a final decision at all, but a calculated gambit — a pressure tactic designed to force Bersatu’s hand.
The real target may not be Bersatu as a party, but Muhyiddin as its leader.
My prediction is this: PAS’s move is intended to push Bersatu into resolving its leadership crisis. Faced with the prospect of permanent junior status or political irrelevance, Bersatu will be forced to either persuade Muhyiddin to step aside or remove him outright. Should Bersatu replace Muhyiddin with Hamzah Zainuddin — a leader with greater aggression, credibility, and organisational grip — PAS is likely to relent and accept Bersatu’s continued leadership of PN.
That outcome best serves PAS’s interests. A PN led by Bersatu under Hamzah preserves the coalition, prevents Umno from reabsorbing Bersatu defectors wholesale, and allows PAS to continue expanding its representation, territorial control, and institutional influence — all while avoiding the destabilising consequences of overt dominance.
PAS’s other options — going solo or reviving Muafakat Nasional — carry higher risks and fewer guarantees.
In the end, political parties, whether secular or religious, are driven by a single constant: the imperative to win. They may not always be fair, functional, truthful, or selfless — but they are always strategic.
Viewed through that lens, the most likely endgame is not PAS leading PN outright, but Bersatu remaining at the helm under new leadership, with PAS retaining its subordinate — yet highly influential — position within the coalition.
When the dust settles, Perikatan Nasional may look remarkably similar to what it is today — except with Muhyiddin gone, Hamzah ascendant, and PAS satisfied that it has extracted maximum leverage without bearing the full cost of leadership.
If you are Chinese, you must read this article written by n Indian.
