MCA Pouring Fuel on a Burning UMNO–DAP Relationship

OPINION | MCA Pouring Fuel on a Burning UMNO–DAP Relationship


31 Dec 2025 • 5:00 PM MYT


TheRealNehruism
An award-winning Newswav creator, Bebas News columnist & ex-FMT columnist

Image credit: Sinar Daily / Utusan / Focus Malaysia


Politics, according to Clausewitz, is war by other means. And war, as history repeatedly reminds us, is the highest and most unforgiving form of competition—one in which victory is rarely shared and survival often comes at another’s expense.


In any contest, for one side to win, another must lose. In politics and war alike, success is frequently built on the weakening, humiliation, or destruction of an opponent.


Nowhere is this logic clearer than in Malaysian Chinese politics, the long-contested arena between MCA and DAP. For decades, MCA dominated this space, shielded and empowered by its alliance with a strong UMNO under Barisan Nasional. DAP, during that era, was the perennial challenger—loud, persistent, but locked out of real power.


That historical balance has since collapsed. Over the past decade, fortune has turned decisively in DAP’s favour. Election after election, DAP has expanded its dominance, while MCA has endured defeat after defeat, shrinking to the margins of political relevance. Today, MCA faces a nightmare scenario: not only losing elections, but potentially losing UMNO itself—its long-time patron and protector.


Even more alarming for MCA is the emerging possibility of an UMNO–DAP accommodation. What once seemed politically impossible now looks conceivable. Should MCA drift further into irrelevance or exit BN altogether, UMNO and DAP could find common cause, formal or informal, leaving MCA politically orphaned.


Faced with this existential threat, MCA has been watching closely for opportunities. This December, it believes it has found two.


The first is DAP’s disappointing performance in the Sabah state election, which reignited the party’s pressure for the recognition of the Unified Examination Certificate (UEC)—a demand that predictably inflamed UMNO’s sensitivities.


The second is Najib Razak’s legal setback, when the High Court dismissed his judicial review application related to house arrest in the SRC International case. While Najib’s conviction is a matter of law, the political fallout has been shaped by perception—particularly the reaction of DAP leaders.


DAP Puchong MP Yeo Bee Yin’s Facebook post describing the court decision as “another reason to celebrate this year end” struck a nerve within UMNO. Senior UMNO figures, including secretary-general Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki, openly questioned whether the party should continue cooperating with partners who showed such “arrogance and insensitivity”.


This simmering anger recently boiled over when UMNO Puchong announced it was severing ties with Pakatan Harapan in the Puchong parliamentary area, citing Yeo’s refusal to apologise within a given timeframe.


Enter MCA.


Rather than calming tensions, MCA chose to escalate them. Former MCA vice-president Ti Lian Ker publicly mocked UMNO Puchong’s move as “toothless”, deriding it as nothing more than “purring like a house cat”. According to Ti, the divisional boycott was politically irrelevant, changing nothing at the federal or state level and doing absolutely nothing to weaken DAP’s grip on Puchong.


According to Ti , UMNO should not “roar like a tiger in Kuala Lumpur and then whimper at the division level”.


He said Asyraf had “thundered” with his warning that Umno would not tolerate arrogance and insensitivity.


“That was the language of confrontation. That was chest-thumping. That was a political roar.


“So here’s the question: after roaring like a tiger at the national level, why is Puchong Umno left purring like a house cat?” Ti said to pour petrol on the flame that is burning the UMNO- DAP relationship.


Ti pointed out—accurately—that Yeo Bee Yin won Puchong with a staggering 57,957-vote majority. Cutting ties at the divisional level, he argued, only made DAP look untouchable and UMNO look weak, reactive, and powerless.


His message was clear: if UMNO is serious, it must act nationally, and challenged UMNO to match its national rhetoric with real action.


This was not commentary. It was provocation.


MCA sees a spark—and it wants to turn it into a fire that burns down any budding UMNO–DAP rapprochement. By ridiculing UMNO’s half-measures, MCA is daring UMNO to escalate the conflict, to sever ties more decisively, and in doing so, push DAP further away.


This is politics as war.


For decades, a powerful MCA backed by an even more powerful UMNO did everything it could to bring DAP to its knees. Now that DAP stands ascendant and likely intent on doing to MCA what MCA had done to it previously, it would be naïve to think that MCA will quietly accept its own marginalisation. To survive, MCA must weaken DAP’s alliances—particularly with UMNO and PKR.


At present, MCA sees a narrow opening. If it can help unravel UMNO’s relationship with DAP, it may simultaneously weaken its rival and rebuild its own relevance to UMNO. Killing two birds with one stone is not just desirable—it is necessary.


Whether MCA has the political skill to pull this off remains to be seen.


UMNO and DAP are not naïve players. Both understand exactly what MCA is trying to do. But politics is not about preserving relationships; it is about winning power. If UMNO, DAP, or both conclude that their cooperation no longer improves their electoral prospects, they will look for a reason—any reason—to walk away.


In that context, MCA’s mocking may serve a useful function. Not as a cause, but as an excuse.


If MCA, UMNO, and DAP all find pathways to winning by burning the UMNO–DAP relationship, then the obvious question arises: who loses?


The most likely answer is Anwar Ibrahim and the Madani government.


An escalation between UMNO and DAP threatens the stability of the governing coalition and, by extension, Anwar's own place in Putrajaya itself.


If Anwar intervenes however, he risks having to make painful concessions to either or both sides, at his expense. If he does not intervene, on the other hand, tthe bickering could spiral, costing the government its coherence—and possibly its majority.


Either way, Anwar appears set to lose. The only question is whether he loses big or loses small.


But politics, once again, is war. And Anwar is not a minor combatant. He is the biggest fish in the Malaysian political pond. If UMNO and DAP believe they have trapped him into choosing between two losses, they may be gravely mistaken.


If past experience is any guide, Anwar will find a way to flip the board—turning his supposed dilemma into a choice between winning big or winning small, while forcing UMNO, DAP, MCA—or some combination of them—to swallow defeat so that he may taste victory.


For now, the fuel has been poured, the fire is burning, and all that remains is to see how the cookies crumble.