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[1] Malaysia’s politics has entered another period of uneasy flux. Across the aisle and within the government itself, alliances are fraying, loyalties are shifting, and long-suppressed tensions are surfacing. The opposition Perikatan Nasional appears to be coming apart at the seams, even as the unity government struggles to contain its own contradictions. What we are witnessing is not a passing wobble, but a deeper reckoning with a political order that no longer fits the realities of a fractured, post-2018 Malaysia.

[2] At the centre of the opposition’s troubles is Bersatu — weak, divided and rudderless. The party has been ailing for some time, and few expect it to survive the next general election in its current form. Its move against the Perlis Menteri Besar, a senior PAS leader, may have shattered what little trust remained between the two parties. 

[3] A weak opposition should be good news for the unity government, but it too is riven with tension and disillusionment. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s push to shore up support among the Malay-Muslim electorate has not only failed to deliver the gains he hoped for but has also alienated segments of his non-Malay base. Promises of reform — on the cost of living or the fight against corruption — have steadily given way to frustration and fatigue.

[4] UMNO, for its part, has been unable to leverage its formidable presence in cabinet — courtesy of Anwar — to reclaim its former standing among Malay voters. Continued cooperation with DAP remains a source of deep unease within the party. Meanwhile, party President Zahid Hamidi, never particularly popular even within his own ranks, is forced to constantly watch his back.

[5] DAP is facing pressures of its own. Anthony Loke’s strategy of quiet cooperation has failed to yield the political dividends many supporters expected. Anwar has offered little more than rhetorical reassurance while resisting substantive concessions. As a result, DAP is increasingly perceived — fairly or not — as weak and overly accommodating.

[6] Amanah, meanwhile, fears being rendered expendable altogether, particularly if Anwar were to strike a tactical accommodation with PAS that leaves it isolated.

[7] In short, none of the peninsula-based parties appear satisfied with their current position. UMNO leaders have openly threatened to withdraw from the government. DAP has warned that it may reconsider its participation if reforms continue to be delayed or diluted. PAS, for its part, is calling for a revival of Muafakat Nasional with UMNO — a telling sign of its growing estrangement from Bersatu.

[8] Yet this instability is not necessarily a bad thing. It confirms that the 2018 general election irretrievably shattered the old political framework built around a single dominant party. Coalition politics are no longer an aberration; they are the new and unavoidable norm.

[9] Coalitions, however, demand negotiation, accommodation and compromise. They require Malay and non-Malay, religious and secular parties to work together to forge arrangements capable of sustaining stable governments. If PAS hopes to form the federal government, it will have to make meaningful concessions to minorities. Likewise, if Anwar wishes to remain prime minister, he must manage — far more deftly than he has so far — the competing expectations of both Malays and non-Malays.

[10] There will inevitably be renewed calls for an exclusively Malay-Muslim coalition. History suggests such unity is simply not sustainable. Not even persistent claims that Malays are under existential threat have been enough to overcome rivalries, distrust and personal ambition. Non-Malays, too, remain fragmented despite shared anxieties about the Islamic agenda.

[11] Given these realities, engagement across political and communal lines is unavoidable. Hard bargaining lies ahead as parties seek more workable coalitions, with each community demanding credible assurances that its core interests will be protected. It should allow the DAP, for example, to use its parliamentary strength to represent non-Malay interests more effectively. 

[12] This is, arguably, what the country’s founding leaders envisaged when they crafted the independence compact — a system built on negotiation and mutual accommodation, balancing for example Malay privileges with non-Malay rights or honouring Islam’s position within a multireligious polity. In a sense, political will be more transactional than aspirational. 

[13] That momentum was abruptly derailed by May 13, which replaced consultation and compromise with the rigid doctrine of Ketuanan Melayu. The choice facing today’s political leaders is therefore stark: persist with zero-sum ethnic politics and perpetual instability, or rebuild coalitions grounded in genuine consensus and respect for diversity. If they choose the latter, Malaysia may yet reclaim the promise of the multiethnic, multireligious nation it set out to be.

[Dennis Ignatius | Kuala Lumpur | 4th January 2026]