Wong Chin Huat
Published: Mar 14, 2025 1:36 PM
Updated: 5:37 PM
COMMENT | The DAP party election is drawing a great deal of attention, but DAP will remain one of the most stable main parties in Malaysia after the election.
Regardless of the election outcome, there would be no splinter party or migration to another party, as what used to happen between MCA and Gerakan from the 1970s to the 1990s.
DAP is set to face two challenges, which are structural and not caused by leadership style or leaders’ characters as some may try to attribute.
The first is well-known, to be discussed in this column, is how not to be MCA 2.0. The second challenge, almost not discussed in the public, is how to escape “bonzaination”, as DAP might be capped at 40 parliamentary seats from the 16th general election onwards.
MCA in DAP narrative
As the sole main rival of MCA after Gerakan and PPP became part of BN in 1974 and largely remain so even after the emergence of PKR in 1999, DAP has a simple narrative to explain the failures and ineffectiveness of MCA (and Gerakan) in government: betrayal.
It means that MCA (and Gerakan) leaders willingly sold out the interests of Chinese/non-Malays/liberal Malaysians because they were captured by the Umno-controlled system. Ministers were compared to eunuchs (for having no balls) in the imperial courts, who were addressed as Gong-Gong (grandfather and incidentally, “Datuk”).
Enjoying the ministerial power and perks was the original sin of MCA (and Gerakan) senior leaders when in contrast with DAP top leaders like Lim Kit Siang, Karpal Singh and Lim Guan Eng who endured ISA detention or imprisonment.
Published: Mar 14, 2025 1:36 PM
Updated: 5:37 PM
COMMENT | The DAP party election is drawing a great deal of attention, but DAP will remain one of the most stable main parties in Malaysia after the election.
Regardless of the election outcome, there would be no splinter party or migration to another party, as what used to happen between MCA and Gerakan from the 1970s to the 1990s.
DAP is set to face two challenges, which are structural and not caused by leadership style or leaders’ characters as some may try to attribute.
The first is well-known, to be discussed in this column, is how not to be MCA 2.0. The second challenge, almost not discussed in the public, is how to escape “bonzaination”, as DAP might be capped at 40 parliamentary seats from the 16th general election onwards.
MCA in DAP narrative
As the sole main rival of MCA after Gerakan and PPP became part of BN in 1974 and largely remain so even after the emergence of PKR in 1999, DAP has a simple narrative to explain the failures and ineffectiveness of MCA (and Gerakan) in government: betrayal.
It means that MCA (and Gerakan) leaders willingly sold out the interests of Chinese/non-Malays/liberal Malaysians because they were captured by the Umno-controlled system. Ministers were compared to eunuchs (for having no balls) in the imperial courts, who were addressed as Gong-Gong (grandfather and incidentally, “Datuk”).
Enjoying the ministerial power and perks was the original sin of MCA (and Gerakan) senior leaders when in contrast with DAP top leaders like Lim Kit Siang, Karpal Singh and Lim Guan Eng who endured ISA detention or imprisonment.
DAP veteran Lim Kit Siang
The strongest contrast came in the 1987 Ops Lalang not long after leaders of Chinese parties and NGOs protested in an indoor gathering in Tianhou Temple against then-education minister Anwar Ibrahim’s controversial decision to place headmasters and senior assistants with no Chinese proficiency at Chinese schools.
Leaders of Dong Jiao Zong, DAP and even Gerakan were detained but the outspoken MCA’s then-minister Lee Kim Sai flew to Australia.
Of all the offices held by MCA ministers and deputy ministers, the most unenviable job was that of the deputy education minister.
The deputy minister was tasked to protect Chinese education against erosion by Malay nationalists who dominated the ministry from the minister’s office to departments at various levels. When he failed as Umno’s linguistic nationalism agenda triumphed, MCA bore the brunt.
MCA was constantly caught in the trap of how to do two incompatible jobs: getting support for the Umno-led ruling coalition and in exchange, keeping Umno’s game at bay. Of Umno’s 13 former and existent allies, only one party could do that: Sarawak’s Muslim-led Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu Sarawak (PBB). In MCA’s defence, MCA’s long-term decline was very much Umno’s own doing.
Of course, power abuse and corruption involving MCA leaders from ministers like Ling Liong Sik and Chan Kwong Choy to local warlords made more convincing the narrative that MCA was a community sell-out. As Umno weakened after 2008, the instrumental value of MCA as the Chinese community’s agent in the government quickly diminished.
Landing in an MCA-like situation
Within three elections from 2008 to 2018, DAP replaced MCA as the largest Chinese-based party and the community’s representative in the government.
Compared to MCA, DAP’s more competent and dynamic leadership - also relatively less captured by business interests - made the Chinese voters more understanding of and generous towards DAP’s shortcomings, an often complaint of double-standard by MCA leaders and supporters.
The strongest contrast came in the 1987 Ops Lalang not long after leaders of Chinese parties and NGOs protested in an indoor gathering in Tianhou Temple against then-education minister Anwar Ibrahim’s controversial decision to place headmasters and senior assistants with no Chinese proficiency at Chinese schools.
Leaders of Dong Jiao Zong, DAP and even Gerakan were detained but the outspoken MCA’s then-minister Lee Kim Sai flew to Australia.
Of all the offices held by MCA ministers and deputy ministers, the most unenviable job was that of the deputy education minister.
The deputy minister was tasked to protect Chinese education against erosion by Malay nationalists who dominated the ministry from the minister’s office to departments at various levels. When he failed as Umno’s linguistic nationalism agenda triumphed, MCA bore the brunt.
