RMAF forced to pivot as sanctions threaten to derail Su-57 MRCA plan; enter the Gripen?

By Haris Hussain

November 21, 2025
3:13 pm


RMAF forced to pivot as sanctions threaten to derail Su-57 MRCA plan; enter the Gripen?





Malaysia’s push to field a new generation of fighters for the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) has hit a sudden snag – and it has nothing to do with engines, airframes, or budgets. It is geopolitics; more specifically, Washington’s.



The recent Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) between Malaysia and the United States was meant to ease tariffs and open new economic avenues. Instead, clauses within its fine print now threaten to complicate any defence acquisition involving sanctioned countries. Several of these clauses mirror restrictions under the US Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), particularly Section 231, which allows Washington to penalise nations that conduct significant transactions with Russia’s defence sector.



Defence planners say these provisions give the US the ability to flag, stall, or even block Malaysian procurement programmes involving Russian suppliers. This places the long-discussed Sukhoi Su-57 Felon purchase squarely in the ‘kill’ zone. Any move involving a sanctioned Russian design bureau or manufacturer could trigger punitive measures, including the suspension of trade privileges Malaysia had just negotiated.

“It puts us in a very tight spot,” said one official familiar with the discussions. “If we proceed, we risk sanctions. If we don’t, we open a capability gap we’ve been trying to close for years.”

The fallout is already being felt. The RMAF’s MRCA timeline – initially framed around first deliveries by 2028 – is now being quietly relooked. A more realistic window may be 2030–2035, effectively delaying the programme by up to seven years. It buys Malaysia time to navigate the diplomatic minefield but leaves the air force without a top-end fighter replacement in the near term. That gap now needs filling.

The FA-50M Light Combat Aircraft programme, at least on paper, remains on firmer footing. The first four aircraft from Korea Aerospace Industries are due in October 2026, with the remaining 14 scheduled to arrive by end-2027. The RMAF will also be the first operator to field the Block 20 version, complete with air-to-air refuelling capability, strengthened hardpoints, a tougher airframe, and the option of advanced AESA radars such as the AN/APG-83, AN/APG-79(V)4, Raytheon PhantomStrike, or South Korea’s indigenous Hanwha sets. With BVR capability on the cards, the FA-50M becomes a credible light fighter and an effective Fighter Lead-In Trainer (FLIT) platform.

Even so, it cannot carry the entire load. It is by no means an MRCA.

“It’s a good aircraft for what it is, but it won’t replace an MRCA,” said a defence analyst. “We still need something for the medium-to-high end of the spectrum.”

This is where Sweden’s Saab JAS-39 Gripen E/F has rejoined the fight.

The Gripen has long been viewed as a smart, efficient solution for smaller air forces, consistently punching above its weight class. The new E/F variant builds on that with a more powerful General Electric F-414G engine, increased internal fuel, a state-of-the-art AESA radar (the ES-05 Raven built by Leonardo), the Skyward-G infra-red search and track (IRST) system, enhanced electronic warfare architecture, and additional hardpoints. It is designed for high sortie rates, dispersed operations, and ease of maintenance – all areas that resonate with RMAF planners. Sources tell Twentytwo13 that the RMAF is looking at a fleet of possibly 16 to 18 airframes to fill the gap and supplement the FA-50Ms.



The Gripen F, the two-seat version, is particularly attractive. The rear cockpit is fully missionised, allowing it to serve in the FLIT role and as a dual-seat combat aircraft capable of air-to-air, interdiction, anti-shipping, air-to-ground, suppression of enemy air defences, and defensive and offensive counter-air missions. It gives the RMAF the flexibility it needs at a time when its long-term MRCA path is clouded by geopolitics.

Operationally, the Gripen has seen service in NATO missions and multinational exercises, with operators consistently highlighting its reliability and low operating costs. For Malaysia, which must balance capability with sustainability, that counts for a great deal.


Before the Gripen re-emerged as an option, planners had hoped that acquiring ex-Kuwaiti F/A-18C/D Hornets would buy the RMAF some time. But that possibility now looks increasingly unlikely – and not just because of US politics.

Kuwait’s own force modernisation programme has slipped badly. The Kuwaitis ordered 28 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to replace their ageing C/D fleet, but delays in US production, testing, and certification have repeatedly pushed the delivery schedule to the right. Initial batches that were supposed to arrive as early as 2021 have not, instead being diverted to the US Navy as attrition replacements for its own Rhino fleet. This has forced Kuwait to extend the service life of its legacy Hornets.

Because the new jets have not yet arrived, the Kuwait Air Force cannot retire its older Hornet fleet. Defence insiders say the Kuwaitis may only achieve full operational capability with the Super Hornets around 2026 or 2027. But even that is not yet firm. Until then, releasing any C/D airframes – let alone the 24 to 33 Malaysia is eyeing – is virtually impossible.

Even if the aircraft eventually become available, the deal still requires US sign-off. With President Donald Trump back in office, approval has not moved. Analysts say the delay may be linked to Malaysia’s BRICS alignment, though others argue the issue is more practical: supportability. The US Marine Corps will retire its final C/D Hornets by 2030. Once that happens, spares will dry up, costs will rise, and serviceability will drop sharply.

“You might only get five to 10 years out of them. After that, it becomes a money pit,” said one analyst.



This shifts the calculus. Instead of splitting resources between a stalled Hornet buy and a delayed MRCA, some argue that redirecting funds into a sustainable interim solution – such as a Gripen E/F-based fleet – may offer better operational value.

With the ART complicating Russian procurement, the Kuwaiti Hornet deal slipping out of reach, and the MRCA programme sliding down the calendar, the RMAF is being pushed into a forced pivot. Not because of its own planning, but because of the shifting strategic and industrial landscape around it.

And in that reshuffle, the Gripen – once viewed as an outsider – has moved into a far more interesting position.