Border diplomacy, backdoor politics: What the Thai-Cambodian leaked call really reveals — Phar Kim Beng

Border diplomacy, backdoor politics: What the Thai-Cambodian leaked call really reveals — Phar Kim Beng



Sunday, 06 Jul 2025 7:00 AM MYT


JULY 6 — The leaked phone call between Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen — now President of the Cambodian Senate — has thrown regional diplomacy into the spotlight for all the wrong reasons.

What was intended as a private overture of trust between two ruling families has escalated into a diplomatic and political firestorm.

But beyond the theatrics, the content of the call revealed strategic anxieties and aspirations on both sides — ones that speak volumes about where Asean’s fault lines may widen next.

What Cambodia really wants


The first half of the audio, as released and now transcribed by multiple international outlets, shows Hun Sen playing the role of a concerned elder statesman — but one armed with a clear agenda. Cambodia’s key demands are fourfold:


1. Strategic sympathy, not nationalist posturing

Cambodia clearly wants Thailand to refrain from letting domestic nationalist sentiment shape its foreign policy. When Paetongtarn pleaded, “Please don’t listen to the hardliners,” she was echoing Phnom Penh’s discomfort with hawkish Thai military voices pushing for a more aggressive stance over the border dispute. Hun Sen, by extension, wanted reassurance that Paetongtarn could control these elements — or at least neutralise them diplomatically.


2. Avenue for quiet diplomacy

Cambodia sought to shift the tension from the public square to quiet bilateral channels. Rather than letting the Thai Parliament, Thai Army, or even Asean intervene too loudly, Cambodia favoured a more personal, familial form of diplomacy that would yield faster, more controllable outcomes.

3. Prevention of escalation to the ICJ

Although Cambodia hinted it could bring the border issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), that move was primarily rhetorical. In truth, Phnom Penh would prefer Thailand to reach a consensus informally — leveraging personal relations rather than risking a lengthy legal entanglement that could further internationalise the dispute.

4. Preservation of Cambodian economic interests

Underneath the discussion of border posts lies a more practical concern: Cambodia’s investments and access routes through the Thai-Cambodian border regions. The friction jeopardised both cross-border trade and Chinese infrastructure projects that connect through Cambodian territory. Cambodia sought guarantees that these would not be impacted by Thai military posturing.



Thailand’s Minister of Culture Paetongtarn Shinawatra reacts as she walks out from a cabinet meeting, after Thailand's Constitutional Court suspended her from duty as prime minister pending a case seeking her dismissal, at Government House in Bangkok, Thailand, July 3, 2025. — Reuters pic



What Thailand — or more precisely, Paetongtarn — wanted

The other side of the conversation is arguably more revealing, not least because Paetongtarn spoke with an air of vulnerability. Her words — “Please have some sympathy for me... I’m doing my best,” — were not just a diplomatic appeal. They were the voice of a young leader navigating a labyrinth of old power structures.

1. Shield from the military establishment

Since taking office, Paetongtarn has faced scepticism and even subversion from elements within the Thai military — some of whom maintain closer ties to the royalist establishment and still view the Shinawatras as populist threats. The call shows she attempted to use Cambodian support to counterbalance these internal forces. It was not so much a betrayal of national interest as it was a desperate attempt to reframe her authority on her own terms.

2. Soft handling of border issues

Rather than allow the situation to escalate publicly or militarily, Paetongtarn wanted to create a parallel backchannel to Hun Sen, enabling both countries to quietly dial down the temperature. Her repeated reassurance — “Whatever you need, let me know and I’ll take care of it” — was not capitulation, but calculation. She wanted to preserve Asean unity without inflaming Thai nationalism.

3. Time to consolidate power

Above all, the Prime Minister seemed to want breathing space. With her father Thaksin’s influence still viewed suspiciously by Thailand’s conservative elite, and her own mandate resting on a coalition that is uneasy at best, the call was an effort to buy time — to slow the pace of external crises while she stabilised internal politics.

The fallout: From whisper to whiplash

Yet, the very act of making that call — let alone having it leaked — backfired spectacularly. Thai nationalists and royalists swiftly accused her of undermining national sovereignty, and the military’s public posture hardened. The suspension of Prime Minister Paetongtarn on grounds of “breach of national security” now seems less a legal outcome than a political coup in slow motion.

For Cambodia, the leak is both a warning and an opportunity. On the one hand, it signals that attempts at private diplomacy can be easily weaponised. On the other, it shows how fragile Thailand’s civil-military relations are — potentially allowing Cambodia and other foreign actors to exploit the vacuum should Paetongtarn be ousted.

Asean’s structural weakness, again exposed

At a deeper level, the call exposes Asean’s structural dilemma. With no formal conflict-resolution mechanism and with its cherished principle of “non-interference” often limiting multilateral intervention, Asean becomes vulnerable to personalist diplomacy and internal sabotage. When bilateral disputes like this emerge, there is no arbiter. And when such disputes are leaked, they can unravel a government overnight.

A cautionary tale

The lesson from this saga is not that diplomacy should avoid personal channels. It is that backchannel diplomacy must be supported by institutional trust and political stability — neither of which Thailand currently enjoys. Cambodia may have overplayed its hand in trying to extract concessions through the Shinawatra lineage. Paetongtarn, in turn, underestimated how deeply her own bureaucracy would resent foreign influence — especially from an old ally with a reputation for cunning like Hun Sen.

As the dust settles, Asean must finally reckon with the reality that family politics cannot substitute for multilateral frameworks. And leaders, no matter how close or seasoned, must never forget that in diplomacy — as in politics — what is whispered today can be weaponised tomorrow.

* Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is the Director of the Institute of Internationalization and Asean Studies (IINTAS) at IIUM.