MCA was constantly caught in the trap of how to do two incompatible jobs: getting support for the Umno-led ruling coalition and in exchange, keeping Umno’s game at bay. Of Umno’s 13 former and existent allies, only one party could do that: Sarawak’s Muslim-led Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu Sarawak (PBB). In MCA’s defence, MCA’s long-term decline was very much Umno’s own doing.
Of course, power abuse and corruption involving MCA leaders from ministers like Ling Liong Sik and Chan Kwong Choy to local warlords made more convincing the narrative that MCA was a community sell-out. As Umno weakened after 2008, the instrumental value of MCA as the Chinese community’s agent in the government quickly diminished.
Landing in an MCA-like situation
Within three elections from 2008 to 2018, DAP replaced MCA as the largest Chinese-based party and the community’s representative in the government.
Compared to MCA, DAP’s more competent and dynamic leadership - also relatively less captured by business interests - made the Chinese voters more understanding of and generous towards DAP’s shortcomings, an often complaint of double-standard by MCA leaders and supporters.
However, after 2018, DAP soon found itself in an MCA-like situation. Bersatu felt the need to weaken DAP to fend off attacks by Umno and PAS that the government it led was dominated by DAP. DAP’s inexperience in dealing with federal civil servants helped its enemies to paint it as a threat to Malays and Islam.
Under its new leadership, when DAP joined the federal government for the second time, it was much more lowkey and diplomatic. In fact, it started with an announced readiness to stay out of the cabinet if that was necessary for Anwar to become prime minister.
Unlike Dr Mahathir Mohamad, Anwar does not feel the same need to weaken and control DAP. Even senior leaders of Umno like Ahmad Zahid Hamidi appreciated DAP’s accommodation for the Madani government’s survival.
However, no matter how diplomatic and conflict-averse DAP opts to be, DAP would remain the bogeyman for the Malay-based opposition - now PN - and second-liner Umno leaders like Dr Akmal Salleh.
By portraying DAP as an existential threat to the Malays and Islam, competition for the Malay votes - which decides the survival and prospect of Umno, PAS, Bersatu and PKR - becomes a no brainer-game in which policies, competence and integrity are irrelevant - Who is tougher towards or more powerful over DAP and the non-Malays?
And this is how DAP finds itself boxed in an MCA-like situation. If it fights back on every quarrel, the Madani government will fall as per the wish of PN and Akmal. If it does not, it looks just like an MCA 2.0.
The ‘minority-based No 2 party’ trap
Calling this simply “race and religion politics” at work risks missing the complexity and nuances in the structural traps faced by the largest party supported by the Chinese/non-Malays, whether that is MCA, DAP or any other party label.
Such a party can be framed as an existential threat to the Malays in two ways. First, the largest “anti-establishment party”, the most convenient reference in Malay politics was the communists, which was erroneously yet deliberately used on the pro-market DAP for this reason.
Second, the second largest party in the government that makes Malay leaders its puppets.
From Gagasan Rakyat-APU (1990-1995), Barisan Alternatif (effectively 1999-2001), Pakatan Rakyat (2008-2015) to Pakatan Harapan (since 2015), DAP tried its best to mellow its stand from Malaysian Malaysia to Malaysia First to simply not highlighting it.
It succeeded in escaping the first demonising label, only to find itself stuck with the second demonising label after 2018.
Was there ever a successful example of a minority-based No 2 government party? Yes, at the regional level, Sarawak’s United Peoples’ Party (SUPP) which represented Chinese and Bidayuh.
SUPP was an effective minority representative in the PBB-dominated state government until 2006 when then-chief minister Taib Mahmud’s corruption went too far to push the Chinese voters towards DAP. (It was a different game for Gerakan, which was the largest state government party in Penang incrementally weakened by Umno with MCA as a tool.)
Why could PBB be so nice that it did not see SUPP as a threat like Mahathir saw the resurgent MCA under Lee Sam Choon in 1982? Sarawak’s more harmonious ethnic relations aside, PBB was not threatened by another Muslim-based party championing nationalism.
In fact, Taib secured a shrewd deal with both Mahathir and Sarawakian voters: as long as Sarawak BN delivered the seats for Kuala Lumpur, Kuching would be left untouched; and as long as Umno could be kept out, Sarawakians would tolerate Taib’s corruption.
The second part of the deal was broken in 2006 but largely restored after 2014 under Adenan Satem and now Abang Johari Openg.
DAP’s way-out
Unfortunately for DAP, it would never have the luck of SUPP from 1970 to 2006. If the first party in government is Umno, Bersatu or PAS, it would feel the need to weaken DAP. Even PKR feels the pressure to act tough and uncompromising when its power can be threatened by Umno, Bersatu or PAS. And if Bersatu or PAS joins a PKR-led government, DAP would be simply dispensable.
Ultimately, DAP would be forced to accept its gradual weakening or return to the opposition bench, a choice to which half of the Chinese community would not agree. Contrary to some wishes, DAP won’t be able to get out of this trap by getting more outspoken leaders or employing some Trump-style negotiation tactics.
DAP’s only way out is structural: helping Malaysia to leave “zero-sum game” politics. This is possible albeit time-consuming and I will elaborate tomorrow.
WONG CHIN HUAT is a political scientist at Sunway University and a member of Project Stability and Accountability for Malaysia (Projek Sama). He believes that politicians can be men’s and women’s best friends given the right House training.
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